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ABSTRACT
Demonstratives, Indexicals, and Tensed
Attributions of Belief
February, 1982
Mark Richard, B.A., Hamilton College
M.A., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Edmund L. Gettier, III
Sentences of natural languages are often said to express pro-
positions (abstract entities which are objects of belief) and to have
meanings (abstract entities which are what are 'grasped' by speakers
when they understand a sentence). This work is about the nature of such
entities and their role in an account of the truth conditions of tensed
attributions of belief containing demonstratives and indexicals.
In Chapter I, I discuss the temporal properties of propositions.
Two views concerning the temporal properties of proposi tions— temporal ism
and eternal ism—are characterized; eternalism is defended as the correct
view. I show that the temporal ist cannot give adequate truth conditions
for tensed attributions of belief, and, in addition, that criticisms of
eternalism made by David Kaplan are unfounded. I also show that, given
the truth of eternalism, Kaplan's identification of sentence meaning
with character must be rejected.
Chapter II takes, as its point of departure, Kaplan's work on demon-
stratives. An account of the semantical properties of demonstratives
and indexicals is presented, one based upon Kaplan's account, but modified
in the light of the results of Chapter I. It is then argued, on the
v
basis of this account, that the usual truth conditions accorded to
attributions of belief are incorrect: I argue that an attribution of
belief is not true sjmplj/ if the person to whom belief is attributed
believes the proposition expressed by the sentence used to attribute
bel i ef
.
In Chapter III, two recent attempts to deal with the problems
raised in Chapter II are considered: The semantics for attributions of
belief suggested by Robert Stalnaker and Bas C. van Fraassen. On
Stalnaker's and van Fraassen's views, in attributing belief to a person
u using a sentence S, we sometimes do not attribute to u a belief in the
proposition expressed by S, but in some other proposition. Both accounts
are shown to be unacceptable.
Finally, in Chapter IV, a solution to the problems raised in Chapter
II is proposed. I suggest that not only the proposition expressed by
a sentence S, but the meaning of S, is involved in truth conditions for
attributions of belief containing S. The work concludes with a formal
development of this proposal.
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CHAPTER I
ETERNAL ISM AND TEMPORALISM
It is often held that sentences bear a relation of expressing to
members of a class of abstract objects, usually dubbed propositions
.
The relation of expressing, and the objects which are expressed by
sentences, are used in accounts of the conditions under which sentences
are true or false, and in accounts of when a sentence expresses a
person's belief.
A not untypical account of this sort procedes as follows: The
expresses relation is said to hold between sentence tokens (or utter-
ances, or sentences in a context) and propositions; a token is under-
stood to express at most one proposition at a time. We then say that
a sentence token S is true iff there is a p such that S expresses p and
p is true. A sentence token S expresses a belief of a person u just in
case there is a p such that S expresses p and u believes p. Such an
account takes the entities expressed by sentences to be both the bearers
of truth and the objects of belief associated with sentences.
Philosophers may agree about this much and yet disagree over the
nature of propositions. Notable among such disagreements is one con-
cerning the temporal properties of propositions expressed by sentences
of languages such as English. Given the sort of account outlined above,
there seem to be but two views concerning the temporal properties of
propositions that one could hold. First of all, one could say that all
sentences of English are such that, if they express a proposition relative
1
2to a time t, then they express (relative to t) a proposition which
cannot change truth value over time. Let us call this view eternalism
.
The other view, that at least some sentences of English express pro-
positions which can change truth value over time, we will call temporal ism
.
A number of philosophers appear to subscribe to temporalism.
David Kaplan
,
1
for example, argues that (some of) the bearers of truth
and falsity which are associated with sentences must be such that they
can change truth value over time; he then identifies these objects with
the objects of belief. Richard Montague2 and A. N. Prior3 have also
expressed views which are most naturally interpreted as temporal ist.
In this chapter, I argue that eternalism is preferrable to tempor-
alism. I procede as follows. In section I, I characterize eternalism
and temporalism. I then present my principle argument against temporal-
ism. I argue that temporalism cannot provide an adequate account of
attributions of belief, while eternalism can. In section II, I consider
defenses of temporalism against the argument advanced in section I. In
section III, I explain an alternative to temporalism which is not
vulnerable to the argument presented in section I. I show that this
version of temporalism does not seem to be such that it can be defended
by appeal to traditional arguments for temporalism. In section IV, I
defend eternalism against the objection that it is inconsistent with
the picture of the semantics of tensed English given to us by Priorean
tense logic. Finally, in section V, I formalize the argument of section
I, using results on alternative semantics for tense logics obtained in
section IV. I conclude that our investigations show that, on balance,
eternalism is preferable to temporalism.
3I. An Argument Against Temporal ism
The difference between eternalism and temporalism comes out quite
clearly when one considers the eternalist and temporalist views of
sentences such as
(1) Nixon is president.
Of such a sentence, which contains neither demonstratives nor indexicals,
the temporalist would say that there is a proposition p such that, rela-
tive to any time, (1) expresses p. Consequently, the temporalist
reasons, what is expressed by a sentence such as (1) may change truth
value over time. For (1) expressed a truth in 1971, but does not express
a truth today.
The eternalist views matters differently. Holding that what is
expressed by a sentence is something which cannot change truth value
over time, the eternalist reasons that (1) must express different pro-
positions at different times. For (1) expresses a truth at some times,
but a falsehood at others.
According to the eternalist, a sentence such as (1) contains an
implicit reference to a time. (1), as English speakers use it, is
elliptical for (or, at least, expresses the same proposition at a time
t as)
(2) Nixon is now president.
(2), relative to a time t, expresses an eternal proposition, one that
is true at a world w iff Nixon, at t in w, is president. I will suppose
that the temporalist would agree with the eternalist that (2), relative
to any time, expresses an eternal proposition.
4So differ the eternalist and the temporal ist. I'll now argue that
the temporal ist is unable to give an adequate treatment of attributions
of belief. Let us begin by supposing that the temporal ist accepts the
following (restricted) truth conditions for attributions of belief:
Let a be a singular term which is neither a demonstrative
nor an indexical (and does not contain such); let $ be a
sentence containing neither demonstratives nor indexicals.
Then fa believes that <jTI is true at a time t iff the
denotatum of a (at t) believes the proposition expressed
by <j> (at t).
In discussing the temporal ist position, we will confine our attention
to sentences which are free of indexicals and demonstratives. Given
this, we may, in discussing temporal ism, adopt the convention of naming
the proposition expressed by a sentence S by bracketing S. He can then
represent the temporal ist truth conditions for sentences such as
(3) Mary believes that Nixon is president
as follows. (3) expresses a truth at a time t just in case
(3 1 ) (3p)(p = [Pn] & Bmpt)
That is, just in case, at t, Mary believes the temporal proposition that
Nixon is president.
What of attributions of belief in tenses other than the simple
present? Let us confine our attention to attributions of belief in the
simple past tense, such as
(4) Mary believed that Nixon was president.
(4) is used to report that, at some time t' in the past, Mary had a
belief, expressible at t
' ,
using the sentence "Nixon is president". The
5temporalist holds that this is the case iff, at some time in the past,
Mary believed the temporal proposition that Nixon is president. Thus,
for the temporalist, (4) is true at a time t exactly in case
< 4 ') (3t')(3p)(t > f 8 p = [p n ] 8 Bmpt 1 )
Note that the temporalist must give such truth conditions to (4). For
the temporalist holds that the sentence "Nixon is president" expresses,
at every time, the same temporal proposition. Sentence (4) is true if
and only if Mary once had a belief correctly expressible, at the time
of her belief, with a sentence expressing this proposition. But one has
a belief correctly expressible using a sentence expressino a proposition
p iff one believes p. Thus, (4) is true, according to the temporalist,
exactly if Mary believed the temporal proposition that Nixon is president
Now, consider the following argument:
(4) Mary believed that Nixon was president.
(5) Mary still believes everything she once believed.
.*.(3) Mary believes that Nixon is president.
This argument is not a valid argument in English. As speakers of English
use sentences such as (4) and (5), (3) simply does not follow from them.
Essentially the same point can be made by observing that from Mary's
sincere statement
(6) I, Mary, believed that Nixon was up to no good
in the White House, and I still believe that.
it would not only be uncharitable, but incorrect, to infer
(7) Mary believes that Nixon is up to no good in
the White House.
6Since these arguments are clearly invalid, we ought to reject any
position which is committed to their validity. The temporalist is so
commi tted.
To see this, consider the truth conditions for
(5) Mary still believes everything she once believed.
This is a statement to the effect that Mary retains her belief in all
those propositions which she believed at some earlier time. (5) is true
at a time t just in case
(S') (p)((3t')(t > t ' & Bmpt ’ ) -> BrriDt)
The temporalist is committed to the validity of the inference from (4)
and (5) to (3) just in case his truth conditions for (4) and (5) entail
his truth conditions for (3). That is, just in case
(4') Gp)(3t')(t > t* & p = [Pn] & Bmpt')
(5 1 ) (p )((3t')(t > t' & Bmpt') + Bmpt)
.*•(3') (3p)(p = [Pn] & Bmpt)
is valid. But, of course, it is valid. A similar argument establishes
that the temporalist truth conditions for (6) ential his truth conditions
for (7).
While the temporalist is committed to the validity of the araument
from (4) and (5) to (3), the eternalist is not thus committed. Consider
(3) Mary believes that Nixon is president.
The eternalist holds that the proposition expressed by the sentence
"Nixon is president", at a time t, is the same proposition as that ex-
pressed, at t, by the sentence "Nixon is now president".
It will do no harm if we identify eternalist propositions with the
set of worlds in which they are true. For any method of individuating
7propositions the eternalist may employ will be one on which propositions
true in different worlds are different propositions. But, as we shall
see, the above argument can be shown to be invalid by the eternalist
even with this crude individuation of propositions in terms of sets of
worlds. Thus, we identify the proposition expressed, according to the
eternalist, by "Nixon is president" at time t with the propositions p
such that
(9) a(Tp = Pnt
)
That is, with the proposition p such that, necessarily, p is true iff
Nixon is president at t.
Since (3) is used to express the fact that Mary has a belief ex-
pressible usinq "Nixon is president", the eternalist will say that (3)
is true at a time t exactly if
(3") Op)(Q(Tp = Pnt) & Bmpt)
The sentence
(4) Mary believed that Nixon was president
is true, by the eternal ist's lights, just in case, at some time in the
past, Mary believed the eternal proposition then expressed by "Nixon is
president". (4) receives the truth conditions
(4") Ot')(3p)(t > t' & a(TP = Pnt') & Bmpt')
Given these truth conditions, it is apparent that the eternalist is not
committed to the validity of the argument from (4) and
(5) Mary still believes everything she once believed
to (3). For his truth conditions for (4) and (5) (namely, (5')), do not
entail his truth conditions for (3). Rather, (4") and ( 5
' ) entail
8(9) ( 3t')Op)(t > V 8 0(Tp = Pnt 1 ) 8 Bmpt)
That is, Mary now believes the proposition that was. expressed by the
sentence "Nixon is president" at the time of Mary's original belief.
This, I think, is a much more plausible conclusion than the conclusion
the temporal ist was forced to draw. Thus, eternal ism is to be preferred
to temporal ism.
1 1 • Responses to the Argument
The temporal ist can make two sorts of responses to the argument of
the last section. First of all, he can provide an alternative account
of belief retention, an account on which we could not deduce that Mary
believes that Nixon is president from the facts that Mary believed that
Nixon was president and that Mary retains all her beliefs. Secondly, the
temporal ist may offer alternative truth conditions for attributions of
belief. In this section, I examine the most plausible responses alonq
the first of these lines. I shall continue to assume that the temporalist
wishes to hold that a sentence such as
(1) Mary believes that Nixon is president
is true iff Mary believes the (temporal) proposition expressed by "Nixon
is president".
If the temporalist opts for an alternative account of belief re-
tention, he will claim the following: To retain a belief is not to con-
tinue to believe the same proposition. Rather, it is to believe a pro-
position related in some special way to the proposition originally be-
lieved. The problem here, of course, is to specify this special relation-
ship.
9Let us allow the temporalist to postulate that, for each proposition
P, there is a unique proposition q such that q is the proposition that
P has obtained. For example, where p is the proposition expressed by
(2) Nixon is president
q is the proposition expressed by
(3) Nixon was president.
Obviously, what (3) expresses is true at t iff what (2) expresses was
true before t. Indeed, one might plausibly say, to believe what (3)
expresses just is to believe, of what (2) expresses, that it has obtained.
Where ’ p
' denotes a proposition, let us use 1 W ( p
)
1
to denote the
proposition related to the denotation of ' p
* ,
as what is expressed by
(3) is related to what is expressed by (2). Now, the temporalist might
say, the problems raised above for temporal ism can be avoided if we
adopt the following account of belief retention:
u retains, from t-j to t
2
» the belief in the proposition p iff
i ) 1
2
is later than t-j
i i ) u bel ieves p at t-j
iii) u believes W(p) at t^.
Treating belief retention in this way, the temporalist will hold that
(4) Mary still bel ieves everything she once believed
is true at t exactly in case
(4
* ) (p)((3t')(t > t' & Bmpt') + BmW(p)t)
As the reader may verify, given these truth conditions for (4) and our
original truth conditions for the sentences
(5) Mary believed that Nixon was president
(1) Mary believes that Nixon is president
10
we can no longer deduce (1) from (4) and (5). Rather, what is deducible
from (4) and (5) is
(6) (H p) (p = [Pn] & BmW(p)t ).
Given our characterization of W(ph it is plausible to suppose that (6)
gives the truth conditions for
(6 ) Mary believes that Nixon was president.
It is, I think, reasonable to suppose that (6') follows from (4) and
(5). However, the account of belief retention which gets the temporalist
this result is not acceptable.
Suppose that in 1966 Mary had a belief she correctly expressed using
(7) It will be the case that Johnson is re-elected.
Suppose, further, that Mary keeps abreast of current events, and thus
by 1969 has repudiated this belief. We would not want to say that Mary
has retained the belief she correctly expressed in 1966 using (7).
However, Mary may well, in early 1964, have had a belief she then
correctly expressed using (7). Certainly she may have retained this
(true) belief while not retaining the (false) belief she expressed, in
1966, using (7).
This cannot be, given the account of belief retention currently
under consideration. For (7), on the temporalist account, expressed the
same proposition in 1964 as it did in 1966. Thus, Mary believes W(the
proposition expressed by (7) in 1964) iff she believes W(the proposition
expressed by (7) in 1966) . Thus, on the current view of belief reten-
tion, Mary retains her belief from 1964 iff she retains her belief from
1966.
11
Let us consider a somewhat different account of what it is to re-
tain a belief. We begin by identifying temporalist propositions with
sets of worlds at a time, or world-times. Note that for each proposition
p and time t, there is a proposition p' such that (t , )(Tp't' Tpt).
For example, where p is the proposition expressed by the sentence "Nixon
is president" and t is the present moment, one such p' is that expressed
at t by "Nixon is now president". Again, for each p, assume that there
is exactly one such p'. Where it denotes a proposition p and y denotes
a time t, let N(n,y )
1 denote the proposition so related to p and t.
The temporalist might offer the following account of belief re-
tention, hoping to avoid the problems raised in section I:
u retains, from t
]
to t
2 ,
the belief in the proposition p iff
i
)
t
^
is later than t-j
ii u bel ieves p at t^
iii u bel ieves N(p,t
1
) at t 2>
The reader may verify that this account renders intuitively plausible
results in all of the cases thus far considered. However, at least
three considerations speak against this view:
(a) The view does not seem to provide an account of what it is to
retain a belief. In general, a proposition p neither entails nor is
entailed by N(p,t), t anytime you like; one can accept p without accept-
ing N(p,t) and vice versa. It is difficult to see why believing N(p,t),
as opposed to some other proposition, should constitute a retention,
from t, of the belief in the proposition p.
(b) There is, at the least, a very strong presumption that retain-
ing a belief consists in maintaining a relation (belief) to a particular
12
object (presumably, a proposition). (Perhaps this provides only a
necessary condition for the retention of belief.) This presumption,
needless to say, is not satisfied on this view.
(c) This view has the air of the ad hoc. To explain the retention
of belief, the temporalist appeals exclusively to eternal propositions.
Why explain only belief retention by appeal to eternal propositions?;
why not simply say that whenever one has a belief, the object of one's
belief is eternal? If my retaining my belief, expressible yesterday by
"Nixon is president", consists in my believing that Nixon was president
yesterday, why, one may reasonably wonder, isn't the belief I expressed
yesterday using "Nixon is president" the belief that tiien (yesterday)
Nixon was president?
The temporalist will, I hope, concede these points. It appears
far more plausible for the temporalist to abandon the view that the
(temporal) proposition expressed by "Nixon is president" is the object
of a belief correctly expressible by "Nixon is president", than it is
for him to give an account of belief retention such as either of the
preceding.
III. Moderate Temporal ism
The views I have discussed thus far share the following assumptions
(a) a sentence expresses at most one thing (a proposition) at a time;
(b) the proposition expressed by a sentence S is the object whose truth
or falsity determines the truth or falsity of S and the object believed
when one has a belief expressible by S. My arguments have been directed
13
towards showing that, given these assumptions, eternalism is to be pre-
ferred over temporal ism.
My arguments may not sway you to forsake temporal ism completely.
After all, it may be said, surely there is some sense in which what is
said by an utterance of
(1) Nixon is president
on Monday is the same thing as what is said by an utterance of this
sentence on Wednesday. And surely, it may be added, the truth of a
sentence such as (1) is tied to the truth of the thing so expressed.
If one wishes to maintain this, then one ought, it seems, reject
the assumptions stated at the beginning of this section. For the argu-
ment of the previous sections, I think, strongly suggests that the objects
of belief expressed by sentences are all eternal. If we hold that a
sentence can express but one thing at a time, the entity expressed doing
double duty as bearer of truth and object of belief, we seem forced to
conclude that the entity so expressed is eternal.
Thus, those who find a temporal ist sort of view attractive seem
to be led to embrace a view on which sentences may, at one time, ex-
press two different entities. One natural way to develop such a view
is as follows. We distinguish two different relations of expressing
(say, expresses
-)
and expresses,, ) and two distinct classes of objects,
which we may call contents and propositions. Expression-) is a relation
between sentences and contents; expression
2
is a relation between sentences
and propositions. Contents may be either eternal or temporal; pro-
positions are all eternal.
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We now take contents to be the bearers of truth and falsity ex-
pressed by sentences, propositions to be the objects of belief so ex-
pressed. A sentence S is true, relative to time t, iff there is a
content c such that S expresses., c at t and c is true at t. A sentence
S expresses, relative to t, a belief of a person u iff there is a pro-
position p such that S expresses
2 p
at t and u believes p at t.
Such a theory may be elaborated in a number of ways. For example,
one may hold that the class of propositions is a sub-class of the class
of contents. One may, in deference to eternalism, identify the proposi-
tion expressed^ by
(1) Nixon is president
at time t with the content expressed., at t by
(2) Nixon is now president.
Indeed, a natural view of propositions, given this sort of position, is
one on which they are contents which are 'specific' with respect to, or
which 'involve', times; believing a proposition, one might say, is be-
lieving of a time that a content is true at it.
Let us call the sort of view just outlined moderate temporal ism.
Such a view is not, I believe, to be rejected on the basis of arguments
such as those presented earlier in this chapter. Whether or not there
is good reason for preferring moderate temporal ism to eternalism is a
question which I will not consider here. What I should like to do here
is to consider one objection to moderate temporalism which might be made
by the eternal ist. The objection does not show that moderate temporalism
is untenable. However, a consideration of the appropriate response to
this objection does, I think, case doubt upon the soundness of one
15
argument to which the moderate temporalist might appeal in defense of
his position.
The objection against moderate temporal ism may be put as follows:
Let us suppose that Mary, at t, says
(3) Carter is president.
Amanda, hearing Mary, responds
(4) What you say is true and I believe it, too.
It would appear that Amanda's utterance may be correctly paraphrased by
(4') There is a (unique) p such that (i) Mary says p,
(ii) p is true, and (iii) Amanda believes p.
However, that we may correctly paraphrase (4) in this way implies that
there is but one object associated with (i.e., expressed by) Mary's
utterance of (3). This thing, of course, is what Mary said; to this
(the thing Mary said), Amanda attributes the properties of being said
by Mary, being true, and being believed by Amanda. But we know that
the object of belief associated with a sentence must be eternal. Thus,
the bearer of truth or falsity associated with the sentence must be
eternal, too, contra the view of moderate temporalism.
As I said above, I do not find this a particularly compelling ob-
jection. The appropriate response, I think, is this: That (4') is a
correct paraphrase of (4) does not imply that there is but one object
associated with Mary's utterance of (3). Presumably, 'Mary says p' in
(4') has the force of 'Mary asserts p'. If we accept moderate temporal-
ism, we ought to allow, not only that the objects of belief are eternal,
but that the objects of assertion, knowledge, etc., are eternal as well.
Moderate temporalism is not inconsistent with the claim that the objects
16
of belief and assertion may be said to be true or false. Thus, it is
the Proposition expressed
2
by Mary's utterance which Amanda says to be
asserted, to be true, and to be believed by Amanda. None of this speaks
against there being another entity— a temporal content— suitably assoc-
iated with Mary's utterance.
This is a perfectly adequate response to the objection. This re-
sponse, however, suggests that it would be a mistake to identify what
is said by a sentence or an utterance, in the sense of what is asserted,
with a (temporal) content.^ For it does seem correct to identify the
object of assertion associated with a sentence with the object of be-
lief so associated. The latter, however, is eternal.
These considerations, in turn, should make us somewhat suspicious
of the argument for moderate temporal ism suggested by the remarks at the
beginning of this section. The argument is this: Clearly, if I utter
"Nixon is president" at two different times, I have said the same thing.
But for any distinct times t and t\ it is possible that what I say at
t, when I utter this sentence, be true, while what I say at t
' ,
when I
utter this sentence, be false. Thus, what I say when I utter "Nixon is
president"— the content of this sentence— is something that can change
truth value over time.
It is far from clear what we should make of this argument, as, I
hope, the preceding remarks bring out. For if what is said by an utter-
ance, on the moderate temporal ist view, can change truth value over time,
then what is said must be quite different from what is asserted. At
least, this must be so if the above argument is to get off the ground.
17
Until some clarification of this notion of 'what is said' by an utter-
ance is given, we should remain sceptical with respect to arguments such
as the above.
IV- Eternal ism and Tense Logic
Thus far, I have argued relatively informally that eternalism
is to be preferred to temporalism. It would be nice if we could for-
malize the argument presented in section I, showing, within the context
of temporalist and eternalist representations of tensed English, that
the temporalist is, the eternalist is not, committed to the validity
of an invalid argument.
This is something we can do— such a formalization of the argument
of section I will be given in the next section. However, before for-
malizing our argument, we must consider an objection to eternalism
posed by David Kaplan. For Kaplan has argued that the eternalist cannot
give a formal representation of tensed English which is compatible with
eternalist metaphysics. If this were true, it would, of course, bar
us from adequately formalizing the argument of section I; indeed, such
an objection, if correct, would seem sufficient to refute eternalism.
Thus, we must at this point consider Kaplan's objection.
We proceed as follows. We first discuss, briefly, the syntax and
semantics of Priorean tense logic and its relation to tensed Enalish.
We do this since Kaplan's objection presupposes that an adequate formal
representation of tensed English will be one making use of the syntax
of such a tense logic. (We do not question this assumption.) Next,
Kaplan's objection is presented: Roughly, Kaplan argues that an adequate
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formal representation of tensed English must satisfy two criteria, and
that a representation of tensed English consistent with eternalism
cannot satisfy both these criteria; thus, eternalism is to be rejected.
We then respond to Kaplan. We present two different semantics for
tense logic. We show that both tense logics provide acceptable formal
representati ons of tensed English and that, even on the assumption that
temporal ism, and not eternalism, is true, there is not qood reason for
preferring one of the logics (as a representation of English) to the
other. Since, however, Kaplan's objection to eternalism is sound only
if one of the logics is preferrable (as a representation of tensed English)
to the other, we thereby show that Kaplan's objection to eternalism fails.
Finally, we show that one of the tense logics we describe is such that
the eternal ist can use it to give an adequate formal representation of
tensed English.
According to the tense logician, English tensed sentences are to
be understood as being 'built up' from sentences in the simple present
tense and various tense operators, such as 'It was the case that' and
'It will be the case that'. For example, the tense logician tells us
(1) Andy Warhol was in New York
may be parsed, in order to make explicit its logical form, as
(1‘) It was the case that (Andy Warhol is in New York).
When the tense logician goes to formalize English, he has two
basic categories of expressions: Sentences and sentential operators.
(I am, of course, confining my attention to propositional tense logic.)
(1) might be formally represented as
(1")1P(A
1
)
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TP the past tense operator, , A
]
' representing 'Andy Warhol is in
New York 1
.
How does one give a semantics for a tense logic with formulas such
as (1")? The most common way to motivate such semantics is as follows. 5
Consider first the operator 'It is (logically) possible that'. This
operator may be thought of as looking at what a sentence says (at the
proposition it expresses) and mapping that proposition to one true iff
the original proposition is true at some possible circumstance of eval-
uation. Analogously, we may understand the operator 'It was the case
that’ as mapping the proposition expressed by a sentence to one true iff
the original proposition is true at some past circumstance of evaluation.
It is thus natural to think of a semantics for tense logic as
assigning the formal representati ves of propositions to the atoms of the
tense logic. These representatives are intensions— functions from
circumstances of evaluation to truth values, or, equivalently, sets of
circumstances. We naturally think of tense operators as having, as
semantic values, appropriate functions on such intensions. In fact,
many philosophers and logicians seem to have thought that semantics for
tense logic must assign intensions to sentences and functions on intensions
to tense operators as semantic values. Hans Kamp, for example, has
claimed that the only appropriate semantic values for tense operators
are functions on intensions ( [FP] , 248) ; Dana Scott has said that the
basic principle of modal and tense logics is that "The intension of a
whole expression is determined by the intensions of its parts" ([AM],
154)— a principle which strongly suggests that sentences must receive,
as semantic values, intensions.
20
So, somewhat informally, runs the traditional view of the tense
logician on the formal representation of tensed English and its semantics
In order to understand Kaplan's objection to eternalism, let us note
that the semantical account suggested above is not open to the eternal ist
For suppose the eternalist were to attempt to give such a semantical
account. He would have to assign intensions to the atoms of the lang-
uage, functions on such intensions to the tense operators. Since the
eternalist takes propositions to be invariably eternal, he will take
intensions to be either sets of worlds, or eternal sets of worlds at a
time sets S, such that if <t,w> e S, then, for all t
' ,
<t',w> e S. But
note that there seems to be no function on such intensions which is an
appropriate value for the tense operators. If intensions are taken as
sets of worlds, one cannot even make sense of the notion of the assign-
ment to a tense operator mapping a proposition to one which was_ true.
If intensions are taken as eternal sets of world-times, we can make
sense of such a notion— but then the assignment to
,
for example,
will map a proposition p to the true iff p is true, a disasterous result.
Thus, it would seem that the eternalist cannot even make semantical
sense out of tense logic. It is this fact which underlies Kaplan's
objection to eternalism. Kaplan writes
Operators of the familiar kind treated in intensional
logic (modal, temporal, etc.) operate on contents
[Kaplan's term for what is said by a sentence]. ...Thus,
an appropriate extension for an intensional operator is
a function from intensions to extensions. ( [ D] , 22)
...if what is said is thought of as incorporating refer-
ence to a specific time [i.e., as eternal ]... it is otiose
to ask whether what is said would have been true at
another time... . Temporal operators applied to eternal
sentences .. .are redundant. ( [ D] , 22)
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...we must note that intensional operators must if
arp
Y
np
r
t T vacuous ’ operate on contents ’whiche eu ral with respect to the feature of circum-
stance the operator is interested in. Thus for
af^i!nn
1f We take
^
he content of [a sentence such
nf J^p°no
1 S
i
PreSen
^
t0 be eterna1
^’ the application
a t«emporal operator to such a content would have
no effect; the operator would be vacuous.
...This is
^ to_say that no such operator can have the effectof fixing the relevant feature and thus, in effect
rendering subseguent operations vacuous; indexical’
operators do just this. It is just that this must
not be the general situation. A content must be
the kjjrd of entity that is subject to modification
in the feature relevant to the operator. ([D],
1 05 - 1 06 )
Kaplan's objection seems, then, to be this: Given that we wish to
use tense logic to formally represent tensed English, our semantics for
tense logic should satisfy the following reguirements
:
(a) it should
assign formal representatives of propositions to the atomic letters of
the language; (b) it should assign functions on the type of entities
assigned to atomic letters to the tense operators of the language. The
eternal ist is unable to satisfy both of these requirements; the temp-
oralist, as we shall see, can satisfy them. Thus, since an adequate
formal representation of tensed English will be a tense-logical one,
eternal ism cannot provide such a representation, although temporal ism
can.
Thus runs Kaplan's objection to eternalism. I shall grant Kaplan
that the eternal ist cannot satisfy both of the above mentioned require-
ments; I also grant that (b) is a reasonable requirement. I shall,
however, argue that (a) is ncrt reasonable, and that there are tense
logics which, although they do not satisfy (a), provide perfectly ade-
quate formal representations of tensed English. Indeed, as we will see.
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one of these logics is such that the eternal ist can use it, with no
metaphysical embarassment, to represent tensed English.
We begin by describing two semantics for tense logic.
Let us take as our syntactic base an extension of the propositional
calculus, including the modal operators D' and '<y and the tense
operators 'IP' (It was the case that), (it will be the case that)
and N (It is now the case that); we assume some standard set of
formation rules.
We define the class of T-models for our language as follows: Such
a model is a triple, M = <W,T,V>, where W and T are non-empty, disjoint
sets, T the set of positive and negative integers. (They play the roles
of worlds and times, respecti vely
. ) V assigns to the atomic letters of
the language subsets of TxW. We define a TE model for our language as
a triple, M - <W,T,I>, where W and T are as before. I assigns to atomics
subsets of TxTxW, where, for any atom 4),
(t ) (t ' ) (w) (<t ,t
'
,w> el -*- (t")(<t M ,r ,w> e I ).
<P <j>
For atomics, we define truth in a T-model as follows: We write
t
1
[*]t
2
w
(reading this:
<f>, taken relative to t-j , is true at t
2
w) and, where
<f>
is atomic, say (surpressing reference to a model)
t-j [<f]t
2
w iff <t
2
,w> e V .
We define truth for atomics in a TE model as follows: We again
write
t
1
U]t
2
w
(This is read as before, if we are temporal ists ; the eternal ist reading
is discussed below.) Where <j> is atomic, we say
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t
l
U]t
2
w iff <t-j ,t
2
,w> e I
Otherwise, the definition for truth in a T-model is just as it is for
truth in a TE-model
. The crucial clauses in the truth definition are
t
-|
[rptj,
]
tw iff ( 3
1
•
)
(t>t • & t-jUit'w)
t
-|
[TF
<f ] tw iff ( 3 ' ) (t ‘>t & t-, [<j>]t ’w)
t-j [ N tj)]tw iff t-, [<j>:t lW
t-| [O <f>]tw iff (3 w' ) (t-j [4>]tw
'
)
t-j [D ]tw iff (w')(t
1
[^]tw')
We say that a formula <p is T-valid (is TE-valid) iff for every T-model
M = <W,T,V> (for every TE-model M = <W,T,I>), for every t e T and w e W,
t[(j)]tW
.
6
Let us now ask if there is some reason for the temporal ist to
prefer using the logic T (our syntax plus the semantic set-up given by
the definition of T-model and its truth definition) to the logic TE
(our syntax plus the semantic set-up given by the definition of a TE-
model and its truth definition) as a formal representation of tensed
English. For Kaplan's objection requi res such a preference, since on
n£ view are the semantic assignments to atoms in TE representatives of
propositions. So far as I can see, there are only three possible reasons
for this preference: (i) T provides a better theory of the consequence
relation for tensed English than does TE; (ii) While the assignments
to the tense and modal operators implicit in the truth definition for
T satisfy Kaplan's requirement (b), the assignments implicit in the
truth definition for TE do not satisfy this requirement; (iii) there
is good reason, given thatourlogic is intended to represent tensed English,
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to prefer the sort of semantic assignments T-models make to atomics
to those made by TE-models. I shall argue that neither (i), (ii), nor
(iii) is true.
It is easy enough to show (i) false; a sketch of a proof that T
and TE yield the same set of validities is as follows. First, note that
we can biject the set of T-models into the set of TE-models. Say that
a TE-model M = <W,T,I> is a TE-correlate of a T-model M' = <W',T,V> iff
W=W' and
(t) (t
' ) (w) [<t ,t
'
,w> e I iff <t',w> £ V 1
4>
J
Say that a T-model M = <W,T,V> is a T-correlate of a TE-model M' =
<W ,T,I> iff H=W' and
(t)(w)[ <t,W> £ V iff (t 1 )(<t 1 ,t,w> £ I )]
? <j>
Obviously, every T-model has a TE-correlate and vice versa; likewise, M
is a T-correlate of M' iff M' is a TE-correlate of M. Finally, a
simple induction establishes that for any M and M
' ,
if M is a T-correlate
of M', then, for any t, t
' ,
w and formula <j>, t[<j>]t'w (in M) iff t[<f>]t'w
(in M'J. This suffices to establish that T and TE yield the same set
of val idities.
Let us now verify that the truth definitions of both T and TE may
be construed in such a way that Kaplan's requirement—that tense operators
be assigned, as semantic values, functions on the sort of entity assigned
to atomics— is satisfied. I will only discuss the operators '7p
1
and
'
N
1
,
since it is obvious enough how one would generalize such a discussion.
Take first the logic T. In it, atoms receive intensions— subsets of
TxW— as semantic assignments. We may look upon the definition of truth
for T as implicitly assigning to the tense and modal operators, relative
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to times, functions in (2‘P(TxW)
)
TxW
.
(Here we follow Kaplan; see the
citation from Kaplan above). Thus, taken relative to a time, the
assignment to a tense operator has as its extension, relative to an
arbitrary circumstance of evaluation (member of TxW) a function from
intensions into truth values. We take the assignment of values to the
operators to be relativized to times because of the presence of the
mdexical operator
'
N
1 in our language, which is intended to represent
the English now 1
. Intuitively, this English indexical expresses
different things at different times; if 1 N ' is to adeouately represent
'now' it must be correlated with different members of (2^ TxW )) TxW
relative to different times. In the interests of standardization, we
say that all of the tense and modal operators receive semantic assign-
ments relative to times.
p ^ r
Write |a|
t
for the semantic value of a relative to t 1 . We look
upon the truth definition for T as assigning to relative to any
time t, a function such that, for any t
' ,
w, and p e (P(TxW)
rtPl t
(t'w)(p) = 1 iff Ot")(t'>t" & p ( t "w ) = 1).
The semantic assignment to ' N
' ,
relative to a time t-j
,
is such that,
for any circumstance tw and p e (p{ TxW)
I N 1 1
( tw) (p) = 1 iff p(t ]W ) = 1.
Thus, it is clear that Kaplan's requirement (b) is satisfied by T.
Just as clearly, we have the result that the semantic value of a complex
formula is a function of the semantic values of its parts. Taking the
semantic value of a complex formula, relative to a time, to be the set
of world-times at which it is true, the above assignments to '-jp' and
1
N ' verify the claims
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tWWw iff |-ff>|
t (t'w)(U| t ) = i
t[ N 4>]t ’w iff |N|
t
(t'w)(|
+ | )
= 1.
So far as TE is concerned, we can look at its truth definition as
assigning, to the tense and modal operators, appropriate functions in
UP(TxTxW)) <P(TxTxW ). Writing 'lap for rthe semantic value of cT1
,
we
may say
I7PI - the function f such that for any s e ^(TxTxW),
f(s) = { < t
i
,t
2
,W>
| OtgHtg^g 8i <t-j,t
3
,W> £ S)
|
N
I
= the function f such that for any s e ^P(TxTxW),
f(s) = (<tpt
2
,w> | <t-j ,t-j ,w> e s}.
Thus, TE satisfies Kaplan's requirement (b). As with T, in TE, the
semantic value of a complex formula is a function of the semantic values
of its parts. Letting |<j>|, for an arbitrary formula <|>, be the set of
triples <t^,t
2
,w> such that t^[<j>]t
2
w, we have
ti [T7* 4>]t 2
w iff <t^,t
2
w> e |^|(|<|>|)
^1 C N <J>]t 2
w iff <t^t
2
w> e
|
N
| ( | (j) | )
.
Let us turn to the third possible reason for preferring T to TE
as a formal representation of tensed English— a preference for the
assignment of intentions to the atoms of tense logic over the sort of
assignments which TE makes. Clearly, Kaplan thinks such an assignment
is to be preferred. But it is very difficult to see how such a pre-
ference is to be justified. So far as we can see, there are but two
claims which Kaplan could make, in an attempt to justify such a pre-
ference: (I) Such a preference is justified because the semantic
assignments to sentences of T allow us to establish a satisfactory
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relation between the (formal representatives of) propositions and the
sentences of T, while the semantic assignments to the sentences of TE
do not allow us to establish such a relationship; (II) The semantic
assignments to sentences in T represent 'semantically important' entities
those in TE do not: Since semantic assignments to sentences ought to
represent 'semantically important' entities, given that our formal
language is to represent tensed English, T is to be preferred to TE.
I will consider these contentions in turn.
With respect to (I), we may note the following. Kaplan would
clearly beg the question, were he to insist that the only satisfactory
relation between the formal representati ves of propositions and the
sentences of a formalism intended to represent tensed English is one
in which the representatives of propositions are the semantic values of
sentences. Surely, all that is required, so that our formalization is
an adequate representation of tensed English, is that we be able to
characterize formal representatives of propositions in terms of our
semantic primatives, showing that such representati ves can be assigned
to sentences in such a way that a sentence is true at a circumstance
iff the proposition assigned to it is true at the circumstance.
Of course, we can do this in TE. We define, if we are temporal ists
,
the proposition expressed by a sentence S, relative to t
—
| S
|
t
— as
{t'w|t[S]t'w}. Saying that a proposition p is true at tw iff tw e p,
we have the result that for any sentence S, t[S]t'w iff t'w e
[
S
1
1
.
Let us consider (II). We note that it is not altogether clear why
semantic assignments must represent 'semantically important' entities
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in the first place. Presumably, the primary job of semantic values is
simElj. to induce an appropriate distribution of truth values to the
sentences of the language. Why, one may well wonder, must semantic
values also represent entities such as propositions, particularly when
it is the case that such entities are definable in terms of semantic
values (as is the case, as we have just seen, with the semantic values
of sentences in TE)?
If Kaplan were to insist upon (II), there is yet a reply we can
make to him: The semantic assignments to sentences in TE do in fact
represent 'semantically important' entities. They correspond, in a
natural way, to what the temporal ist would take to be meanings of
sentences (in Kaplan's own sense of meaning as character). Surely
sentence meanings are exactly as 'semantically important' as are pro-
positions. Let us show how the semantic assignments in TE may be
construed as meanings.
As Kaplan describes linguistic meaning, the meaning of a sentence
S is that function f from contexts to propositions such that f applied
to a context c yields the proposition expressed by S in c. If we so
view meanings, then, in the context of a logic like TE, we will re-
present meanings of simple present tense sentences as constant functions
from times (which correspond, in TE, to contexts) to subsets of <P(TxW)
(which represent propositions). Such functions are constant functions
because, on the view of the temporal ist, simple present tense sentences
free of demonstratives and indexicals (which the atoms of tense logic
are intended to represent) express the same proposition relative to
every context.
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Now, the semantic assignments made by TE to atomics-restricted
subsets of TxTxW— correspond in an obvious way to such constant functions
in (*P(TxW)) T
. It is open to the temporalist, then, to think of these
assignments as meanings. Likewise, he can look upon the implicit
assignments made by the truth definition of TE as being assignments in
((^(TxW) )(^( Tx ^)) __ as functions mapping meanings to meanings.
Thus, it is extremely difficult to see why, on temporalist grounds
alone, there is some reason to prefer the sort of semantic assignments
made to sentences of T to those made to sentences by TE. Thus, since
there seems to be no other reason to prefer T to TE as a representation
of tensed English, we conclude that, on temporalist grounds alone, TE
must be said to provide just as good a representation of tensed English
as is provided by T. Therefore, Kaplan's objection to eternalism fails—
for Kaplan's objection, as we saw above, requires that T be preferable
to TE as a representation of tensed English.
It remains to be shown that the eternal ist may make use of the
logic TE to represent tensed English. This is a fairly straightforward
project.
When discussing the temporalist view of the semantics of tense
logic, we found that it was a (single) time that played the role of an
index, relative to which a sentence was to be interpreted so that it
could be evaluated for truth; for the temporalist, it was world-times
which played the role of circumstances. For the eternal ist, it is
pairs of times which play the roles of index; worlds simpliciter which
are circumstances. We read
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t-| [
]
"t
)
if we are eternalists, as *. taken relative to t, and t
2 ,
is true at
w'. A sentence 4,, on the eternalist view, expresses a truth, relative
to t, at w, iff t[<|>]tw.
Thus, it is clear that the eternalist can use TE to qive an account
of the truth conditions of tensed sentences of English, taken relative
to a time. As we saw above, such an account yields a theory of loqical
truth and of the consequence relation which is exactly as plausible as
that yielded by the temporalist logic T. Again, as seen above, the
semantic value of a complex expression in TE is a function of the semantic
values of the parts of the expression. Finally, the eternalist is
perfectly well able to characterize propositions in terms of the semantic
assignments to sentences of TE, and he is able to associate propositions,
so characterized, with sentences of TE in a sensible way. We say, if
we are eternal ists, that the proposition expressed by a sentence S,
relative to t— |S|^.— is {w|t[S]tw}. Given this definition, a sentence,
taken relative to a time t, is true at a world w iff the proposition it
expresses, relative to t, is true at w: That is, t[S]tw iff w e
|
S
1
1
.
This, I think, is all that we are required to show in order to
establish that the eternalist can represent tensed Enalish using Priorean
tense logic. We have shown that he can give a semantics for such a
logic in which the tense operators operate on the sort of entity assigned
to atomic formulae, in which the semantic value of a complex expression
is a function of the semantic values of its parts, and in which he is
able to explain, in eternalist terms, when a formula, taken relative to
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a time, is true at a circumstance of evaluation. Surely, nothing
else is required of such a representation.
It is to be expected that some temporal ist readers will have
lingering doubts concerning our claim. Thus, we close this section by
considering two more objections to the claim that eternalist can sensibly
use TE to represent tensed English.
(i) Many phi 1 osophers— Kaplan and Carnap are two such— have thought
that an appropriate association of sentences and representatives of
propositions must be one which satisfies a Fregean principle of inter-
change, e.g., a principle such as
(P) If S = S'[A/A'], A and A 1 sentences, and, relative
to a context c, A and A' express the same pro-
position, then relative to c, S and S' express the
same proposition.
(See [D], p. 27; [MN], pp. 118-24) As the reader may easily verify, TE
does not satisfy such a requirement, if we represent propositions as the
eternalist tells us to represent them. Now, the temporal ist may arque,
since such a principle seems to be true of the relation between sentences
of English and the propositions they express, TE, as interpreted by the
eternalist, is not a satisfactory representation of tensed Enalish.
To reply to this objection, we think, it suffices to note that it
is far from clear that a principle such as (P) i_s true of tensed English.
Consider, for example, the pair of sentences
(2) Mary believed that Edwina was happy.
(3) Mary believed that Edwina would be happy now.
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It would seem that (2) and (3) are correctly represented by
(2 1 ) 7P(B(m,He))
(3'
)
tP (B(m,N(He) )
)
respectively, where 'B( ,)' is the belief predicate, V represents
'Mary 1
,
and 'He 1 represents 'Edwina is happy 1
. If we are eternalists,
we will say that, relative to any context, 'He' and 1 N(He) 1 express the
same proposition. If propositions are associated with sentences in
such a way as to satisfy the above mentioned principle (P), and if a
sentence is true in a context exactly if the proposition associated
with it, relative to the context, is true, then (2 1 ) and (3 1 ) (and (2)
and (3)) ought never diverqe in truth value. But obviously, these pairs
of sentences do sometimes diverge in truth value. Thus, to insist that
a principle such as (P) must be satisfied by a formalization of tensed
English is to beg the question against the eternalist, who has conent
reasons for denying that English satisfies any such principle.
(ii) One might object to the claim that TE, in the hands of the
eternalist, yields a satisfactory formalization of Enqlish because, on
eternalist grounds, the semantic values of sentences in TE do not re-
present any 'semantically important 1 entities. For, obviously, these
semantic values do not represent eternalist propositions; neither do
they correspond to sentence meaninqs (i.e., they are not functions from
times to eternalist propositions).
We have already argued that it is far from clear that the semantic
values of sentences must represent propositions or other 'semantically
important 1 entities, in order for a formalism to constitute an adequate
representation of a fragment of natural language. Thus, it is not clear
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that this objection poses a serious problem for the eternalist. However,
it is worth noting that the eternalist can reply to such an objection
by arguing that the semantic values of sentences in TE do represent, on
his view, 'semantically important' entities. For the eternalist can
quite cogently hold that these semantic values represent sentence
meani ngs
.
In order to show that the eternalist can sensibly say this, we
begin by noting that if we are eternal ists, we will most certainly
reject Kaplan s view that sentence meanings are correctly represented
by functions from (representatives of) contexts to (representatives of)
propositions. For an eternalist will accept a Fregean principle of
interchange for meani ngs
,
even though she will reject a corresponding
principle of interchange for propositions. That is, although the eternal-
ist will reject principles such as (P), she will accept a principle such
as
(0) If S=S
'
[A/
A
1
] , A and A' sentences, and A and A'
have the same meaning, then S and S' have the
same meaning.
Now, if the eternalist does accept a principle such as (0), she
must reject the view that the meaning of a sentence can be represented
as a function from contexts to propositions. For consider again the
pair of sentences
(2) Mary believed that Edwina was happy.
(3) Mary believed that Edwina would be happy now.
represented, respectively, as
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(2 1 ) TP (B(m,He)
)
O') TP (B(m,N(He) )
)
On the eternal 1st view, the function from contexts to propositions
associated with 'He' is the function from contexts to propositions
associated with
' N ( He
)
' . But it is false that (2) and (3) ((2') and
(3')) have the same meaning.
On the eternal ist view, sentence meanings are appropriately re-
presented by functions from (representatives of) a context and a time
to (representatives of) a proposition. It is precisely such functions,
on the view of the eternal ist, which determine what proposition a sentence
expresses, relative to a context. Thus, it is such functions which are
correctly said to be meanings. Thus, on the view of the eternalist,
the semantic assignments to sentences of TE do (implicitly) represent
meanings, since such assignments correspond, in an obvious way, to
functions in (P(W)
.
(In TE, of course, contexts are represented by
times
.
)
Thus, the eternalist can quite justly say that the semantic values
of sentences of TE correspond to 'semantically important' entities. To
insist, as does Kaplan, that the meaning of a sentence is to be repre-
sented as a function from contexts to propositions is to beg the question
against eternal ism.
We have seen that the eternalist can give a satisfactory represent-
ation of tensed English, using the logic TE. The temporal ist, of course,
can also use TE to represent tensed English. Let us now return to the
argument of section I, showing how the temporal ist and the eternalist
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would extend TE to give an account of the truth conditions for tensed
attributions of belief. Doing this will allow us to formally verify
the argument of section I.
V
. Formalizing Our Argument
In this section, we will formalize the argument of section I.
After doing this, we conclude the chapter with a brief assessment of
the relative merits of temporalism and eternalism, based upon our
results in this and previous sections.
In order to formalize the argument of section I, we must first
show how the temporal ist and the eternalist would extend the logic TE
of section IV to give truth conditions for tensed attributions of belief.
Syntactical ly, such an extension is straightforward. We first extend
the primitive vocabulary of TE to include the following items:
(a) A one-place term-sentence functor, '©
'
(the intended
interpretation of which is 'Mary believes that');
(b) a denumerable set, V, of variables:
P, Pr P 2 > •••
9 > 9
1
» 9 2 »
• •
•
(these will range over propositions);
. .
ii
(c) a one-place sentence-term functor, "
;
(d) the quantifiers 'y' and '3'.
We define the set of terms for our language as follows:
(i) Any member of V is a term.
(ii) If <p is a formula, then
r
<jf* is a term.
(iii) These are the only terms.
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Finally, we extend the formation rules as follows:
(iv) If a is a term, then 3B(a) is a formula.
(v) If <|) is a formula and v is a variable, then
and (Vv)(c|>y are formulas.
We now give temporalist and eternalist extensions of our definition of
a TE-model
. For the temporalist, we define a TE-model as a triple
M - <W,T,I>, where W, T, and I are as before, except that I, as well as
mapping the atomics of TE into <P(TxTxW), also assigns, to each member
of TxTxW, a subset of <P(TxW), in such a way that if I(<t
1
,t
2
,w>) = p,
then, for all t3> I(<t 3 ,t 2 ,w>) = p. For the eternalist, a TE-model is
also a triple M = <W,T,I>, W, T, and I as before, save that I, as well
as mapping atomics into (P (TxTxW), assigns, to each member of TxTxW, a
subset of <P(W), in such a way that if I (<t
]
,t
2
,w>) = p, then, for all
£3 > I ( <t 3
,
t
2 >
w > ) ~ P*
We turn to the definition of truth. First, temporalist truth
conditions. We say that f is an assignment to the set V of variables
of TE just in case f e (^(TxW)) V
.
fj is, as usual, the assignment just
like f, except that it assigns p to v. We define the denotation of a
term a, relative to a time t under an assignment f, (write:
|
a
| t ^)
as
follows
:
(i ) If o e V, then |a|
tf
= f(a).
(ii) If a = V, for some formula <f> , then |a| tf. = { t ' w | tf [4)] t ' w)
.
Truth is now defined as follows. We define truth for a formula <j>,
relative to a time t and assignment f, at a world time t'w, writing
tf [<|>]t 'w.
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We preserve the six clauses of the truth definition for TE qiven in
section IV (writing, of course, tf[*]t'w, instead of t[*]t'w). The new
clauses in the truth definition are
tf[®(a)]t'w iff
| a | tf e I(<t,t',w>).
tf[(3 v)(<j>)]t'w iff there’s a p e 6> (TxW) such that tfp [<}>]t 'w.
t r[ ( V'v) (4>)]t 'w iff for all p e <*>(TxW), tf^[<>]t 'w.
We now give eternal ist truth conditions for our extended lanquage.
We now let an assignment f be a member of (tf>(W))
V
,
the difference, of
course, corresponding to the difference between the eternal ist and
temporal ist views of propositions. We define the denotation of a term,
relative to t, t
' ,
and f, as follows:
(i) If a e V, then
|
a
| tt , f =
f( a )
(ii) If a = Hjf1
,
for some formula
<f> ,
then
i
a
| tt
, f =
{w | tf [«|>]t *w}.
The new clauses in the truth definition for the eternal ist are
tf[tB(a)]t'w iff
|
a
|
,
.p
e I(<t,t',w>).
tf[(3v)(^)]t'w iff for some p e {P (VI)
,
tfp [c^]t
' w
.
tf[(Vv)4)]t'w iff for all p e <P(W), tfp [(f]t 'w.
Given our discussion in section I, it should be clear that these
truth conditions correctly represent the views of the temporalist and
the eternalist. Consider, for example, the temporalist. Our truth
conditions for the temporalist correctly represent his view just in case,
(i) for any formula 4>, > taken relative to t and f, is true at
t'w iff the proposition expressed by £, relative to t and f ( viz .
,
{t"w|tf[<j)]t"w}) is in the extension of IB at t'w ( viz . , is in I ( <t ' ,t' ,w>));
(ii) tensed belief statements—those of the forms (TP0B(c.)j"\
r
FF(l»(c.)P,
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and N(U ( a )) 1 in which the term a is formed from an indexical free
formula <j> are true, relative to t and f, just in case, respectively,
(a) what was once expressed by 4 was, at that time, in the extension of
(where this extension is determined, in the obvious way, by V's
assignments to members of TxTxW); (b) what will, at some time, be ex-
pressed by
<f>
will, at that time, be in the extension of 'jp 1 ; (c) what's
now expressed by <j> is now in the extension of (iii) Attributions
of belief involving terms from formulas containing
'
N
' bear the appro-
priate relation to the set of circumstances at which the formulas are
true and to the extension of 'C0 ' . It is easy, given our truth conditions,
to verify that these conditions obtain. Likewise, it is easy to verify
that our truth conditions capture the eternalist's views concerning the
truth conditions of attributions of belief.
Now, recall the argument discussed in section I:
(1) Mary believed that Nixon was president.
(2) Mary still believes everything she once believed.
.’.(3) Mary believes that Nixon is president.
This argument is to be symbolized, in our extension of TE, as
follows
:
(D mw(Q))
( 2
1
) (Vp)(1P(JB(p)) -0( P ))
•
‘
•
(3
'
)
3(Q)
Now, it is clear, given our temporal i st truth conditions, that this
is a valid argument. That is, for any t, f, and w, if (l 1 ) and (2
1
),
taken relative to t and f, are true at tw, then ( 3
' )
,
relative to t and
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f, is true at tw. For suppose (l 1 ) and (2 1 ) are so true. If
tf[TP(3J&(Q))]tw, then, at some time t-j prior to t, p = {tV |tf[Q]t 'w 1 }
was in I ( <t ,
t-j ,w> ) . Given this, it follows from the truth conditions
of (2 ) that p is in I(<t,t,w>). But, then ( 3
' ) , relative to t and f,
is true at tw. Thus, the arqument is valid, qiven the temporalist truth
conditions for tensed attributions of belief.
Things are otherwise, however, with the eternalist truth conditions
for (1 ) through (3'). For (l 1 ) to be true, relative to t, t, and f,
at w, it must be that, for some time t^
,
earlier than t, q = {w|tf[0]t^w}
is in I(<t ,t.| ,w>)
. Given the truth conditions for (2 1 ), it follows
that q is in V(<t,t,w>). But for (3 1 ) to be true at w, when taken re-
lative to t, t, and f, it must be that q' = {w|tf[0]tw} is in I(<t,t,w>).
But, in general, q f q', since it is not in general the case that
tf [Q]tw
,
when t-j < t. Thus, q' need not be in I(<t,t,w>) when q is.
Thus, on eternalist grounds, the arqument in question is not valid.
We have succeeded in showinq formally that the temporalist is
committed to the validity of an invalid arqument, while the eternalist
is not. Let us take stock. We have established that temooralism is
objectionable because of its inability to qive an adequate account of
the truth conditions of belief, while eternal ism is not objectionable
for this reason. We have seen that modifications of temporalism which
depend upon denying the identity of the object of belief expressed by
a sentence with the bearer of truth so expressed do not seem able to
appeal to the most common argument in favor of temporalism: Such
modifications cannot, in any clear sense, claim that non-simultaneous
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utterances of sentences such as "Nixon is president" say the same
thing. Finally, we have seen that the major objection to eternalism-
that it is inconsistent with certain necessary strictures on an adequate
formalization of tensed Engl ish— fai Is
.
In light of these results, I think, we are entitled to reject
temporal ism. And so we shall. In the remainder of this work, we will
proceed on the assumption that eternalism is correct. We now turn to
an examination of the truth conditions for attributions of belief suggested
in this chapter. We shall argue that these truth conditions prove in-
adequate, once they are applied to languages containing sentences con-
taining demonstratives and indexicals.
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Notes
Kaplan discusses these matters in his unpublished manuscript
[D]. References to this, and to other works, will qenerally be indicated,
parenthetically, in the text.
See, for example, "The Proper Treatment of Quantification in
English", in [CM]. Montague's treatment of tense and belief in PTO seem
to commit him to the view that what is expressed by a sentence—there
taken to be an intension-is both the object of a belief expressed by
a sentence and is, in general, something which changes truth value over
time.
3
See, for example, "Worlds, Times, and Selves" in [WTS], pp. 54-55.
4
Kaplan has suggested such an identification.
5
Here, I follow Kaplan's discussion in [D], pp. 20 ff.
g
This definition of validity is adopted from Kaplan's definition
of validity for the logic LD; see [D], pp. 74 ff. and [LD]
.
CHAPTER II
DIRECT REFERENCE AND ATTRIBUTIONS OF BELIEF
In the last chapter we discussed the temporal properties of the
objects of belief expressed by sentences of English. We there assumed
that belief is a two-place relation, and that a sentence of the form
ra believes that <p is true if, and only if, what is denoted by a believes
the object of belief, or proposition, expressed by <j>. In this chapter,
we will argue that it is not sufficient, for the truth of something of
the form of ra believes that <p , that the denotatum of a believe what
is expressed by <j>.
Our argument proceeds from a consideration of the conditions under
which substitution of co-referential singular terms preserves pro-
positional identity. We will argue that, under certain conditions,
substitution of co-referential demonstratives and indexicals preserves
propositional identity; we will then show that pairs of sentences which,
by our previous arqument, express the same proposition cannot be inter-
substituted within the scope of "believes that" salva veritate.
We proceed as follows. In section I, we give an exposition of
David Kaplan's formal work on the logic of demonstratives and indexicals;
we do this because we shall adopt Kaplan's logic (modified and inter-
preted in such a way as to accord with our results in the last chapter)
as the formal basis of our discussion in this and following chapters.
In sections II and III, we critically discuss Kaplan's thesis that
demonstratives and indexicals are directly referential. On the basis
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of our discussion, we formulate and defend a principle giving a suffic-
ient condition for two sentences' expressinq the same object of belief.
In section IV, we state and defend our objections to the truth conditions
for attributions of belief mentioned in the first paraqraph of this
chapter. In section V, we consider a related objection to these truth
conditions, having to do with so-called de se ascriptions of belief.
^ Kaplan s Treatment of Indexicals and Demonstratives
In order to understand Kaplan's formal treatment of demonstratives
and indexicals, one must understand his notions of content and context.
The notion of content was discussed in Chapter I; let us now consider
the notion of a context.
Kaplan says that a context is "a possible occasion of use (of an
expression)." ( [D] , 24) For model theoretic purposes, Kaplan takes
each context c to have an agent (c^), a positon(c
p
), a time (c^), and
a world (c
w
). Contexts are distinct iff they diverge in at least one
of these respects.
Calling a context "a possible occasion of use" of an expression is
somewhat misleading. On Kaplan's view, we may ask, of any expression e
and context c, what is the content of e in c; there is no need, for an
expression to have a content relative to a context, that the agent of
the context (or anyone else) use the expression in the context. Since
contexts are world-bound, in few, if any, contexts will every expression
be used. Thus, it is only in a very attenuated sense of "possible" that
a context is "a possible occasion of use." Rather, a context for a
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language L is that relative to which the content of well
-formed
expressions of L can be determined.
In an early work, Kaplan characterizes demonstratives and indexicals
as those "words and phrases whose intension [or content] is determined
by the contexts of their use." ([LD], 401) In light of the results of
Chapter I, one may wonder how useful this characterization is: If
eternal ism is accepted, almost every tensed sentence of a language such
as English is such that its intension varies according to the context
in which it is used; the same is true of all tensed predicates. This
is the case because, given the truth of eternal ism, a sentence such as
"Nixon is president" exrpesses, relative to a context, what is expressed
by "Nixon is now president"; a predicate such as "is red" functions
semantically as does "is now red."
Nonetheless, we think Kaplan's characterization to be correct; the
reader who thinks this leaves us with too many demonstratives and index-
icals may think of such expressions as that primitive vocabulary of a
language whose content is determined by context.
Demonstratives are those context sensitive expressions which "require,
in order to determine their referents, an associated demonstration:
Typical ly, though not invariably
,
a (visual ) presentation of a local object
discriminated by a pointing." ( [D] , 9) Thus, "that", used as a term,
but not as a bound variable, is a demonstrative. (In section V, I will
discuss what constitutes a demonstration of an object.) For formal
purposes, Kaplan represents demonstrations as descriptions, introducing
a functor "dthat" from terms to terms: A use of "that" in English is
45
formally represented as rdthat (the F)1
,
r
the P a description approp-
riate to represent the accompanying demonstration.
An indexical — "I", "here", and "now" are prime examples of index-
icals— requires no accompanying demonstration: "the linguistic rules
which govern their use fully determine the referent (of indexical s ).
"
(CD], 9-10)
It will be useful to introduce some notational conventions. We
shall use £'s, subscripted and primed, as metalinguistic variables
ranging over contexts; likewise, £'s and w's will function as meta-
linguistic variables over times and worlds, respectively. Where a is
an expression, we write Cc[a ]'1 for *the content of a in c"*J Note that
where a is a closed sentence, *"c[a.]f* is a proposition. We write ^cEalw"1
for ^the value of c[a] at wT When a is a sentence, *"c[a]w~* is a truth
value; we will often use *c[a]vP, in such cases, to abbreviate
*a, taken relative to c, is true at w~V We shall use this notation
when discussing formal languages (such as Kaplan's logic LD) and when
discussing English.
We shall adopt, as a formal basis for our discussion of the truth
conditions for attributions of belief, a modification of Kaplan's loqic
of demonstratives, LD, We modify Kaplan's semantics to accord with the
results of Chapter I. We also drop Kaplan's treatment of spatial
indexical s (as their behavior is not directly relevant to our work); we
extend Kaplan's language to include terms corresponding to the singular
"you"
.
Here, then, are the syntax and semantics of our language, which
we call RLD. After presenting RLD's semantics, we explain and discuss them.
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The Language RLD
1. Syntax
A. Primitive Vocabulary
1* For each n
’
a denumerable set, of n-place predicates.
2. The two-place identity predicate: =
3. A singular term: I
4. A denumerable set, Y, of singular terms: you
Q ,
you
5. A denumerable set, V, of variables.
6. A term-term functor: dthat
7. A definite description operator: 7
8. Truth-functional connectives:
~, &, v,
9. Non truth-functional connectives: D, O, TP, F, N
10. Quantifiers: V, 3
11. Punctuation: (, )
B. Formation rules
( i ) Terms
1. Members of V and of Y are terms.
2. 1 1
1 is a term.
3. If a is a term, then rdthat(a)"1 is a term.
4. If a e V and <|> is a formula, then r( 7 a ) ( <j>
j"
1
is a term.
5. These are all the terms.
(ii) Formulas
1 . If F e it^ and
,
. .
.
,
a
p
are terms
,
then ^Fa-j
,
. .
.
,
i
2. If a, B are terms, then ra=B1 is a formula.
3. Truth functions of formulas are formulas.
a formula.
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4. If * is a formula, then so are
'"
0 ( 4,)'’, r<>(*f
,
Ii*?.
5. If a e V and 0 is a formula, then rOa)U )*1 and *1 Va) (7 are
formulas
.
6
. These are all the formulas.
II. Models
A model for RLD is a five-tuple M = <W,T,U,C,V>, where
1 • W, T, U, C are non-empty, mutually disjoint sets, T the set of
negative and positive integers. (They represent, respecti vely
,
worlds, times, possible individuals, and contexts.)
For each c in C, there is
(i) a member of W, c
1(w
(ii) a member of T, c^
( i i i
)
a member of U, c^
( i v a denumerable sequence of members
member of c wi th 'c 1 )
.
a a,
of U, c
a
C is such that, for all c, c’ e C, c = c 1 iff
(i) C
A
= C
A
;
(ii) C
T
= C
T
;
(iii) c
w
= c* # and;
(iv) Vn(c = c' ).
a
n
a
n
V is a function which
(i) to each w e W assigns a subset of U
(ii) assigns to each n-place predicate a member
. th
lCxTxU
n
where
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(a) if V
nn
(<u
1
, u
n
>)(<c,t>) = p, then for all t
'
»
V
nn( <u i » • • • . un>)(<c,t’>) = p;
(b) if w e V
nn
(<ur .... u n>)(<c,t>), then U] , ..., u p e V .
5. (i) (c)(u)(u = c A + u e V ).A c
w
(ii ) (c)(u)(n)(u = c -*• u e V ).
a c
n w
III. Truth, Denotation, and Validity
An assignment f to the variables of RLD is any member of U V
. We
wri te
v
for: the assignment just like f, save it assigns u to v.
Where a is a term, we write
l
a lctfw
for: the denotation of a, relative to the context c, time t, and
assignment f, at w. (We surpress reference to a model.) Denotation
is defined:
'
1
' ctfw CA
2
- ly°unlctfw
= c
a
n
3. Mthat( 0 )| - |«|
I w
l
a lctfw
= f
^
a ^’ if a e v -
5-
|
(^?ot)(4>)
l ct -pw
= the unique u e U such that ctf^[<j>]w, if there is
such; zero, otherwise. (Recall that U n T = A.)
Where <j> is a formula, we write
ctfU]w
for: <j>, taken relative to c, f, and t, is true at w. (Again, reference
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to a model is surpressed.) Truth is defined:
1. If * =
r
n
n i
a
r
” then cft [<j)]w iff
w e V
nn
(<|
“lLtfw I“nlctfw>)(<c ’ t>) -
Cft[a=6]w iff a
ctfw
" e
ctfw'
2. eft [ ]w iff not: ctf[<|)]w.
Cft[(J>&T]w iff cft[<j>Jw and cft[T]w.
Etc.
3. eft [IP 4>]w iff ( Jft
1 j)(t'<t & eft
'
[cj)]w )
.
eft [R*
<jj ]w iff (3 t 1
e
j) (
t
1
>t & eft 1 [
cf>
]w )
cft[ N <d]w iff 3
i
—
i
-©
i
i1—u
<+-o
4. cft[o 4>]w iff (V w ,
cW )(cft[(t)]w
,
)
.
cft[0<j>]w iff (3 w ' eW )(cft[*]w' )
5. Cft[( v Ot) (4>)]w iff (Vu)(u e V -> cfu t[4»]w)
w a
Cf
't [ ( 3 a ) (<f> ) ]w iff (3 u )( u e V & cfU t [4>]w)
w a
We say that
,
taken relative to c and f, is
model M) iff cfCy[<j>]w. A formula $ is true in a
iff for all c e C and for all f, cf
c
T [tj> ]c . A formula <f> is RLD-valid
i w
iff 4> is true in every RLD model. This concludes the exposition of the
syntax and semantics of RLD.
The most important difference between LD and RLD is their differing
assignments to predicates. Kaplan would assign temporal ist intensions—
members of (Un )^x^—to n-place predicates; we, reflecting our bias
towards eternal ism, assign such predicates eternal ist meanings—members
of ( ( (<P(W)
.
Given the results of Chapter I, it should be clear
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why we cannot assign eternal 1st intensions-members of (Un )
W
(or
((P(W))
Un
), or constant functions in ((U n )
W
)
T
-to predicates: Such
assignments would yield unacceptable results for the truth conditions
of formulas such as "TP(F^ I ) ".
This difference in semantic assignments is reflected in the
difference in truth conditions for atomic formulae in LD and RLD.
Kaplan defines truth for atomics thus!'/:
cf[Fnv .. an]tw iff <|a 1 l ctfw , I «n | ctfw> e V pn (<t,w>).
Here, an atomic is true iff the denotations of its terms are in the
extension of its predicate (viz., in the result of applyinq its intension
to the circumstances of evaluation).
In RLD, matters are somewhat different. We wish the semantics of
the language (implicitly or explicitly) to assign to sentences the sort
of functions from contexts and times to eternal ist intensions which we
called eternal ist meanings in I. IV; likewise, we wish tense and modal
operators to have associated with them (explicitly or implicitly)
functions from meanings to meanings as in I. IV. Such an assignment is
achieved by letting V assign to an n-place predicate a member of
( ( «P(W) )
CxT
)
u
t as above. Thus, an atomic is true at w, relative to
eft, iff the meaning of the predicate, applied to the designata of its
terms, yields an eternal ist meaning m such that w is in m(<c,t>). It
is relatively easy to verify that this treatment of the predicates, in
the company of the rest of our semantical apparatus allows us to under-
stand the tense operators as being implicitly assigned the same functions
r j 2
in [(<? (W)
tx
] as in our treatment of tenses in Chapter I.
51
Other significant differences between RLD and LD lie in the treat-
ment of quantification and the introduction, in RLD, of 'you'-terms.
Quantification in LD is unabashedly 'possibl ist 1
. Kaplan, in effect,
allows worlds to have domains which are proper subsets of U. (This is
achieved by introducing a predicate 'Exists 1
.) But Kaplan places no
restrictions on what objects may be in the extension of a predicate at
a world, and he allows an existentially quantified formula to be true
at a world if anything in U satisfies the relevant open formula.
We would prefer it to be the case that something of the form **Ft~*
is true (relative to eft) at w only if |t|
ctfw exists at w; likewise,
we do not wish to have formulas of the form of r03xFx -> 3 xOFx"*
to be valid, as they are on Kaplan's treatment. Thus, we have restricted
the function V so that predicates have only members of V (w's domain)
in their extensions; we also allow existentially quantified formulas to
be true at w only when something in V
w
satisfies the quantified sentence.
In introducing the terms ^**you3, for each i, to represent English
singular 'you 1
,
we choose to treat English 'you' as an indexical. (To
treat it as a demonstrative, we would introduce a "you-functor" from
terms to terms.) We realize that English 'you' appears to behave some-
times as an indexical, sometimes as a demonstrative: If but two of us
are present, my use of 'you' in "You are anythina but svelte" denotes
you without an accompanying demonstration; but it seems that when address-
ing a crowd, I must demonstrate a person to indicate whom my use of
'you' denotes. We think, however, that in cases of the second sort, the
use of a demonstration does not determine the referent of 'you', but
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simply clarifies for the audience who 'you' denotes. On our view, the
denotation of 'you' in such cases is determined by the speaker's
intentions. Thus, we choose to treat 'you' as an indexical.
We may say that a term a is a rigid designator just in case, for
any context c, assignment f, time t, and worlds w and w ' U|
1
'ctfw'
01
ctfw " We have foll °wed Kaplan in making all terms in RLD which play
the role of demonstratives or indexicals-"I", ryou T
> for each n> and
fdthattoij1
,
for any term a— rigid designators. Let us turn to a con-
sideration of the justification for this.
II • Direct Reference and Propositional Identity
That demonstratives and indexicals are rigid designators follows
from a stronger thesis held by Kaplan: The thesis that such terms are
directly referential
. As Kaplan explains the notion, a directly re-
ferential term is a term which
refer[s] directly without the mediation of a Fregean
Sinn as meaning. ... the proposition expressed by a
sentence containing such a term.
. . invol ve[s] individuals
directly rather than by way of ... "individual concepts"
or "modes of presentation"
...( [D] , 1)
...I intend to use " directly referential " for an
expression whose referent, once determined, is taken
as fixed for all possible circumstances, i.e., is
taken as being the propositional component [corresponding
to the term]
.
For me, the intuitive idea is not that of an
expression which turns out to designate the same object
in all possible circumstances, but an expression whose
semantical rules provide di rectly that the referent
in all possible circumstances is fixed to be the actual
referent. ( [ D] , 12; Kaplan's emphasis)
How one might defend the claim that demonstratives and indexicals
are directly referential, I shall consider in section III. Here, I wish
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to discuss what consequences this thesis has with respect to the
question: When do two sentences express the same object of belief?
If one adopts Kaplan's views concerning language, the thesis that
demonstratives and indexicals are directly referential has extremely
strong consequences. According to Kaplan, the content of a sentence
(which Kaplan identifies with the object of belief expressed by a
sentence ([D], 60)) is determined functionally by the contents of the
parts of the sentence:
(FP) If two compound well formed expressions, each
set in (possibly different) contexts differ
only with respect to components which when
taken in their respective contexts have the
same content, then the content of the two
compounds each taken in its own context is
the same. ([_D]
, 26)
"
The passages cited above clearly imply that co-referential directly
referential terms have the same content (the propositional component
corresponding to such a term is^ its referent). More precisely, for
any directly referential terms a and 3 , if c[a]c = c
'
[elc
'
,
then
w w
c[a] = c'[e]. This, in conjunction with (FP), clearly entails that if
two sentences, taken relative to contexts c and c 1
,
differ only with
respect to demonstratives and indexicals which, when taken relative to
c and c', have the same referent, then the content of (the proposition
expressed by) the two sentences, relative to their respective contexts,
is the same. Let us call this principle (A).
Principle (A), of course, requires that any interchange of co-
referential demonstratives and indexicals, even within the scope of
epistemological verbs, preserves propositional identity. We think that
this is false; we will attempt to give a direct counter-example to this
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in section IV. Even without directly appealing to the behavior of
such terms in epi stemol oqical contexts, however, we can cast serious
doubt upon principle (A).
First of all, assuming the truth of the view that demonstratives
and indexical s are directly referential
,
the case for (A) rests uDon
(FP). Reflection upon our work in Chapter I shows that (FP) must be
rejected, once eternalism is accepted and it is allowed that the syntax
and semantics of tense logic give an acceptable account of the loqical
form of tensed English. For, on the eternal ist view, sentences of the
forms of
<f>
and *~N<p have the same content, relative to any context.
Thus, relative to any context, sentences of the form of rfF cjT1 and
^FFNcfT
7 differ only with respect to components (viz_.
, $ and
r
Nc^) which,
when taken in the context, have the same content. Such sentences do not,
in general, have the same content, contradicting (FP). Since the case
for (A) rests upon (FP), and we have good reason for rejecting (FP),
we have reason for rejecting (A).
Secondly, serious theoretical considerations, which emerge after
reflection upon our work in I. IV, caution us aqainst acceptance of
principles such as (FP) and (A). Those who advance principles such as
(FP) and (A) seem to assume that only one sort of semantic value-
content— can play a role in determini no the content of a sentence. We
do not see why this must be so.
Let us first indicate schematically what worries us about principles
such as (FP) and (A). A priori
,
it seems conceivable that languages such
as English may behave as follows: (i) Associated with sentences are
55
two different sorts of abstract entities-propositions and a distinct
sort of entity which we might term abstracta
; (ii) sentences, pro-
positions, and abstracta are so related that, relative to some contexts,
two sentences may express the same proposition but distinct abstracta;
(m) the language contains an operator sensitive, not to proDositions
,
but to abstracta: That is, the operator is such that, for some property
P of abstracta, prefixing the operator to a sentence S yields a sentence
true relative to a context c iff the abstractum expressed by S relative
to c has P.
If a language satisfies (i) through (iii), it is an open question
as to whether or not (FP) (and principles such as (A)) will be true of
it. For it may be that the language contains sentences S and S' such
that, relative to some context, S and S' express the same proposition
or content, but the abstractum expressed by S does, while that expressed
by S' does not, have property P. In that case, prefixing the abstracta
sensitive operator to S and to S' yields sentences with diverging truth
values relative to the context. Since sentences with diverging truth
values relative to a context cannot express the same proposition relative
thereto, in such a case (FP) would fail for the language.
It is our contention that the above described situation is not simply
an idle possibility. Given our work in I . IV
,
it is plausible to suppose
that English itself satisfies conditions (i) through (iii): Eternal ist
meanings are distinct from contents; sentences may express the same
content relative to a context, although they have distinct meanings;
furthermore, our analysis of tensed English in I. IV suggests that tense
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operators should be seen as sensitive to meanings, and not (directly)
to content.
That there are counter-examples to (FP) other than those involving
sentences of the form of <p and rN^ is something we shall argue for
directly in Chapter IV, although we give evidence for this claim in
section IV of this chapter. At this point, however, I think it is fair
to say that we have given good reason to doubt that (A) is true, even
given the truth of the thesis that demonstratives and indexicals are
pdirectly referential.
Our discussion thus far, however, does not cast doubt upon a
somewhat weaker version of principle (A). Call a sentence normal if,
within it, no singular term occurs within the scope of a non-truth
functional operator or non-extensional predicate. Nothina said thus
far speaks against the truth of what we may call principle (B): If
S and S' are normal sentences such that S' is obtained from S by sub-
stituting 3 in S for an occurrence of a, a and 6 demonstratives or
indexicals, then, relative to any contexts c and c', if c[a]c = c
'
[ e]
c
'
,
w w
and the expressions otherwise occurring in S and S' have, relative to
3
their respective contexts, the same content, then c[S] = c'[S'].
That (B) is weaker than (A) follows from (B)'s restriction to
normal sentences: Both (A) and (B) assure us that "You are tired,"
"I am tired," and "He is tired," uttered simultaneously and used in
such a way was to have co-referential subject terms, express the same
proposition. But while (A) entails that there are cases in which "Mary
believes that I am tired" and "Mary believes that she is tired" express
the same proposition, (B) does not have such entailments.
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Let us turn to the question of what arguments can be mustered in
support of principle (B) and the view that demonstratives and indexicals
are directly referential.
111 * Arguments for the Existence of Direct Referpnrp
In [D], Kaplan presents a number of arguments which he suggests are
arguments for the thesis that demonstratives and indexicals are directly
referential. Thus, for example, Kaplan argues
Suppose I point at Paul and say,
He now lives in Princeton, Jew Jersey.
Call what I said— i.e., the content of my utterance,
the proposition expressed— "Pat"
. Is Pat true or
false? True! Suppose that unbeknownst to me, Paul
had moved to Santa Monica last week. Would Pat have
then been true or false? False! Now, the tricky
case: Suppose that Paul and Charles had each
disguised themselves as the other and had switched
placed. If that had happened, and I had uttered
as I did, then the proposition I would have
expressed would have been false. But irTTFat
possible context the proposition I would have
expressed is not Pat. That is easy to see~because
the proposition I would h ave expressed, had I
pointed to Charles instead of Paul ,— call this
proposition "Mike"— not only would have been false
but actually is false. Pat, I would claim, would
still be true in the circumstances of the envisaged
possible context, provided that Paul — in whatever
costume he appeared—were still residing in
Princeton. ([D], 34)
When we consider the vast array of possible circumstances
with respect to which we miaht inquire into the truth of
a proposition expressed in some context c by an utterance
u, it quickly becomes apparent that only a small fraction
of these circumstances will involve an utterance of the
same sentence in a similar context, and that there must
be a way of evaluating the truth value of propositions
expressed using demonstratives in counterfactual
circumstances in which no demonstrations are taking
place and no individual has the exact characteristics
exploited in the demonstration. Surely, it is irrelevant
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to determing whether what I said would be true or
not in some counterfactual circumstance whether
Paul or anyone else for that matter, looked as he
now does. All that would be relevant is where
he lives
. ( [ D] , 35)
What, precisely, does such an argument show about the semantics
of demonstratives? The simplest and most straightforward interpretation
of these passages is as follows: Kaplan is here appealing to the
(common) intuition that what is expressed by an utterance u of a sentence
such as "He is now happy" (at a time t) is true in a world w iff in w
(at t), the person actually denoted by "he" in u is happy. Such an
intuition about the truth conditions of sentences in which demonstratives
occur is widely shared, and similar claims about the semantic behavior
of indexicals have as great an intuitive force as the above claim.
I propose to accept these intuitions; let us allow that, where a
is a demonstrative or indexical, a normal sentence of the form *a is F~*
that expresses, relative to a context c, a proposition, expresses a
proposition true in a world w iff the denotatum of a, relative to c,
has the property expressed by Hs F1
,
relative to c, in w. Such con-
siderations certainly do not establish that demonstratives and indexicals
are directly referential terms; they establish only that such terms
are rigid designators. Co-referential rigid designators cannot in
general be intersubsti tuted sal va propositi one .
One might, however, interpret the above passages as the basis for
5
a somewhat more subtle argument. Following Nathan 0. Salmon, we might
distinguish between descriptional and non-descriptional terms. A term
is descriptional if its denotation (the denotation of a particular use
of the term), relative to a world, "is determined by semantics alone to
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be whoever or whatever 1 ' has uniquely a particular set of properties,
or satisfies a sufficient number of a set of such properties. "A
descriptional term is a term that denotes by way of properties. The
paradigm is a definite description in attributive use." ( [RMD] , 444)
A term is non-descriptional if it is not descriptional. 6
Part of Kaplan's point in the above cited passages is that the
denotation of "he", as it is used in Kaplan's utterance of "He now
lives in Princeton, New Jersey", at a world w, is in no way dependent
upon who has, in w, the property of being demonstrated by Kaplan or
the property of looking like Bernacerraf looked when demonstrated by
Kaplan. Such considerations at least form the starting point for an
argument that terms such as "he" are thoroughly non-descriptional:
There does not seem to be any property or set of properties associated
with a use of such terms which determines the referent of the term at
an arbitrary world.'7
The above quoted passages do not in any way establ ish this last
O
claim; they barely suggest it. I have shown elsewhere that demon-
stratives and indexicals do not seem to be capable of being construed
as descriptional terms: No one has advanced a theory, that is even
mildly plausible, on which demonstratives and indexicals can be construed
as terms whose reference, at arbitrary worlds, is determined in whole
or in part by a set of properties semantically associated with (uses of)
such terms.
Supposing that it can be established that demonstratives and index-
icals are non-descriptional in the sense characterized above, does it
follow that a principle such as (B) is correct?
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It seems to me plausible to think that it does. We have insisted,
in Chapter I, that the object of belief expressed by a sentence is to
be identified with the bearer of truth or falsity expressed by that
sentence. In showinq that demonstrati ves and indexicals are non-
descriptional
,
we go quite some way towards showinq that the bearers of
truth and falsity expressed by sentences, alike but for co-referential
demonstratives or indexicals, are identical. This is because it is
plausible to think that what bearer of truth is associated with a use
of a sentence of a language is determined by the semantics of the
language. In the case of a non-descriptional term, the semantics of
the language does not associate a property or set of properties with
the term; nothing, corresponding to such a term, seems to "enter into"
(I intend this terminology metaphorically) the bearer of truth associated
with a sentence in which such a term occurs, except, perhaps, the object
gthe term denotes. As Kaplan puts it, for such terms "the semantical
rules.
.. (provide) a way of determining the actual referent and no way
of determining any other propositional component." ([D], 12)
Thus, given that demonstratives and indexicals are non-descriptional,
and that the bearer of truth expressed by a sentence is to be identified
with the proposition expressed by that sentence, we have good reason to
accept principle (B). As I noted above, I have shown elsewhere that it
is implausible to suppose that demonstratives and indexicals are anything
but non-descriptional; we have argued in Chapter I that the bearer of
truth expressed by a sentence is most naturally identified with the
object of belief expressed thereby. Thus, I think we are entitled to
accept principle (B) as correct.
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Let me make one more point in favor of principle (B): It seems
to accord with our pre-theoretical ideas of how beliefs are to be
individuated. It would seem that whenever two people are able to
(simultaneously) correctly express beliefs with normal sentences that
differ only with respect to co-referential demonstratives or indexicals,
we attribute the same belief to them. Thus, for example, if I can
express something I believe by saying "I am wounded" and you can express,
at that time, a belief of yours by addressinq me and sa.yinn "You are
wounded," one is inclined to say that we share a belief-that I am
wounded. Likewise, if I point at Edwina and say "She is attractive"
while she says to herself "I am attractive," we would again be inclined
to say that Edwina and I share a belief— that she is attractive.
(This last example, by the way, seems to undercut an objection to
the claim that demonstratives are completely non-descriptional
. It
might be claimed that what is expressed by "She is attractive" is a
proposition that is such that anyone who accepts it accepts the pro-
position that there exists an attractive woman. If this were the case,
then, it would seem, "she" would be at least partially descriptional
:
Its denotation at any world would be determined, in part, by which
things are female at that world. However, if it is allowed that my
utterance expresses what Edwina's utterance of "I am attractive" expresses,
then such an objection cannot be sustained. For certainly Edwina could
believe what she says, when she says "I am attractive," and yet believe,
say, that she is a male and that there are no attractive females.)
Accepting principle (B), however, we have cause to reject traditional
views concerning the semantics of attributions of belief.
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Iv * Aii_ .Objection to the Traditional Semantics of Belief Attribution
As we noted at the beginning of Chapter I, it is commonly held
that belief is a dyadic relation between a believer and an object.
Objects of belief-propositions-are held to be expressed by sentences;
a sentence S correctly expresses a person's belief iff he believes the
proposition expressed by S'. Anyone who holds such a view concerning
belief will most likely assent to the following proposal for truth
conditions for (present tense) attributions of belief:
Where a is a singular term and a (closed) sentence,
c[a believes that cf>]w iff c[ a ]w believes, at c-p and w, c[<j>].
That is, an attribution of belief ra believes that <p, taken relative
•to a context c, is true at w iff the denotatum of a (taken relative to
c, at w) believes (at c^ and w) the proposition expressed by $ (taken
relative to c). I will call this the traditional account of the semantics
of belief attribution. In this section, I araue that this account is
incorrect; my argument assumes the truth of what I above dubbed principle
(B). I will attempt to show that it is not a sufficient condition for
c [a believes that ] w that c[a]w believes, at c^ in w, c[<j>].
I begin by stating what I think is a plausible sufficient condition
for two sentences' expressing the same proposition. Let us say that
two predicates £ and £ are joinable exactly if, relative to any context
c, if F expresses the property P relative to c and 6 expresses P' relative
to c, then Ms F and G7 expresses, relative to c, a property P* such
that, necessarily, a thing has P* iff it has both P and P'. Using
normal as in section II, we formulate
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(C) Let S and S' be normal sentences such that
S - is F and a is G*7
,
S' = ra is F and g"7
,
where a is a singular term and F and G are
joinable. Let c by any context such that all
occurrences of a in S and S' are co-referential
.
Then c[S] = c [S
'
]
.
Principle (C) requires us, for example, to identify what is expressed,
relative to any context, by "I am svelte and I am happy" and "I am
svel te and happy.
"
I will defend (C) against certain objections below. I note for the
moment (C) seems very plausible. Intuitively, sentences express the
same proposition exactly if they express the same state of affairs.
No matter how finely we individuate states of affairs, we would, I think,
wish to allow that sentences related as in the antecedent of (C) express
the same state of affairs.
With principles (B) and (C) in hand, we may pose an objection to
the traditional account of the semantics of belief attribution. Let
us suppose that William is in a hotel room in New York with a friend,
looking out of the window at a woman in a phone booth. We suppose
that he has an unobstructed view of the woman, who, William's friend
insists, is William's daughter. William insists that his friend is
mistaken (although the woman is in fact his daughter); William believes
that his daughter is in Atlanta. At this point, the phone rings; it
is William's daughter. While he is listening to his daughter speak,
his friend continues to gesticulate at the woman across the street,
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insisting that it is William's daughter. William explains all this to
his daughter (who, for purposes of the example, I assume never ceases
talking through the telephone). While looking and pointing at the
woman across the street, William sincerely says
(1) I believe that she is in New York and you are not in
New York.
It is very plausible to think that this utterance is true: Practically
any Enqlish speaker, appraised of the facts of the case, would aqree
with this assessment. According to the traditional account, William
speaks truly in uttering (1) if and only if he believes what is expressed,
relative to the context of utterance (call it c) by
(2) She is in New York and you are not in New York.
Now, by principle (B), what is expressed by (2) in c is identical with
what is expressed in c by
(3) You are in New York and you are not in New York.
(It is understood, of course, that all occurrences of "you" in (2) and
(3) are co-referential
. ) By principle (C), we know that (3) expresses,
relative to c, exactly what is expressed, relative to c, by
(4) You are in New York and not in New York.
Thus, given the traditional account of belief attribution, it is the
case that, relative to c
(5) I believe that you are in New York and not in New York.
is true. But certainly (5) is not true, relative to c. For it to be the
case that William could truly utter (5), William would have to be
extremely confused, perhaps irrational. Such confusion or irrationality
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is not an element of the case we have presented. Thus, given the truth
of (B) and (C), and the truth of William's utterance of (1), we must
reject the traiditonal account.
We have already argued that principle (B) is correct. Thus, if our
counter-example is to be disputed, it will have to be on the basis of
one of the following claims: (i) it is not the case that (1) is true
in c; (ii) principle (C) is false; (iii) (5) is true in c. Let us
consider each of these contentions in turn.
(i) On what grounds could it be reasonably denied that (1) is
true in c? It is, I think, fair to assume that anyone who would deny
that (1) is true would have to base his case upon the contention that
William fails to believe the proposition expressed, relative to c, by
one of the following sentences:
(6) She is in New York
(7) You are not in New YorkJ 0
For certainly, if William does believe what is expressed by (6) and by
(7) and explicitly and sincerely testifies that he believes what is
expressed by their conjunction (of course, understanding what he is
saying in giving such testimony), we should allow that he does believe
what is expressed by the conjunction and that (1), relative to c, is
true.
It is, however, difficult to see how we can deny that William
believes what is expressed by (6) and by (7). One might try denying
that William grasps what is expressed by (his use of) (6) or (7), and,
therefore, cannot believe the proposition. But on what grounds? Our
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case does not resemble in the least cases in which it is plausible
to deny that a speaker fails to grasp what is expressed by a sentence
he uses in which a demonstrative or indexical occurs. In such cases,
there fails to be an appropriate connection between the perceptual
state of the speaker, his use of a demonstrative or indexical, and the
referent of the term used. Thus, for example, if a blindfolded man
points at a vase he has never seen, saying "That's blue", it is plausible
to say that he doesn't grasp the proposition he expresses and that he
would, strictly speaking, be speaking falsely if he were to say "I
believe that that s blue. ' Similarly, a woman who believes that some-
one is in the room, but does not touch, see, hear, smell, or taste
anyone, may say "You are making me afraid"; if but one other person is
in the room, she expresses a proposition. However, it is unclear that
she grasps what she expresses.
However, the case we have presented does not have such a lack of
an appropriate connection between perceptual state, term used, and
referent of the term. William sees the referent of his use of "she";
it is plausible to say that he knows that he is perceiving the referent
of his use of "she". A similar point can be made concerning William's
aural perceptions and his use of "you".
To deny that William grasps what is expressed by (6) or (7) would
seem to commit us to the view that people rarely, if ever, grasp the
propositions they express when they use terms such as "she" and "you";
for surely there is not some feature absent in our case, but present in
ordinary uses of such terms, the absence of this feature accounting for
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William's failure to grasp what is expressed by (6) or (7). But a view
according to which people rarely, if ever, grasp what they say when
using terms such as "she" or "you" is unacceptable.
On what other grounds could one deny that William believes what is
expressed by (5) or (6)? One could, perhaps, appeal to principle (B)
and note that, according to it,
(6) She is in New York.
expresses, relative to c, what is expressed, relative to c, by
(8) You are in New York.
This last proposition, however, is the negation of that expressed
relative to c by
(7) You are not in New York.
Thus, to hold that William believes what is expressed by both (6) and
(7) is to hold that there is a proposition such that William believes
both it and its negation. But, it might be objected, this is, if not
simply impossible, at least very unlikely: Having such beliefs is a
mark of utter irrationality.
It is difficult to know what to make of such an objection; in
Chapter IV, we will argue that the claim of irrationality made here is
misguided. At this point, we may note that one who poses such an
objection will have a very hard time saying which of the propositions
in question William fails to believe. (Surely, it is implausible to
hold that William fails to believe both propositions.) There is, so
far as I can see, no reason to say that he believes what is expressed
by (6), but not (7), or vice versa. Each proposition is such that there
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is a sentence, expressing it in the context, to which he assents; each
is such that there is a sentence expressing it to which he would refuse
to assent.
There seems to be no good reason for holding that William does not
believe what is expressed by (6) and by (7), relative to c. I conclude
that William speaks truly in uttering (1).
(n) In objecting to the traditional account we claimed, appealing
to principle (C), that
(3) You are in New York and you are not in New York,
expressed, relative to c, what is expressed by
(4) You are in New York and not in New York.
Some may object to this move. Herbert Heidel berger
,
in discussing an
analogous objection to the traditional account, has made such an
objection. Of the pair of sentences
(9) I believe that you are in California and you are
in New York.
(10) I believe that you are in California and in New York.
Heidel berger writes
On the first of these, I am attributing the property of
being in California while you are in N.Y., a property
which is instantiated by all Californians, and in the
second case I am attributing the property of being
(concurrently ) in California and N.Y., which nothing
instantiates . '
1
Applied to our present example, Heidel berger ' s objection might
be put as follows: Let us call the denotation of "you" as it occurs in
(3) and (4) "Edwina". Consider the properties
F: being in New York and such that Edwina is not in New York
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G: being in New York and not in Mew York
Heidel berger might be construed as arguing that a (necessary and)
sufficient condition for believing what is expressed by (3) is attributing
F to Edwina; a (necessary and) sufficient condition for believing what
is expressed by (4) is attributing G to Edwina. Yet F and G are distinct
properties, and, therefore, one can attribute one of them to Edwina
without attributing the other to her. Thus, what is expressed by (3)
can be believed while what is expressed by (4) is not believed. Hence,
the propositions in guestion are distinct; both our putative counter-
example and principle (C) fail.
Heidelberger holds that to believe a proposition such as that ex-
pressed by sentences (2) through (4) is to attribute a property to an
individual; he, like Chisholm, takes the notion of attributing a property
1
2
as undefined. Let us begin a response to Heidelberger' s objection by
noting that F does not seem to be the only property which one must
attribute to Edwina in order to believe what is expressed by (3). Surely,
(3) expresses the same proposition as does
(11) You are not in New York and you are in New York.
It would seem that a necessary and sufficient condition for believing
what is expressed by (11) (and, therefore, by (3)) is attributing
H: not being in New York and such that Edwina is in New York
to Edwina; H is, of course, distinct from F. Likewise, one thinks, a
necessary condition of believing what is expressed by (3) is attributing
to Edwina the property of being in New York and the property of not being
in New York.
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There are, then, a multitude of properties which one must attribute
to Edwina in order to believe what is expressed by (3). Why should we
think that G is not among them, as Heidelberger argues? Note that it
cannot be simply because one can attribute F to some objects while
failing to attribute G to them. For one can attribute F to some objects
while failing to attribute H to them. But, as we saw above, attributing
both F and H to Edwina are necessary conditions for believing what is
expressed by (3)
.
Now, while Heidelberger is correct in arguing that one can attribute
F to an object without attributing G to it, he fails to give us a reason
for thinkinq that one can attribute F to Edwina without attributing G
to her. We would argue, against Heidelberger, that if he holds that the
traditional account of belief is correct, he is committed to the view
that if one attributes F to Edwina one attributes G to her.
In order to make this plausible, I will try to make plausible the
claim that, given the traditional account of belief attribution, in any
context in which
(12) I believe that she is in New York and you are not
in New York.
is true and such that "she" and "you" both denote Edwina, we may infer
(13) Ox) (I believe that x is in New York and x is not in
New York.
)
I take it that (13) is true in a context only if the agent of the context
attributes the property expressed by the open sentence "x is in New York
and x is not in New York" to something; furthermore, I take it that this
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—
the Pr0perty G
- Thus, to show that (13) is validly inferable from
(12), under the conditions specified, is to show that when (12) i s true
under these conditions, the agent of the context attributed G to
someth i ng— Edwi na
.
My argument depends upon the assumption that we may validly infer,
from something of the form of
(13) a believes that B is F
a sentence of the form of
(14) (3 x) (a believes that x is F)
provided that B is a demonstrative or indexical, and that b is free for
x. I take it that this is a plausible rule of inference, provided that
we agree that a necessary condition for the truth of an attribution of
belief is that the person believe what is expressed by the sentence in
the belief context. (I will discuss this rule more fully in Chapter
IV.)
If this rule be granted, and we adopt the traditional account of
belief attribution, the following argument can be given: Suppose that
(12) is true in a context in which "you" and "she" both denote Edwina.
If (12) is thus true, then so, relative to the context, is a use of
(15) You are identical with her and I believe that you
are not in New York and she is in Mew York.
where both uses of "you" are addressed to the same person and both uses
of "she" are accompanied by the same demonstration.
Now, two applications of the above introduced rule to (15) yield
(16) (3 x)(3y)(x=y and I believe that x is not in
New York and y is in New York.)
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But, given the traditional account of belief, we must, I believe,
conclude that (16) implies
(17) (3x)(I believe that x is not in New York and x is
in New York.
)
Why? Well, given the traditional account, it would seem that (16) is
true if and only if there are objects U] and u
?
such that U] is identical
with u
2
and the denotatum of "I" believes the proposition expressed by
"x is not in New York and y is in New York 11 when U] is assigned to x.
But this last, given the traditional account of belief, constitutes the
truth conditions for (17). (This argument, of course, assumes that it
makes sense to speak of the proposition expressed by a sentence under an
assignment to its free variables. I will discuss this assumption in
Chapter IV. Heidel berger, at any rate, is willing to accept such a view.)
Thus, I think, it is plausible to think that if one accepts the
traditional account of belief, one is committed to the view that to
attribute F to Edwina is to attribute G to her. Thus, Heidel berger
does not establish that one can believe what is expressed by (3) but not
by (4). Our counter-example and principle (C) stand. 13
It is worth noting that even if Heidel berger 1 s objection is accepted,
it is plausible to think that our case still presents an objection to
the traditional account of belief. For even without making appeal to
(C), the traditional account of belief commits us to the truth, relative
to c, of
(21) I believe that you are in New York and you are
not in New York.
given the truth of (1) in this context and principle (B). That (21) is
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true in this context seems almost as counter-intuitive as the claim that
(5) is true in c.
(m) Finally, one might respond to our counter-example by
maintaining that
(5) I believe that you are in New York and not in
New York.
is true, relative to c. After all, it may be said, that (1) is true in
c already shows that William is confused; to allow (5)
' s truth is not
to admit to any greater degree of confusion on his part.
Surely this is the counsel of desperation. To say that a sentence
of the form of
(22) A believes that x is F and not F.
is true is to say something terribly derrogatory about the denotatum of
"A"; such claims are simply not made when we are not prepared to also
make attributions of complete irrationality. Nothing in the case we have
presented suggests such irrationality on William's part.
I conclude that our counter-example shows the traditional account
of belief to be incorrect.
V . Belief de se and the Traditional Semantics
There is yet another sort of objection to the traditional account
which we will consider. Such an objection, which is suggested by work
1
4
of John Perry's, involves so-called cte s£ ascriptions of belief.
A cte se^ ascription of belief is one of the form of
(1) a believes that a himself (herself, etc.) is F,
74
a any singular term. (We understand (1) to be an idiomatic variant of
sentences of the form of ra believes himself (herself, etc.) to be F1
and of sentences of the form of ra believes that he himself (she herself,
etc.) is F 1
.) it would seem that at least part of what is said by a
sentence of the form of (1) (relative to a context c) is that the denotatum
of a (in c) believes the proposition which he would express, were he to
say something of the form •
(2) I am F 1
where F_, relative to the appropriate context, expresses whatever F
expresses relative to c. Furthermore, it would seem that there is no
other proposition p which is such that (1) implies that a's denotatum
believes p. Thus, it would seem that given a de^ se^ ascription such as
(1), we should identify the proposition expressed by himself is f"1
(as it occurs in (1)) with that which the denotatum of a would express,
uttering (2); then, given the traditional account, we would have to say
that (1) is true iff the denotatum of a believes this proposition.
The (putative) objection to the traditional account is based on the
not altogether implausible intuition that the above claim of a sufficient
condition is wrong. Consider the following situation: I am standing
in front of a mirror (which I think to be a pane of transparent glass).
I see a man in front of me (I am, of course, seeing my own reflection)
who looks, for all the world, like my father. I say to myself
(3) I believe that he is my father.
Call the context of my utterance c. Since my use of "he" in
(4)
He is my father
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denotes me, and "he" therein behaves as a demonstrative, (2), relative
to c, expresses what
(5) I am my father
expresses relative to c (by (B)). But then, given the above, we would
have to say that
(6) Richard believes that Richard himself is his father
is true in c, if the traditional account is correct. But surely (3) and
(6) diverge in truth value in this context: I speak truly when I utter
(3), but I would have to be deranged for (6) to be true relative to any
context. Again, we have cause to reject the traditional account.
Such examples are more controversial than the example discussed in
the last section. In this section, I wish to argue that such alleged
counter-examples cannot be disposed of simply by supposing that (4) and
(5) do not express the same proposition. We will defer until Chapter
IV a consideration of whether cases such as the above do indeed give
us cause to reject the traditional account. I shall assume that (4),
as used in (3), is properly construed as an identity statement. Making
this assumption, we may state the obvious objection to our example as
follows: (5) may be formally represented as
(5’) I = (7x)(FxI)
(where "Fxy" represents "x is the father of y"). rf (4), as it occurs
in (3), were properly represented as
(4 1 ) dthat( (*? x) (Gx) ) = (?x)(FxI)
(where "( /7x)(Gx) M is some description, denoting the speaker, used to
represent the speaker's demonstration), then it would be plausible to
think that (4) and (5) express the same proposition relative to the
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context. But such a representation of (4) is not in the least plausible.
The speaker is not demonstrating himself, he is demonstrating his re-
flection. Since the speaker's use of "he 1 ' is not accompanied by a demon-
stration of himself, his use of "he" cannot be considered to be a directly
referential term denoting himself. Thus, it is incorrect to suppose that
(4) and (5) express the same proposition relative to the context; the
counter-example fails.
I will respond to this objection presently. First of all
,
I wish
to consider the suggestion, made in the course of the objection, that
the speaker in our example is not demonstrating himself. This seems to
me to be a curious view. Suppose that someone points at a reflection
of H. Bunker Hunt and says
(7) He likes silver.
Most speakers, I think, would agree that, given that the reflection was
in the line of the speaker's finger and that the speaker intended to be
talking about the person who appeared to him as the reflected Hunt then
appeared, the speaker's use of "he" denotes Hunt. Indeed, I think we
would hold this to be true, even if the speaker didn't realize that he
was pointing at a person's reflection.
Since the speaker's use of "he" denotes Hunt, what prevents us from
saying that the speaker has demonstrated Hunt, and that "he" in this case
functions as a directly referential term? Note that it is very plausible
to say, in this case, that the proposition expressed by (7) is one true
in an arbitrary world w just in case Hunt exists in w and there likes
silver; this claim, I think, is exactly as compelling as the intuition
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that an utterance of (7), accompanied by a "direct" demonstration of
Hunt, expresses such a proposition.
Furthermore, it is very difficult to see what proposition the
original utterance of (7) could express, if it does not express what is
expressed by an utterance of (7) accompanied by a direct demonstration
of Hunt. Given that the truth conditions for the original utterance
of (5) are as suggested in the above paragraph, the speaker cannot be
expressing the proposition expressed by a sentence such as
(8) The man I am demonstrating likes silver
or by
(9) The man reflected by that likes silver
(where "that" denotes the reflection); for the truth conditions for the
propositions expressed by these sentences are very different than those
suggested above.
The paradigm of a demonstration, of course, is an act of pointing
"directly" at an object in which it is clear (from the context or
because of certain conventions which both speaker and audience accept)
which of the objects intersecting the line from the speaker's finger is
intended by the speaker as referent of his demonstrative. But while
this is the paradigm of a demonstration, it is not the only sort of act
which could or does count as a demonstration. The purpose of a demon-
stration is simply to fix the referent of the term it accompanies. In
great part, whether or not a demonstration succeeds in fixing a referent
is determined by the conventions accepted by the speaker and his audience.
If we consider cases like the Hunt case just discussed, we can, I think.
78
agree that it is not necessary to point directly at a thing in order to
make it the referent of a use of “that", “he", or “she", even when such
a use is demonstrative. In particular, it would seem, Enclish speakers
make use of the convention that pointing at an imaqe or reflection of
an object is sufficient to make the object represented the referent of
a (demonstrative) use of such a term.
Having said this, it is obvious how we would reply to the objection
to our example. We hold that it is_ correct to formally represent my
use of
(4) He is my father
by a sentence of the form of
(4‘) dthat(( /7x)(Gx)) = ( /?x)(FxI).
For there is every reason to think that my use of "he" in (4) functions
semantically just as "he" functions in a use of (4) accompanied by a
direct demonstration of a person. Indeed, we may even propose a
suitable candidate for what is represented by "(?x)(Gx)" in (4'): A
description such as "the person I am demonstrating" would, given the
above argument, denote me in this context.
Thus, I think the counter-example given at the beginning of this
section stands up to this sort of objection. At the risk of repeating
myself, let me repeat what I take to be the strongest argument advanced
here in defense of that counter-example. It is this: If the modal truth
conditions for my use of a sentence of the form of
(10) He is F
accompanied by a demonstration of a reflection of an object u are the
same as those for a use of (10) accompanied by a direct demonstration
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of u, then each use expresses the same proposition. (This is so because
there seems to be no plausible alternative for the role of proposition
expressed by (10) when accompanied by a demonstration of a reflection.)
But the modal truth conditions of such utterances are the same. Thus,
a use of something of the form of (10), accompanied by a demonstration
of a reflection of u, expresses the same proposition as a use of (6)
accompanied by a direct demonstration of u.
We note again that we are not asserting at this stage that the
above example does constitute a counter-example to the traditional
account; indeed, we will cast some doubt upon this in IV. IV. Our pur-
pose in this section has been to demonstrate that cases such as the
above cannot be dismissed simply by claiming that the de re belief
ascription corresponding to the de se ascription is false.
VI
. Concl usi on
We have seen that the traditional account of belief attributions
must be rejected. In the chapters which follow, we will consider
alternative accounts of the semantics of belief attribution. However,
before turning to a consideration of such accounts, we must consider
a final objection to the argument of this chapter.
The objection may be stated as follows: What you have really
shown is not that the traditional account of belief attributions is
false, but that it is false, if_ principle (B) is true. You perform
modus ponens on this conditional; isn't it more reasonable to perform
modus to! lens
,
concluding that principle (B) is false? After all, you
have given us no reason to suppose that belief is not a two-place relation
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between a person and what is expressed by a sentence; given that this
is the case, what other account of belief attribution is possible, save
the one provided by the traditional account? The most plausible con-
clusion to draw from your work is that principles such as (B) do not
associate propositions, contexts, and sentences correctly.
Our full response to this challenge will not be given until Chapter
IV. There we will argue that belief is not simply a two-place relation,
but a three-place relation. Here, I think, we must content ourselves
by recalling the points made in section III of this chapter.
In section III, it was noted, first of all, that demonstratives
and indexicals do seem to be rigid designators. Once this is noted, it
is terribly difficult to see how principles such as (B) can be denied.
For, as we noted in section III, there seems to be no set of properties
semantically associated with the use of such a term, which determine the
denotation of the term at an arbitrary world. The content of a belief
expressed by a sentence of the form Q is F^, a a demonstrative or index-
i cal
,
seems to be simply that the object (denoted by a) has what is
expressed by Hs F~* . This point is butressed by the observation that
we identify beliefs in accord with principle (B): Most of us feel that
the belief I express by saying "I am wounded" is identical with the
belief you express by saying, pointing at me, "He is wounded," and with
the belief others express, addressing me and saying "You are wounded".
Accepting principle (B), we conclude that the traditional account
is in need of repair. Let us turn to an examination of several attempts
to make such repairs.
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Notes
^ Strictly speaking, in the context of a formal language such as
Kaplan's LD or our RLD, we should speak of the content of an expression
taken relative to a context and an assignment f to its variables;
likewise for the value of an expression
,
taken relative to c, at w. Thus,
strictly speaking, we should write cf[a] and cf[a]w for c[a] and
c[a]w
. However, where a is closed, it obviously does no harm to speak
of tjie content of a, relative to c; likewise for talk of the value of a,
relative to c, at w. We shall persist in talking in this way when it
can do no harm.
2
Kaplan, in a section of [D] called "Monsters Begat by Elegance,"
argues that the only sentential operators which could occur in English
are (truth functional or) intensional operators; obviously, we disagree.
Kaplan's arguments, however, are less than convincing: He merely suggests
that English could not contain an operator such as "In some contexts it
is true that.
"
3
Principle (B) is a principle about the English language. In form-
ulating it, I am ignoring certain morphological niceties, e.g., that
one cannot simply substitute "you" for "I" in "I am ignoring certain
morphological niceties" and obtain a well formed English sentence. I
hope the reader will tolerate this simplification. (Similar remarks
apply to principle (C) below.)
\aplan appears ambivalent about the arguments in [D]. They are
prefaced, usually, with the title "Arguments for Principle II" (the
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principle that demonstratives and indexicals are directly referential).
However, they are often constructed in such a way that they cannot be
seen as anything but an argument for the weaker thesis that such terms
are rigid designators.
5
See [RND]
. Salmon allows that there may be terms which are
partially descriptional and partially non-descriptional, e.g., "my father.'
This represents a serious simplification: We ought to recognize
the existence of mixed cases, such as "my father." Although I am
radically simplifying here, I do not think the simplification affects
my argument. We mean to hold, of course, that demonstratives and index-
icals are completely non-descriptional.
7
Perhaps it will be objected that the denotation, say, of my use
of "I" at a world w is whatever has the property, at w, of being me.
So long as it allowed that that property is identical with the one
associated with a use of "you" denoting me, or of "he" denoting me, etc.,
I am willing to allow this: Such a view, it seems, is still committed
to principle (B).
g
I argue for this in the unpublished manuscript "Fregean Theories
of Demonstratives and Indexicals."
9
Here, we are echoing Kaplan: See [D], pp. 13-14.
^For ease of exposition, I forego specifying, here and in the sequel,
how the reference of "you" and "she" is fixed.
11
This is excerpted from correspondence with Heidel berger.
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12
See Heidel berger
' s [BP] and Chisholm's [TFP]
.
13
I will discuss the above argument again in Chapters III and IV.
On my view, the above argument is not valid, since we cannot validly
infer
(a) (3x)(I believe that x is F and x is G)
from
( b ) ( 3U) (3y) (x=y and I believe that x is F and y is G).
The account of the truth conditions of attributions of belief given in
Chapter IV does not sanction this inference, although it does sanction the
inference from
(c) I believe that a is F
to
(d) (3r x)(I believe that x is F)
for directly referential a.
My point in the above, of course, is this: If we do allow the
inference from (c) to (d) as valid, assuming a theory about directly
referential terms like that suggested in II. II and II. Ill, then, it
seems, the traditional account of belief commi ts us to the view that
(a ) follows from ( b)
.
14
Thi s case is suggested by the discussion in Perry's [CEI].
CHAPTER III
STALNAKER AND VAN FRAASSEN ON ASSERTION AND BELIEF
In the last chapter, we argued that the traditional account of the
semantics of belief is incorrect. We there argued that it is not
sufficient, for the truth of something of the form of ra believes that <p,
that the denotatum of a believe what is expressed by <j>. An important and
interesting response to the argument of the last chapter runs as follows.
What proposition is associated with a sentence used to attribute
belief is determined, not simply by the semantical rules bearing upon
that sentence, but by features of the context in which an attribution
of belief is made. While the semantics of English may tell us that,
relative to a context c, a sentence S expresses proposition p, a use of
^ohn believes that S1
,
relative to c, may attribute to John belief, not
in p, but in a distinct proposition q, q being determined jointly by
the semantical rules bearing upon S and features of the context. Thus,
the argument of Chapter II does not really show the traditional account
to be incorrect; rather, it shows that propositions and sentences are
associated, when belief is attributed, in a very subtle way.
Accounts of the semantics of belief attribution which run along
the above lines have been suggested by both Robert Stalnaker (in [A] and
[SB]) and by Bas van Fraassen (in [BC] ) . With respect, for example,
to the case considered in II. IV, both might agree to the following
analysis: Relative to the context of which William is the agent, the
sentences
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(1) You are not in New York but she is in New York.
(2) You are in New York and not in New York.
express the same proposition. (At least, they might agree, the semantics
of English associates the same proposition with them, relative to the
context.) However, it is not the case that
(3) I believe that you are not in New York but she
is in New York.
relative to this context, should be taken to attribute to William a
belief in what is expressed (according to the semantics) by (1) and (2).
What belief (3) attributes is determined by features of the context,
which determine what proposition is to be associated with (1), as it
occurs in (3). This fact explains why (3) and
(4) I believe that you are in New York and not in
New York.
diverge in truth value: (4) does attribute to William a belief in what
is expressed by (1) and (2). This is a belief, both Stalnaker and
van Fraassen would concur, that William does not have.
In this chapter, I explain and criticize Stalnaker's and van Fraassen's
accounts. In sections I and II, I discuss Stalnaker's account of
assertion. I confine my attention to his account of assertion because
it is Stalnaker's view that correct semantics for belief are given by
extending his account of assertion ([SB], passim
.
) . Thus, in showing
in section II that Stalnaker's account of assertion is untenable, I
show that he cannot give adequate semantics for belief by extending this
account.
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III sections III through V, I discuss van Fraassen's account of
the semantics of belief. Section III is devoted to an exposition of
these semantics; section IV contains six counter-examples to the account
explained in section III. Finally, in section V, I arque that van
Fraassen has not succeeded in making a convincing case for the view
that an attribution of belief C, believes that *1 can be used to
attribute to someone a belief in somethinq other than the proposition
the semantics of English says is expressed by <{>.
I. Stal naker on Asserti on
On Stal naker
' s view, it is sets of possible worlds (or functions
from worlds to truth values) which are the objects of belief and assertion.
Stalnaker is well aware that the identification of propositions with
sets of possible worlds leads to seemingly counter-intuitive conseguences
.
He writes
...there can be expressions that determine the
same function from possible worlds into truth
values in very different ways. In such cases,
it can be a significant discovery that two
sentences do determine the same function, and
thus have the same content. When expressions
with the same content are not recognized to have
the same content, it seems implausible to treat
them as expressing or referring to the same
object of belief. ([SB], 9)
Stalnaker proposes to deal with such problems by giving an account
on which an assertive utterance (or a sentence within the scope of
'believes that') does not invariably express the proposition that
"straightforward and wel 1 -moti vated semantical rules imply" it expresses;
rather, under certain conditions, Stalnaker maintains, a sentence used
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assertively or to attribute a belief expresses what Stalnaker calls
the diagonal p roposition determined by its utterance.
To understand Stalnaker's account, we need to understand the
notions of a ^oj^i tional
_
concept and of a context set. A propositional
concept is simply a function from worlds to propositions, a member of
(<P(W)) . The diagonal proposition determined by a propositional concept
f is that subset p of W such that, for all w, w e p iff w e f(w).
According to Stalnaker, "each concrete utterance token can be
associated with the propositional concept it determines." ([A], 318)
What propositional concept is determined by an utterance depends upon
the context set of the utterance. This set of propositions is one,
each member of which is such that
...the speaker is disposed to act as if he assumes or
believes that... [it] is true, and as if he assumes or
believes that his audience assumes or believes that it
is true as well. ( [A] , 321
)
...among the items of information taken for granted or
presupposed in this way by the speaker will be the
proposition that the act of assertion itself is takino
place.
.. [H]e is speaking in all those possible worlds
compatible with the background presuppositions which...
[he] is making as he speaks ... [I ]t follows that when
someone makes an assertion his words determine.
. .a
propositional concept, relative to the possible worlds
compatible with the speaker's presumed background
information. ([SB], 15-16)
I will speak of context sets as sets of propositions or as sets of
worlds, as is convenient; I will refer to the propositions in a speaker's
context set as his presuppositions or assumptions. I denote the context
set of an utterance u with "s ".
u
According to the above, the propositional concept determined by a
'concrete utterance token' u is that (partial) function f in ((P(W))
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such that, for each w e s
u>
f(w) is the proposition expressed by u in
w. Where u is an utterance, let 'y denote the propositional concept
determined by u; say that f
y
is constant exactly if, for all w and w*
in V fu (w) = f u (w,) -
Stal naker
' s view is that "Under certain conditions, the content of
an assertion is... the diagonal proposition of the propositional concept
determined [by the utterance used to make the assertion]." ([SB], 21)
Likewise, on Stalnaker's view, under certain conditions, an attribution
of belief using a sentence S is an attribution of belief, not in the
proposition the semantics of the language says S to express, but in the
diagonal proposition associated with S. 1
For our purposes, it suffices to mention but one of the conditions
under which the content of an assertion (or the belief attributed) is
the diagonal proposition. Stalnaker takes it to be an 'essential
condition of rational communication 1 that "A proposition asserted is
always true in some but not all of the possible worlds in the context
set." ([A], 325) Now, Stalnaker accepts the view that proper names,
demonstratives, and indexicals are all rigid designators. Thus, Stalnaker
is committed, among other things, to the view that the content of any
assertion made with a sentence of the form a and b names, demon-
stratives or indexicals, is the (contingent) diagonal proposition
determined by the utterance. Likewise, in cases such as those discussed
in chapter II, Stalnaker will hold that the sentences used to attribute
belief attribute belief in the diagonal, not the semantically determined
proposition: What the semantics of English says is expressed by
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William's use of "You are not in New York but she is in New York" is
true in no world; a fortiori that proposition is not true in some of
the worlds of the utterance's context set. Again, one may reasonably
presume that in no world of the context set of my utterance of "He’s
my father" will the proposition the semantics says I express-that I
am my father— be true.
Thus, it is plausible to think that Stalnaker's position, if tenable
will provide us with the basis of a solution to the problems raised in
the last chapter. To see if his view is tenable, we shall have to under-
stand what, precisely, the diagonal proposition associated with an
utterance would be. This requires an investigation into what, on
Stalnaker’s view, will comprise the context set of an utterance, a
matter to which we shall now turn.
II. Linguistic Presuppositions
Crucial to Stalnaker's account is an account of the linguistic
assumptions a speaker makes concerning his act of assertion and the
sentence he uses therein. Such assumptions, in effect, determine what
is expressed by his 'concrete utterance token' in various worlds in the
context set, thereby determining both propositional concept and diagonal
proposition. Somewhat surprisingly, Stalnaker does not explicitly
discuss this matter: He says simply that "the proposition that the act
of assertion itself is taking place" is assumed. In this section, we
will attempt to determine what linguistic assumptions a speaker must be
presumed to make about his act of assertion and the expressions he uses
therein.
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Taking at face value Stalnaker’s claim that it is the proposition
that the act of assertion takes place that is assumed, one may be tempted
to say something along the following lines. To make an assertion is,
roughly, to intentionally use a sentence (token) to express a proposition;
thus, acts of assertion may be represented as triples of the form <x,s,p>,
x a person, s a sentence token, p a proposition. Such an act occurs
iff the person uses the sentence token, with assertive intent, to express
the proposition. Stalnaker's view must be that the agent of an
assertion <x,s,p> assumes the proposition that <x,s,p> occurs. 2
We must resist the above described temptation. If such an assumption
is a member of the context set, then the speaker's sentence expresses
the same proposition in every world in the context set, thereby associat-
ing a constant propositional concept with the utterance. But it is
crucial, if Stalnaker's account is to succeed, that the propositional
concept, in general, not be constant. (Otherwise, the diagonal pro-
position is identical with the proposition associated semantically with
3
the sentence. )
In [A], Stalnaker remarks that the diagonal proposition determined
by an utterance by x of a sentence 'S is, roughly, the proposition that
what is said in x's utterance of S_ is true, where "what is said in x's
utterance of S" is to be understood as a flacid designator. ([A], 319)
This suggests that the speaker's linguistic assumptions may be confined
to the relatively weak assumption that he uses the sentence token he
uses to express a proposition. Is it, then, the case that the agent of
an act of assertion <x,s,p> assumes simply the proposition that there is
a q such that <x,s,q> occurs?
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A moment's reflection will show that this cannot be the only
assumption concerning the speaker's utterance included in the context
set. There is no end to propositions which could be expressed by a
sentence token, even assuming that the token is a token of a sentence
in some particular language. Suppose, to take an example, that I
assertively utter a token S of the sentence "Hesperus is Mars," and
that I presuppose only (i) that I use S to express a proposition, and
(ii) various non-1 inguistic facts about the world. S is certainly not
wedded to any proposition or set of propositions. It is dubious that
my non-1 inguistic presuppositions will rule out of the context set
worlds in which my use of S expresses various bizarre propositions that
I have never even entertained, much less believe— say, for example, the
proposition that Jack Benny once dated a female impersonator. Thus, if
(i) is the only linguistic presupposition in the context set, it is
extremely implausible to think that the diagonal proposition associated
with my utterance will be one I eyen grasp, much less believe. It will
certainly have nothing to do with Hesperus, Mars, or astronomy.
It is important to grasp that such an assumption is too weak to
fix an appropriate diagonal proposition for an utterance to express,
even if it is also assumed that my token is one of a particular language.
"Hesperus" is not necessarily wedded, in English, to Hesperus; "Mars"
is not tied, throughout the extent of logical space where English is
spoken, to Mars. "Hesperus is Mars" could express any identity you
please.
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What, then, are the sorts of linguistic assumptions which must
figure into the context set of an utterance? Plausible condidates for
such assumptions are ones concerning the meaning of the expressions the
speaker uses. For a competent speaker of a language will, in general,
know the meanings of the expressions he uses. Furthermore, a speaker
will not, in general, use a sentence to make an assertion if he does not
believe that his audience knows its meaning as well. Part of the point
of making an assertion is to communicate a proposition; such commun-
ication won't take place if the audience doesn't know the meaning of
the sentences used. Thus, propositions about the meaning of the express-
ions used by the speaker seem tailor-made to be presuppositions, as
Stalnaker characterizes these: They are propositions which are such
that the speaker "is disposed to act as if he.
. . be 1 ieves that [they are]
true, and as if he. . .believes that his audience.
. .be! ieves that [they
are] true as well." ([A], 321)
However, while such propositions seem to be exactly the sort of
proposition which would be in the context set of an utterance, Stalnaker
cannot allow that, in general, such propositions are assumed by the
speaker. Suppose for the moment that Kaplan's identification of ling-
uistic meaning with character is correct. Then the meaning of a
sentence is a function from contexts to propositions. If Kaplan's
theory concerning the meaning of proper names is correct, then the
meaning of a particular use of a sentence such as "Hesperus is Mars"
is a constant function— the sentence expresses the same proposition
relative to every context.^ So, if a speaker assumes that his token of
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Hesperus is Mars" has the meaning it in fact has, his utterance will
determine a constant propositional concept— somethi ng Stalnaker cannot
allow.
Even if Kaplan's views on the meaning of uses of proper names are
rejected, Stalnaker cannot allow that speakers in general presuppose
propositions concerning the meaning of the expressions they use. For
Stalnaker wishes his account to associate a conti ngent proposition with
utterances of sentences such as "An opthamologi st is an eye doctor"
([A], 328 )— a sentence whose meaning appears to be such that, relative
to every context, it expresses a necessary truth.
Some assumptions concerning the meaning of the expressions a speaker
uses to make an assertion must figure into the context set of an
utterance; this is clear from Stalnaker's characterization of this set
and trivial facts concerning the nature of assertion and communication.
However, such assumptions cannot, in general, fix the meaning of the
expression so that that meaning fails to vary in various worlds in the
context set. Let us, confining our attention to singular terms, attempt
to pinpoint the sorts of assumptions about meaning a speaker might make,
as well as the conditions under which these assumptions will be made.
It will be helpful, at this point, to consider Stalnaker's most
detailed example:
Consider O'Leary's assertion, Hesperus is Mars ...[W]e
approach the question, "what is O'Leary saying?". . .by
asking what the world would be like if what O'Leary
seems intuitively to be saying were true... There is a
possible world (or a class of possible worlds) which
resembles the actual world with respect to the way the
heavens appear to the untrained eye, but in which the
solar system is quite differently arranged. The solar
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anet which appears in the61 (nt o course knowing that it was a planet)by a name from which descends our name "Hesperus"-
a name used by the modern English speakers of this
counterfactual world to refer to that planet.
Now a man like O'Leary, who has the superficialknowledge of the solar system that most of us have
and who is inclined sometimes to misremember what hehas read or heard, might well believe that a world likethe one I have described is the actual world. If hedid believe this, he might express his belief by saving
Hesperus is Mars."... “ y
Ca 1 1 the actual world i_ and this other world, i
The conclusion I am claiming we all should reach is* thatthe content of O'Leary's assertion seems to be the con-
tingent proposition which is false at i_ and true at j.
...let us look... at the whole propositional concept:
ask not just, what does Hesperus is Mars say (accordinq
to the semantical rules)... but also whit would it say if
it were. said. in various alternative possible worlds. If
we consider just the two possible worlds I have labeled
1 and j_, the propositional concept is this one:
j
F
T
In j_, Hesperus rigidly designates Mars, and so the
sentence Hesperus is Mars expresses ... the necessarv
truth. (LSBJ, 18-20)5
Stalnaker s discussion suggests that the speaker may be characterized
as making two different sorts of presuppositions concerning the singular
terms he uses. On the one hand, O'Leary presupposes
(A) The proposition that (his use of) 'Mars' functions,
in English, as a proper name of Mars.
On the other hand, he presupposes
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(B) The proposition that (his use of) 'Hesperus'
functions, in English, as a proper name of the
planet that rises in such and such a place in
the evening sky.
Assumption (A) insures that 'Mars' rigidly designates the same
entity, relative to every world in the context set. Assumption (B),
while it insures that 'Hesperus' is a rigid designator in every world
in the context set, does not insure that the same entity is rigidly
designated by the term, relative to the various worlds in the context
set. I will call assumptions which alone insure that a term behaves
as 'Mars' does in this example A-type assumptions; those which only
provide for a term's behaving as 'Hesperus' does in the above, I will
r
call B-type assumptions.
We may assume that both A and B type assumptions may be made
concerning demonstratives and indexicals, as well as concerning proper
names. Thus, for example, if a speaker addresses Ronald Reagan, saying,
"You are mistaken", she may either make the A-type assumption that her
use of 'you' functions as an indexical denoting Reagan, or she may make
the B-type assumption that her use of 'you' functions as an indexical
denoting the person whom she is addressing.
A and B type assumptions correspond, in various ways, to assumptions
about the meaning of a term. In the case of a proper name, it is A-type
assumptions that constitute assumptions concerning the meaning of the
name, assuming that meaning is to be identified with character and that
Kaplan is correct in holding that the character of a use of a proper
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name is a constant function. However, it is certainly not inappropriate
to think of an assumption such as (B) above as an assumption about the
meaning of 'Hesperus'. A competent speaker of English may have acquired
the name 'Hesperus', use it in a variety of sentences, but not know
anything more about the way its reference is fixed than that it is a
proper name of the planet that rises in such and such a place in the
Sky. In such a case, it is perhaps not implausible to say that what
the speaker knows about the meaning of 'Hesperus' is completely captured
by (B).
In the case of demonstratives and indexicals, on the other hand,
it would seem that it is B-type assumptions which constitute knowledge
about the meaning of a term: To know that a use of 'you' functions as
an indexical which refers to the person addressed, for example, con-
stitutes knowing the meaning of 'you'.
It is plausible to think that a competent speaker will always make
A-type or B-type assumptions concerning the names, demonstratives, and
indexicals he uses. What determines whether or not a speaker makes an
A-type assumption?
A plausible response to this question is the following: The speaker
will make an A-type assumption concerning a use of a term a if he believes
of a and the denotation of a, that the former denotes the latter, and
if he believes that his audience has such a belief. While such a response
is undoubtedly correct, it is not altogether helpful, unless it is
accompanied by a characterization of the conditions under which a person
can be correctly said to have a belief de re with respect to an object.
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Nevertheless, this suggestion suffices to put us in a position to
raise some problems for Stalnaker's treatment of assertion. Consider,
once again, Stalnaker's "Hesperus is Mars" case. In it, Stalnaker has
O'Leary making an A-type assumption concerning "Mars" and Mars, yet he
makes only a B-type assumption concerning "Hesperus". We may well wonder
what it is about the case which Stalnaker presents that could justify
this difference in assumptions.
Note, first of all, that there is little reason to think that there
is some relevant difference between the relations which on the one hand,
0 Leary, Mars', and Mars bear to one another and, on the other hand,
D Leary, Hesperus', and Hesperus bear to one another. Presumably, O'Leary
has seen both Mars and Hesperus, or could, at the appropriate times, find
them in the sky. Any mistakes that O'Leary miqht make in identifying
Hesperus (say, pointing at Mars and, thinking "Hesperus is Mars," think-
ing that he has therefore gotten ahold of Hesperus) will be reflected in
mistakes he will make in identifying Mars. Furthermore, there is no
reason to think, qiven the case as Stalnaker has presented it, that O'Leary
will fail to believe that his audience has the same sorts of beliefs as
he does concerning 'Mars', Mars, 'Hesperus', and Hesperus.
Indeed, one thinks, it will, in general, be the case that when a
speaker uses a sentence of the form ^a=(P, a and 6 demonstratives, index-
icals, or proper names, he will either make A-type assumptions concerning
both terms or he will make them concerning neither. For if he believes of
one of the terms and an object u that the former denotes the latter and
believes that ^=3^ expresses a truth, then he will certainly believe of the
latter term and u that the former denotes the latter. (The exceptions to
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this claim are, presumably, cases in which a speaker uses an identity
statement to introduce a term into the audience's vocabulary. Such uses
of identity statements are far from typical.)
Stalnaker's account of assertion is in deep trouble, if speakers
qenerally make A-type assumptions concerning both the terms flanking an
identity statement: In such a case, the speaker's utterance determines
a constant propositional concept. Perhaps, then, Stalnaker should insist
that speakers, in general, do not make A-type assumptions concerning their
terms. This miqht require Stalnaker to re-appraise the "Hesperus is Mars"
example (perhaps O'Leary only makes the B-type assumption that 'Mars'
names the fourth planet from the sun, or some such); surely, however,
this is a small price to pay in order to salvage his theory.
Unfortunately, there are at least three important objections to the
suggestion that speakers do not, in general, make A-type assumptions
concerning their demonstratives, indexicals, and proper names:
(i) In the case of proper names, Stalnaker's own analysis belies
the claim that speakers do not, in general, make A-type assumptions
concerning their use of a name. Consider, for example, Stalnaker's
discussion of negative existential statements and suppositions in [A]:
Consider, for example, counter-factual suppositions,
as in the antecedent of the conditional "If Aristotle
hadn't existed, the history of philosophy would have
been very different from the way it was." ...The proper
name seems to function in the antecedent like it
functions in ordinary predicative statements: the
proposition is determined as a function of the person
Aristotle; it is true in possible worlds where he does
not exist, and false in possible worlds where he does
exist.
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...To interpret the statement "If Aristotle
nadn t existed, the history of philosophy would
have been very different from the way it was" we
do not need to diagonalize, since in any possible
context appropriate to that statement, it will be
presupposed that Aristotle does exist. ([Al, 329-
331 )
Stalnaker here insists that a use of a proper name like 'Aristotle',
in predicative statements (e.g., "Aristotle loved Zeno") and in counter-
factuals is such that it is accompanied by an A-type assumption. If
speakers generally make such assumptions in these cases, why should we
think that they will fail to make them in cases such as the O'Leary
case?
(ii) Even if it is granted that speakers do not, in general, make
A-type assumptions concerning their uses of proper names, it is difficult
to see how we can deny that A-type assumptions are made by speakers with
respect to their uses of demonstratives and indexicals. Generally, when
a speaker uses a demonstrative or indexical to refer to an object, we
are prepared to ascribe cte re? beliefs to the speaker with respect to
the object denoted by the term he uses. Thus, for example, if Ralph
points at Ortcutt, looking directly at him, and says "He is suspicious",
we will ascribe to Ralph a de belief, with respect to Ortcutt, that
he is suspicious. But, if we are prepared to ascribe such a belief, we
ought also be prepared to ascribe an A-type belief ( viz . , that his use
of 'he' names Ortcutt) to Ralph.
Once this is admitted, however, it is difficult to see how Stalnaker'
s
account of assertion can be made to do the work which Stalnaker wishes
it to do. Consider, for example, a variant of the case considered in
100
II. IV: William is alone is his room; he sees Edwina at the phone booth,
he hears her speaking through the phone. He says to himself "You are
not in New York, but she is in New York." This sentence expresses,
relative to the context, an impossible proposition; if Stalnaker's
account is to succeed, it must be the case that the diaoonal proposition
associated with William's utterance is continqent.
Surely, however, William's utterance does not determine a continqent
diaqonal proposition. For surely William makes A-type assumptions con-
cerning his uses of 'you' and 'she': He assumes of his use of 'you'
and its denotation that the one denotes the other; he assumes of his
use of she and its denotation that the one denotes the other. Hence,
his uses of these terms are co-referential in every world in the context
set; hence, in every world in the context set, his utterance expresses
a necessary falsehood.
Perhaps Stalnaker would deny that A-type assumptions are made
concerning one or both of the terms he uses. It is difficult to envision
how such a denial might be made plausible. To deny this of only one of
the terms used is to take a position subject to the sort of objections
raised on pages 64 through 68 of II. IV. If, on the other hand, Stalnaker
denies that any A-type assumptions are made by William, he must either
(i) show us why it is acceptable in the Ral ph/Ortcutt case to suppose
that Ralph makes A-type assumptions concerning his use of 'he', but
unacceptable to suppose here that William makes such assumptions
concerning 'you' and 'she', or (ii) defend the view that speakers do not,
in general, have de re beliefs about the referents of demonstratives and
indexicals they use in assertive utterances.
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Neither of these alternatives is terribly attractive. As we noted
in II. IV, the Will i am/ Edwin a case is so constructed that it is implausible
to think that there is some feature, absent in it but present in most
instances involving a use of ‘she' or 'you', the absence of which accounts
for William s failing to believe the proposition expressed by his
sentence. On the other hand, the view that speakers do not, in general,
express de re beliefs when using sentences such as "He is threatening"
is surely an unattractive and counter-intuitive view; such a view is
acceptable only in the company of powerful and compelling arguments.
(van Fraassen, incidently, appears to subscribe to such a view; we will
consider his arguments below, in section V.)
Thus, it seems that cases such as the Wi 1 1 iam/Edwina case will
provide problems for Stalnaker's account. Let me consider one other
case which appears to generate a related problem. After his discussion
of O'Leary and "Hesperus is Mars", Stalnaker considers the following
case:
Imagine O'Leary, not asserting anything about the
solar system, but just thinking about it. He might
be out on a clear evening, looking up at the so-
called star he has seen so often, thinking to
himself, that's Mars
. The content of that thought
is obviously something like the contingently false
proposition described above [viz., in the citation
on pp. 93-94]. ([SR], 22).
(I take it that O'Leary is looking at Venus.) Now, the proposition
that the 'straightforward semantic rules' say O'Leary's sentence ex-
presses is the (necessarily false) proposition that Venus is Mars.
Stalnaker, of course, wishes to associate a contingent proposition with
this utterance. However, the most reasonable course here, given
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Stacker's views, may be to say that the content of O'Leary's thought
is a necessary truth! For it is extremely plausible to think that O’Leary
makes a (true) A-type assumption concerning his use of 'that'. But, as
we noted above, when a speaker is disposed to assent to a statement of
the form and makes the A-type assumption that his use of a names
an object u, he can be expected to also make the A-type assumption that
his use of B names u. Thus, it would seem, O'Leary’s sentence will
express, in every world in the context set, the proposition that Venus
is Venus.
( 1 i i ) We have seen one way Stalnaker might avoid our object-
ions to his account of assertion is to maintain that speakers do not,
in general, make A-type assumptions concerning their uses of demonstra-
tives and indexicals. It is worth noting that this position is in-
consistent with Stalnaker's own characterization of what speakers and
audience assume. Stalnaker writes
...when I speak, I presuppose that others know
I am speaking.
. .This fact, too, can be exploited
in the conversation, as when Daniels says "I am
bald", taking it for granted that his audience
can fiqure out who is being said to be bald.
([A], 323)
If Stalnaker takes this to be the case, then surely he must allow
that a speaker makes an A-type assumption concerning his use of T
and himself. To make such an assumption, of course, is in part to be
disposed to act as if one's audience believes the proposition assumed.
If it is granted that one's audience does have such a belief, then
we have allowed that people are able to hold beliefs de re concerning
terms and objects other than themselves. Thus, if we grant that the
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speaker's A-type assumption concerning his own use of 'I' is shared by
his audience, surely we should grant that the speaker is able to make
(and, indeed, does make) A-type assumptions about terms which denote
objects other than himself.
Now, Stalnaker's own account of conversation and assertion appears
to require that the audience, in general, does share this assumption.
Stalnaker writes
Each participant in a conversation has his
own context set, but it is part of the concept
of presupposition that a speaker assumes that
the members of his audience presuppose everythinq
that he presupposes. We may define a non-
defective context as one in which the pre-
suppositions of the various participants are all
the same.
.
A defective context will have a kind
of instability, and will tend to adjust to the
equilibrium position of a non-defective context.
...LAJny unnoticed discrepancies between the
presuppositions of speaker and addresses is
likely to lead to a failure of communication.
([A], 322)
Thus, on Stalnaker's account, the general situation is one in which
the presuppositions of speaker and audience diverge little if at all.
This will not be the case if the audience fails to make A-type assumotions
concerning the speaker's use of ' I' and the speaker. For in such a case,
one thinks, many of the worlds in the audience's context set will not
even have the speaker as an element of their domain.
Stalnaker, then, seems unable to provide an adequate account of the
nature of the linguistic assumptions which figure into the context set
of a speaker. For this reason, his account of assertion fails. Thus,
we cannot, as Stalnaker hopes, make use of this account in order to give
an account of attributions of belief. Let us, then, turn to van Fraassen's
104
account of the semantics of attributions of belief, to see if it can
resolve the problems suggested by the argument in Chapter II.
HI. van Fraassen's Semantics for Belief
van Fraassen's treatment of belief attributions is motivated by
considerations similar to those which motivate Stalnaker's account of
assertion. Of the sentence "Peter believes that I am Kaplan," van
Fraassen writes that it is extremely difficult
to imagine that [it, when spoken by van Fraassen] could
be used to attribute to Peter belief in the proposition
expressed (in the present context) by "I am Kaplan"—
which is the necessarily false proposition.
...I propose to accept completely Kaplan's theory of
indexical language as long as no propositional attitudes
are attributed, and to extend it to sentences like [that
mentioned above]. ([BC], 2)
In this section, I will give an exposition of van Fraassen's
treatment of belief. Like van Fraassen, I will give two expositions of
his truth conditions for attributions of belief: An informal exposition,
making use of certain 'syntactic fictions' and a formal exposition in
which these fictions are abandoned. I mimic van Fraassen's presentation
since an understanding of his formal truth conditions is greatly
facilitated by a grasp of the informal truth conditions.
van Fraassen's treatment of belief rests upon three theses:
(I) "Propositional attitudes attach to character, unlike ordinary
modalities, which attach to content." ([BC], 2) Truth conditions for
attributions of belief are to be given in terms of the character of
embedded sentences, not (simply) in terms of their content.
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(II) "...belief de re is not open to introspection, in general,
and does not follow from acquaintance with the subject." ([BC], 9)
van Fraassen denies that it is in general reasonable to infer that a
person believes what is expressed by his use of a sentence containing
a demonstrative or indexical, even under the assumptions that the
speaker is sincere, understands the meaning of the sentences he uses,
etc. ([BC], 9-10) (I Will discuss this thesis below, in section V.)
(III) Whether or not an attribution of belief is true depends, in
part, upon certain contextual assumptions shared by the speaker and his
audience
:
[In making an attribution of belief] it seems that the
speaker may rely... on certain sentences which he or
someone else has introduced already, or take to be
common knowledge, and no one has just denied, and which
have not been asserted to be disbelieved by anyone,
<3nd...
. I do not know how to finish this description,
or how to give a recipe to isolate such sentences. Let
us call them contextual assumptions a propos belief
(made in this context).
( |_BCJ
,
Tlj
Roughly, contextual assumptions enter into the truth conditions
for belief attributions by altering the semantic behavior of demon-
stratives and indexicals within the scope of 'believes'. Thus, for
example, suppose that A 1 fie has never seen the richest man, never used
a sentence containing a directly referential expression denoting the
richest man, etc. Alfie may nevertheless have a belief he would express
by saying "The richest man, whoever he is, is corrupt." Suppose Croesus,
the richest man, and I, who knows of Alfie's belief and who shares with
Croesus the knowledge that he is the richest man, are talking; I say
to him "Alfie believes that you are corrupt." On van Fraassen's view
what I say is true; that this is so is explained as follows. The
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contextual assumption of my attribution is the sentence "You are the
richest man"; using this assumption, I can 'make' my embedded sentence
express, not the proposition that Croesus is corrupt, but the pro-
position that the richest man is corrupt. Thus, my attribution is
true.
7
TO give his informal truth conditions, van Fraassen assumes, first,
that each person's beliefs can be exactly expressed by a single eternal
sentence, and, secondly, that for each context, there is a sentence which
may be identified with the contextual assumptions of that context. The
first assumption comes, on van Fraassen's treatment, to this: For each
person u and world w, there is a sentence B(u,w), such that, for any c
and w', c[B(u,w)]w' iff everything u believes in w is true in w'. Using
^c
t0 denote the contextual assumptions of c, van Fraassen's informal
truth conditions come to the following:
(Tl) c[a believes that <f>]w iff
(c , )(w•)[(c 1 [B(|a|
cw
,w]w , & c 1 [A
c
]w* ) - c'UJw']
What this says is that an attribution of belief a believes that 6 is true
exactly if, no matter what context c' its contextual assumption A is
interpreted relative to, if A so interpreted is true in a world w',
consistent with o^'s beliefs, then so interpreted, is true in w'.
Although these are van Fraassen's truth condition, they are not
acceptable as they stand, since they ignore certain niceties having to
do with tense. Before showing this, however, I will illustrate how these
truth conditions are supposed to work. Consider once again the Alfie/
Croesus case. Let c be the context in which I say to Croesus
(1) Alfie believes that you are corrupt.
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We may identify the contextual assumption here with
(2) You are the richest man.
Supposing that B(Alfie, cj is a conjunction, one of whose conjuncts
is
(3) The richest man is corrupt.
it suffices, to show that (1) is true, to show that any c' and w 1 such
that c
' [ ( 2 ) ]w 1 and c'[(3)]w' is such that c'[You are corruptjw'. This,
of course, is the case.
Such is van Fraassen's intention. However, note that (3) above is
not an eternal sentence-it expresses different propositions relative
to different contexts. (This, of course, is a consequence of our work
in Chapter I.) Thus, we have incorrectly applied van Fraassen's truth
conditions in the above example. Once we recognize this, we will also
recognize that van Fraassen's truth conditions must be corrected. For
suppose we try to reapply (Tl) to (1), assuming that the relevant con-
junct in B(Alfie,c
w
) is not (3), but something of the form of
(4) The richest man at t is corrupt at t.
where 1 1_' is a term which denotes, relative to every context, the same
time. No matter what time 't' denotes, it is not the case that for
every c' and w' such that c
' [ ( 4 ) ]w ' and c'[(2)]w', c'[You are corruptjw'.
To see this, let
'
t_' denote t-j
,
w-j be one of Alfie's belief worlds, and
suppose
i) u-| is the richest man in w-j at t-j
.
ii) u^ is the richest man in w-j at t^ (u-j + u^, t-j / t 2 ).
iii)
u
i
is corrupt in w^ at t-, ; u^ is never corrupt.
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Let c' by any context such that c'[you] = u
2
and cj = tr While
C
' [(4)]W
1
d " d c ' [(2)]w
l>
^ is not the case that c'[Vou are corrupt^,.
This is not a serious problem; it can be solved by restricting the
quantification over contexts in (Tl) to those with the same time as the
context relative to which the belief attribution is taken. Let us,
incorporating this correction, see how van Fraassen's rigorous truth
conditions would be incorporated into a language such as RLD.
First of all, the primitive vocabulary of RLD must be expanded.
Let us add a two-place operator 'B\ specifying that for each term „ and
formula •oB(*P is a formula. Now, let us add two relations, R 1 and
2
R to the models of RLD. We specify that
(i) R 1 Si UxTxWxW
r\
(ii) R is a function in ((P(W)) C )
C
.
R is to be understood as characterizing the beliefs of the members of
U. R (ujtjW-jjV^) just in case w
^
is a world in which everything that
u believes at t in w^ is true. R^ allows us to dispense with the
assumption that the beliefs of an agent are exactly expressible in the
object language.
2
R allows us to dispense with the assumption that some object
language sentence can be identified with the contextual assumption of
an attribution of belief. We now take such assumptions to be characters
(functions from contexts to propositions), instead of sentences: The
2function R assigns to each context its contextual assumption. We
2
understand the function R to obey the restriction
(ii i ) R^ (c' ) f A -* cT =
cj.
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This restriction reflects the restriction on quantification over contexts
which we noted, above, to be necessary to correctly capture the intent
of van Fraassen's truth conditions.
van Fraassen's truth conditions can be stated thusly:
(T2) cft [aB ( ) ]w iff
(c'KWKtR1 (|a|
ctfw> t, w , w
1
) & w
1
e R^c')) * c'ftWw'}.
In the sequel, I shall discuss these truth conditions. However, I shall
often identify contextual assumption with sentences. To say that the
contextual assumption of c may be identified with sentence S is to say
that, for all c' and w
', w ' e R^(c') iff cj = Cy and c'[S]w'.
IV. Objections to van Fraassen's Account
In this section, I present two sets of counter-examples to van Fraassen's
truth conditions for attributions of belief, van Fraassen can avoid the
first set of counter-examples, but only at the cost of a considerable
complication of his truth conditions. The second set of counter-examples,
I believe, show van Fraassen's truth conditions to be fundamentally
misguided.
It will help, in explaining our first set of counter-examples, to
note the following: Given van Fraassen's truth conditions, an attribution
of the form of
(1 ) a bel ieves that 6 is F
(a and 6 distinct terms, 3 a demonstrative or indexical) expresses, in
the company of a contextual assumption of the form of
(2) 3 is the G
no
the same proposition (construed as a set of worlds) as does
(3) a believes that the G is F.
To see this, first suppose that (1), relative to c, is true at w.
It follows that (3), relative to c, is true at For suopose that c'
and W are such that r’( l-l^. c,, w, W) and W , R8 (c'). Then W
is such that c'[ B is the S]w\ cV [e is F]w', and c| = Cj . Thus, c'[ B ]
IS, in w' at
c-J- , the unique thing which satisfies G. Hence c'[the G is F]w'
and c'[(3)]w'
.
8
Now suppose that (3), relative to c, is true at w. Let c' and w'
be as above. Since c'Cthe G is F]w' and w' £ R
8
(c'), c'[b is F]w'.
Thus, what (1) expresses relative to c is true at w. We are now ready
to present our first set of counter-examples.
(i) Suppose that Alfie has a belief that he could correctly express
at t by saying "The richest man (whoever he may be) is corrupt." I know
that Alfie has this belief, but I mistakenly believe that Tantalus is
the richest man— a belief Tantalus shares with me. Suppose, finally,
that Alfie does not believe of Tantalus that he is corrupt.
If all this is the case, I might well, speakinq under the above
described misconception, say to Tantalus
(4) Alfie believes that you are corrupt.
Even if we agree that (4), in the original A1 fie/Croesus case, expresses
a truth, we ouqht here agree that it does not express a truth. Were I
to learn that it is Croesus, not Tantalus, who is the richest man, I
would certainly withdraw my attribution of belief; indeed, I would say
that I had not spoken truly.
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However, it would appear that van Fraassen is committed to (4)'s
being true in this case. For, by the above, relative to the context,
(4) expresses exactly what is expressed by
(5) Alfie believes that the richest man is corrupt,
assuming that the contextual assumption in this case may be identified
with "You are the richest man." Surely, it is exactly as plausible to
take this to be the contextual assumption as it is to so identify the
contextual assumption in the original A1 fie/Croesus case. But, then,
since (5) is true, so must (4) be, given van Fraassen's truth conditions.
(It is, of course, trivial to show, given Alfie's belief and the specified
contextual assumption, that (4) is true, relative to the context.)
(ii) Consider, now, a case in which Alfie says to me "The richest
man is corrupt, but Alfie has no such belief: He believes, in fact,
that there is no richest man. (Alfie does, we assume, have consistent
bel iefs
.
)
In this case, were I to use (4), addressing Croesus in context c,
it is clear that I would speak falsely. But on van Fraassen's account,
I must be held to be speaking truly. For it is again plausible to
identify the contextual assumption of my attribution with "You are the
richest man." However, there is no c' and w' such that R 1 (Alfie, c
T ,
c
»
w
' ) and w' e R (c
'
)
.
This is because none of Alfie's belief worlds
w c
have a richest man at Cy. Thus, (4) is, so to speak, vacuously true,
according to van Fraassen's truth conditions.
(iii) Finally, suppose that Alfie believes that rf there is a
richest man, he is corrupt; Alfie, however, neither believes nor dis-
believes that there is a richest man. Mistakenly believing that Alfie
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believes that there is a richest man, I use (4) to attribute a belief
to Alfie.
Once again, the attribution of belief I make seems to be false.
On van Fraassen's truth conditions, it is true. For let w be any of
fllfie's belief worlds such that for some c', w e rZ( c '). Since w e R^c'),
there is a richest man in w, namely c'[you], (As always, we identify
R. with You are the richest man.' 1 ) Since w is one of Alfie's belief
worlds, whoever is the richest man in w is corrupt. Thus,
[You dre corrupts, and, therefore, (4), taken relative to c, is true
at c .
These three counter-examples can be avoided if we are willing to
complicate van Fraassen's truth conditions. Example (i) may be handled
thusly: We amend (T2) so that c[0 believes that *]w only if w e f (c).
That is, an attribution of belief is true only if its contextual
assumption (taken relative to its context) is true. This proviso has,
roughly, the effect of making an attribution of belief of the form of
(1) a believes that g is F
made with a contextual assumption of the form of
(2) 6 is the G
express the same proposition as a sentence of the form of
(6) g is the G and a believes that the G is F.
Our second example depends upon the fact that a contextual assumption,
no matter how it is interpreted, may be inconsistent with an agent's
belief. Our third example rests upon the fact that some interpretations
of a contextual assumption, while not inconsistent with a person's beliefs,
may not be entailed by a person's beliefs. If this is so, (T2) requires
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that we confine our attention to a proper subset of the person's belief
worlds in evaluating an attribution of belief. Both counter-examples
can be evaded by requiring that for every belief world w of the agent
to whom belief is attributed, there is some context c' such that the
contextual assumption, taken relative to c', is true in w. Incorporating
these modifications, we formulate
(T3) cft[aB<}>]w iff
W e R*(c) 8 (W ) (R 1 ( [cx|
ctfw , t, «,«')->
Oc')(w' c R^(c')) 8 (o' )(w' ) f (R 1 (
|
0 | ctfw , t, w, „') &
w
1
e R^(c' ) ) * c'ft[*]w' )).
(13) is not subject to objections such as (i) throuqh (iii). However,
(T3) is still liable to damaging counter-examples.
(iv) Our first objection is concerned with 'second-order' attri-
butions of bel i ef— vi
z
. ,
attributions such as
(7) Peter believes that you believe that I am wise.
We contend that neither (T2) nor (T3) gives correct truth conditions for
attributions such as (7). We will show this for both sets of truth
conditions. We do this because applying (T3) to a sentence such as (7)
becomes extraordinarily complicated; thus, we will make our point first
with the relatively non-complex (T2).
According to (T2), (7) taken relative to context c is true iff
(8) (c')(w'){(R 1 ( Peter , cT , c , w') & w' e R
2
(c
' ) )
->
I w c
(c")(w")[(R 1 (|you|.
,, c' w', w") 8 w 1 ' e £,(c")) *
C jW I L
c"[I am wise]w"]}.
Let us try to unpack (8). Let us say that a pair <c-|
,
w-j> is
fi tting for an attribution made in a context c in case the contextual
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assumption of the attribution, interpreted relative to C]
,
is true at
W
1 —
W
1
1S a belief world of the person to whom belief is being
attributed. Now, what (8) tells us is that (7) is true just in case, for
every pair < C]
,
W] > which is fitting for (7) in c, C] [You believe that
I am wisejw,
.
A few moments' reflection will suggest that these truth conditions
are incorrect. Whether or not c
]
[You believe that I am wise]w
]
depends,
in part, upon the contextual assumptions of c
]
. But C] can be any con-
text such that, relative to it, the contextual assumptions of c are true
in one of Peter's belief worlds. Thus, one thinks, C] 's contextual
assumptions could be practically anything you please.
Thus, for example, suppose that (7) is made with the contextual
assumpti on
(9) You are the richest man and I am the poorest man.
Then, one thinks, van Fraassen would say that (7) is used to attribute
to Peter the belief that the richest man believes that the poorest man
is wise. Suppose that Peter does have such a belief.
Let w-j be a belief world of Peter's in which u-j is the richest man
and u
2
is the poorest; let c.j be a context in which c-|[you] = u-j and
C
1
[I ] = u 2
. Then <c-|
,
w^> is fitting for (7). Now, there is no reason
why the contextual assumption of c-j might not be, say, "I am the oldest
man"; furthermore, there is no reason why all of u-j's belief worlds,
relative to w-j
,
should not be such that, in them, the oldest man is a
damn fool. Suppose w
2
is one such world, in which u^ is the foolish
oldest man; let c^ be a context such that Cg[I] = u^ (8) tells us that
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(7) is true only if CjU am wise]w
2
. But C
3
CI am wise] is the pro-
position that u
3
is Wise, a proposition false in w
2
. Thus, (T2) gives
incorrect truth conditions for attributions of belief such as ( 7 ).
Matters do not improve if we attempt to apply (T 3 ) to ( 7 ). Accord-
ing to (T3)
, (7) is true if and only if
c
w
e R
c
( c ) & (w 1 ) (R
1 (Peter, c
T ,
c
w
,
w') ->
(3c‘ )(w' E R^(c' ))) &
(
c
’ ) (
w
'
) { (R
1 (Peter
,
Cy, c^, w') & w 1 e R*(c')) ->
Cw ' e R
c-( c
') & ( W ")(R
1
( |you |
c
,
w
, ,
c-j.
,
w\ w") -v
(3c")(w" e R^(c"))) &
(c")(w"){(R 1 ( | you I
c . w •
9 4 , w\ w") & w" e R^,( C ")) ->
C"[I am wise]w"}]}.
Admittedly, it is somewhat difficult to get clear as to what, precisely,
is required by (T3) for ( 7
)
1
s truth. Fortunately, we needn't have a
complete understanding of ( 10 ) in order to see that ( 10 ) does not give
adequate truth conditions for ( 7 ).
Consider (10)'s third conjunct. A pair <c
1
,
w^ will satisfy its
antecedent iff <c^
,
w^> is fitting for (7) relative to c. Suppose, as
above, that (7) is accompanied by
(9) You are the poorest man and I am the richest man.
as contextual assumption and that Peter does believe that the richest
man believes that the poorest man is wise. Thus, according to (10), (7)
2
will be true only if w, e R (c,).
1 C] I
In general, this will not be the case, for reasons analogous to
those noted above. Suppose, as before, that w^ is a belief world of
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Of Peter's in which U] is the richest man and u
2
is the poorest. Surely
there is a context c, in which c,[yoU ] - u,
. e,[I] - „
2 .
but which has
a contextual assumption incompatible with W]
. For example, c^s con-
textual assumption may be "I am the smartest man"; Peter may believe that
there is no smartest man. Given that c^you] = U] and c^I] = u
2 ,
<c
1
,
Wj> is fitting for (7); thus, according to (10), (7) is true only
if w
]
e R
q
(c-|). But by construction, w, t ( c ).
1 l c
i
1
Thus, van Fraassen is unable to give a unified treatment of belief:
His truth conditions simply do not give an adequate account of second-
order attributions of belief.
(v) Me say that a sentence S strongly implies a sentence S' when,
for every c and w, if c[S]w, then c[S']w. It is not difficult to show
that, given (T3), any sentence of the form of
(11) ( otBcf) ) -> (aBy)
is valid, provided that 0 strongly implies v. Now, sentences such as
You are corrupt" and "You were supposed to be here in December" strongly
imply "You exist." Thus, whenever an attribution of belief such as
(4) Alfie believes that you are corrupt,
is true, on (T3), so is the attribution
(12) Alfie believes that you exist.
It would seem that van Fraassen should wish to deny that (12)
follows from (4). For it is difficult to see how we can hold that (12)
is true in a context if Alfie does not believe what is expressed, relative
to the context, by "You exist": (12) is a sentence which we would use,
one thinks, only to attribute a de re belief to Alfie. But the motivation
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for van Fraassen's account, in part, is the intuition that sentences
such as (4) may be true even when the person to whom belief is attributed
has no de re beliefs with respect to the object denoted by the demon-
strative or indexical which occurs within the scope of 'believes'.
Thus, one of the consequences of van Fraassen's own truth conditions
undermines the motivation for his view.
To reply adequately to this objection, van Fraassen must convince
us that sentences such as (12) are appropriate vehicles for attributing
belief de d ie to . It is, however, difficult to find convincing examples
in which we are prepared to grant the truth of something of the form
of (12), but ready to deny that the subject of the attribution has the
rel evant bel ief de re.
The most convincing case I know of, for the view that a sentence
like (12) can be used to attribute belief de dicto
,
runs as follows: 9
Let us suppose that there is_ a jolly little man with a belly like a bowl
full of coagulated gelatin who delivers presents to children on Christmas,
and that he stands in an appropriate causal relation to our uses of the
expression "Santa Claus." Suppose, now, that Virginia, who has heard
all the traditional tales about Santa, but has never seen or heard him,
is prepared to assent to the sentence "Santa Claus exists." If this
is so, and there is someone who had heard about Virginia's beliefs and
who knew Santa, he might well say to Santa
(13) Virginia believes that you exist.
Now, it might be argued, here we have a case in which it is plausible to
believe that (13) is true, when uttered, but that (13) does not constitute
an attribution of belief de re to Virginia, who has never seen Santa.
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Thus, something of the form of (12) or (13) can be correctly used to
attribute a belief cte dicto.
We may begin an examination of this example by asking what belief
is being attributed in this case, if it is not belief in the proposition
that Santa Claus exists. It is natural to assume that the contextual
assumption of (13) may be. identified with "You are Santa Claus.' 1 How-
ever, this cannot be the case: van Fraassen accepts Kaplan's view that
(uses of) proper names are rigid designators with constant character
(see [BC], passim
.
)
. Identifying the contextual assumption of (13) with
''You are Santa Claus' 1 and adhering to (T3), the claim that (13) is true
implies that Virginia believes what is expressed, relative to the con-
text, by "You exist." 10 It is just this result we were trying to avoid.
With what, then, might we identify the contextual assumption in the
above case? Two initially plausible candidates are, first, "You are
named Santa Claus
,
and, secondly, something of the form of ^You are
the F
-
*, where the F is some description of Santa which Virginia might
plausibly be held to associate with the name 'Santa Claus’.
Neither of these candidates, however, will do the job. I presume
that (13), if true, attributes to Virginia a belief which most of us do
not have, nor would have, were the world as described in the above case.
This is not so, if (13)
' s contextual assumption is "You are named 'Santa
Claus'" and (T3) is adopted: (13) then attributes to Virginia the belief
there is something named 'Santa Claus'. (That is, it is true if and only
if all of Virginia's belief worlds contain something named 'Santa Claus'.)
X am sure that this is the case, just as I am sure that there is some-
thing named, due to the perversity of some philosopher, 'Pegasus'.
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Suppose, then, that the contextual assumption is of the form
*You are the F*, the__F as above. Then the following problem arises:
It may well be the case that the F is not a description such that
Virginia believes the proposition expressed by rthe F exist^1
.
Virginia may, for example, be somewhat sceptical of some of the tales
concerning Santa, and the speaker may have unfortunately selected a
description that Virginia thinks doesn't denote. If so, (13) will not,
on (T3 } , be true. But it does not seem that the truth of (13) is thus
tied to the speaker's beliefs concerning Virginia's beliefs about the
denotation of Santa Claus': If the case is as described above, it
seems, then (13) is true.
Thus, it is difficult to see how, on van Fraassen's view, we can
plausibly hold that the above case is one on which a sentence of the form
of (12) can be used to attribute belief de dicto ; thus, it does not seem
that van Fraassen has a defense against the objection raised above,
van Fraassen is committed to the view that from
(4) Alfie believes that you are corrupt,
the sentence
(12) Alfie believes that you exist.
foil ows . But it seems to follow from the truth of (12) that Alfie
believes of someone that he exists. Thus, van Fraassen's truth conditions
undercut his contention that a sentence such as (4) can be used to
attribute a belief de dicto .
(vi) Finally, van Fraassen's account does not seem to be an adequate
account of the consequence relation, when joined to a logic like LD or
RLD. Consider, first of all, the argument
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(14) (3x)(I-x and Peter believes that x is svelte.)
•'.(15) Peter believes that I am svelte.
Intuitively, this is a valid argument form; only in the company of
compelling arguments to the contrary, I think, are we justified in re-
jecting such an argument.
While van Fraassen does not have, so far as I can see, a compelling
argument against accepting the view that (15) follows from (14), his
truth conditions do not license this inference. For (14) is true,
relative to a context c, iff there is an assignment f to variables such
that f(x) = c
A
and Peter believes, at c
J5
what is expressed by "x is
svelte" when f(x) = c^. 11 This last proposition is what is expressed,
relative to c, by "I am svelte." This is the case no matter what the
contextual assumption of c. However, whether or not (15) is true depends
upon what the contextual assumption of c is. It may well be that this
contextual assumption makes (15) attribute to Peter a belief he fails
to have. Thus, the above argument is not valid.
Again, consider the argument, mentioned by van Fraassen:
(16) Whoever Peter believes to be a poet is a poet.
(17) Peter believes that I am a poet.
.
'
.
(18) I am a poet.
Most philosophically sophisticated speakers of English would agree that
this is a valid argument. But it is valid only if a speaker's use of
(17) entails that Peter believes the proposition expressed by the
speaker's unembedded use of (18). van Fraassen, if he is to adhere to
his truth conditions, must deny this; he writes
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I have to say that [the above argument] is invalidbecause there is a context in which thi Icond
ZiT.f 'i ZUe eVe" thou 9 h Peter Has no de rebeliefs about me— he believes that a certauTpoet 1 srother is a poet, and the context identifies me asthe brother— and the first premiss is only about
IS™™.?
“'iffij, ST*"-
"• •=**—
van Fraassen sounds squeamish here, and well he should. That
arguments like the above 'sound valid', as van Fraassen puts it, is
surely very good evidence for the view that a necessary condition for
the truth of something of the form r„ believes that p is that the
denotatum of a believes what is expressed by f. It is crucial, if
van Fraassen's view is to prevail, that this not be necessary. Let
us turn to a consideration of this question.
V. Attributing Beliefs
While van Fraassen, apparently, accepts the view that belief is a
two-place relation between a person and the sort of entity expressed by
a sentence, he denies that an attribution of belief, in order to be
true, must be such that the person to whom belief is attributed believes
the proposition expressed by the sentence used to attribute belief.
There are, I think, two distinct sorts of considerations to which one
can appeal in an attempt to justify such a view. In this section, I
will explain and evaluate these considerations.
(A) First of all, one may appeal to cases like that of Alfie,
Croesus, and the attribution "Alfie believes that you are corrupt." In
these cases, while it is clear that the person to whom belief is attrib-
uted does not believe the proposition expressed by the sentence used to
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attribute belief, it seems inappropriate to deny that the attribution
is true. The only way we can account for such cases, it may be argued,
is by accepting an account such as van Fraassen's, on which it is not
necessary that AT fie believe what is expressed by my utterance of "You
are corrupt" in order that my utterance of "AT fie believes that you are
corrupt" be true.
This seems a remarkably thin reed to rest a theory upon. Surely
it is not unreasonabl e to say that in the A1 fie/Croesus case my utter-
ance of "Alfie thinks that you are corrupt" is simply a somewhat sloppy
way of getting across the point that Alfie believes that the richest man
is corrupt. That I manage to get this across does not imply that what
I said, strictly, was true. That it is inappropriate to deny that my
attribution is true in such cases is no more evidence of its actual
truth than is the fact, that it is usually inappropriate to deny the
truth of an utterance of "Everybody knows Susan," evidence that utter-
ances of "Everybody knows Susan" are usually true.
Cases such as that of Alfie and Croesus do not seem to lend a great
deal of weight to the contention that in order for an attribution to be
true, the person to whom belief is attributed needn't believe the pro-
position expressed by the sentence used to attribute belief. But more
serious arguments are available to support this contention.
(B) One may, as van Fraassen himself does, appeal to cases such
as that considered in II. IV to support analyses such as that provided
by (T2) and (T3).
van Fraassen motivates his account by appealing to the following
case: The king's son, Charles, is kidnapped; the king is told that he
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IS dead. Charles is put in an iron mask and locked in a dungeon. He
tells the inmates that he is the king's son and then says "The king
believes that I am dead". That day, the king comes to the dungeon to
see the man in the iron mask, who, he is told, is a traitor. Charles
IS led to the king, who says "You are a traitor". Taken back to the
dungeon, Charles tells what has happened and laments “The king believes
that I am a traitor".
van Fraassen holds that while both
(1)
The king believes that I am dead,
and
(2) The king believes that I am a (live) traitor.
express truths in their respective contexts, they cannot both be inter-
preted literally. This is because "on pain of attributing to Charles
the belief that the king believes of someone that he is both dead and
a traitor, we cannot say that he is attributing de re beliefs to the
king... ." ( [BC] , 12) Again
...Surely, if closely interrogated, the king would
say. (to begin with, anyway) "no one knew my son more
intimately than I; of my son I believe that he is
dead; but him (pointing to the prisoner) I believe
to be a common traitor." So the king would be quite
wrong about his own beliefs here, because.
. .there is
some x such that he says that he believes x to be
both dead and alive. ([BC], g_io)
Now, it is not all that easy to see what argument it is that van
Fraassen has in mind in these passages. In the first case, we are asked
to accept that if (1) and (2) are true in distinct contexts, then,
relative to some context of which Charles is the agent,
(3) The king believes that I am dead and a (live) traitor.
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IS true. But I see no argument that this must be the case, supposing
simply that a necessary condition for the truth of (1), (2), and (3),
in their respective contexts, is that the king believe what is expressed
by their embedded sentences.
In the second case, van Fraassen appears to assume that from
(4) The king ’s son and that man are such that the king
believes the first to be dead and the second to be
alive.
and
(5) The king's son is identical with that man.
we may validly infer
(6) There is something that the king believes to be
dead and alive.
But, once again, it is not made clear why we should think that such an
inference is valid.
Perhaps van Fraassen means to appeal to the sort of argument pre-
sented on pp. 70-72 of Chapter II. There we assumed that the rule
(R) a believes that 3 is F
. (3 x
)
(a believes that x is F)
(3 an indexical or demonstrative free for x in ^ believes that 6 is F 1 )
was sound. We then noted that, in the case of William and his daughter,
that the following chain of inferences seems sound: By stipulation, in
the context of which William is the agent
(7) I believe that you-] are not F and she-] is F.
is true; but, then, since William's uses of 'you' and 'she' are co-
referential
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(8) you
1
=she
1
and I believe that yoi^ are not F and
she
]
is F.
is true. By two applications of (R), we derive
(9) ( 3 x )
(
3 y ) (x=y and I believe that x is not F and
y is F.)
But, it seemed, (9) yields
0 °) (
3
x) ( I believe that x is not F and x is F.)
And, perhaps, it will be held that such an argument shows that van
Fraassen has a point in the above examples. For once we grant that a
necessary condition of the truth of something of the form of (7) is that
the person to whom belief is attributed believe what is expressed by the
embedded sentence, we seem driven to admit that if (7) is true, then so
is (10). But these seem to have differing truth values: (7) is true,
but (10) isn't. Thus, perhaps, we should accept the sort of truth
conditions suggested by van Fraassen.
As I shall argue in the next chapter, we are not forced to accept
the above argument if we hold that (7) is true only if William believes
what is expressed by its embedded sentence. For we do not have to hold
(and should not hold) that (7) is true rf William believes what is
expressed by ( 7
)
1
s embedded sentence. We will argue that the meaning
of an embedded sentence, as well as the proposition it expresses, effects
the truth value of an attribution of belief; we will argue that this is
so because belief is a triadic relation between a person, a proposition,
and a meaning. Thus, the argument from (7) to (10) is invalid because
the embedded sentences in (9) and (10) have (relevantly) different
meanings
.
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Thus, our full answer to van Fraassen's objection will be apparent
only in the next chapter. However, if we can there justify our claim
that the argument from (7) to (10) is invalid, then, I think, „e will
have conclusively shown that van Fraassen's truth conditions do not
deserve adoption. For they are cogent only if van Fraassen can give us
some compelling reason for rejecting the view that ra believes that p
is true only if the denotatum of a believes what is expressed by
The only compelling argument for this view, it seems, is one appealing
to arguments such as that from (7) to (10).
Let us, then, turn to developing an alternative to van Fraassen's
views
.
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Notes
^talnaker's remarks in [SB] notwithstanding, it is not altogether
clear how Stalnaker's analysis is to be extended to attributions of
belief. Stalnaker notes the one can’t ask what proposition the sentence
token used to attribute belief expresses in each world compatible with
the beliefs of the object of the attribution: "We cannot ask this
since that statement does not exist in all those possible worlds."
([SB], 26) Stalnaker suggests asking
...if [the attributor] were to utter the sounds he is
uttering in a possible world compatible with [the
attri butee 1 s] belief, what would the content of those
sounds be? ([SB], 26-7)
If it is difficult to see how this strategy will work for attribu-
tions such as "Peter believes that I am dead and Hesperus is Mars."
2
Actually, it is not clear that this is adequate to determine a
proposition, since the same act of assertion can occur at different times
in one world. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that <x,s,p> occurs
at such and such a time (or that there is a q such that <s,s,q> occurs
at such and such a time), Stalnaker will not be able to apply his
analysis to sentences such as "It is now three o'clock". I will ignore
such problems.
3
Speaking strictly, we should say that the two propositions are
identical within the confines of the context set.
4
It is Kaplan's view in [D] that the character of (a use of) a
proper name is constant : It is such that it yields the same content
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relative to every context. Thus, co-referential proper names, on this
view, have the same meaning.
The matrix is Stalnaker's way of representing a propositional
concept; its vertical axis represents the domain of the concept.
6
t
I am assuming that it is a necessary truth, concerning English,
that its proper names, demonstratives, and indexicals are (at least)
rigid designators; Stalnaker seems to make a similar assumption.
7
This example surfaces in Burge's [BD]
. The tenor of van Fraassen's
[BC] suggests that he would treat it in the way I suggest: see his
discussion, therein, of Gettier's desert island puzzle.
g
Note that in this proof we assume that (3) is to be taken, relative
to c, as having (2) as contextual assumption; so far as I can see, van
Fraassen must either deny that attributions of belief not explicitly
made in a context have a truth value relative to the context (an
extremely unattractive position) or he must use the assignment of the
2function R to a context as the contextual assumption for arbitrary
attributions of belief taken relative to the context. This generates
problems which will become apparent below.
g
Hal Levin suggested this case.
^1 am here assuming, as van Fraassen appears to assume, that to
have a cte re belief, with respect to an object u, that it has property
P, is to believe a proposition true in exactly those worlds in which u
exists and has P.
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I am simplifying matters here somewhat; the simplification does
not affect the argument.
CHAPTER IV
BELIEF, MEANING, AND SEMANTICS FOR BELIEF
In this chapter, we will sketch a solution to the problems raised
in chapter II concerning the semantics of belief attributions. Our
work is based upon the hypothesis, suggested by Kaplan and Perry 1
,
that
belief is to be understood as a triadic relation between a person, a
proposition, and a meaning. We assume here that this hypothesis is
correct, and investigate how the triadic nature of belief might be re-
flected in the truth conditions for attributions of belief.
Our work is novel in the following sense: Although other authors
(e.g., Kaplan and Perry) have suggested that belief is to be construed
as triadic, no one, to our knowledge has attempted to give a systematic
account of how the triadic nature of belief effects the truth conditions
of attributions of belief.^ We attempt to do this.
We stress that we are sketching a semantics for belief attributions.
Although our discussion is formally rigorous (we show how to extend the
language RLD to give truth conditions for attributions of belief), we
make several significant simplifications: We choose to represent pro-
positions as sets of worlds, properties as functions from worlds to sets
of individuals, and meanings as sentences. A completely adequate formal
treatment of belief attributions would, we think, individuate pro-
positions and properties more finely, representing them as structured
entities; likewise, we think, a satisfactory representation of meanings
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will be one which represents then, as structured entities, perhaps a la
David Lewis. (See, for example, his [GS].) Developing such represent-
ations would take us somewhat afield from the project of this chapter,
and, therefore, we do not pursue such matters.
We proceed as follows. In section I, we present informal, intro-
ductory remarks concerning the view that belief is triadic. In section
II, we introduce the formal machinery we use to qive truth conditions
for attributions of belief. We there suggest that the meaning a person
believes a proposition under determines what properties he ascribes.
An attribution of belief may imply that the believer ascribes certain
properties; the attribution, we suggest, is true only if the believer,
in believing the proposition, actually ascribes the properties in question.
In sections III and IV, we discuss extensions of the account of
section II. In section III, we suggest that an attribution of belief
may presuppose that certain properties are ascribed, and that this pre-
supposition may enter into the truth conditions of the attribution;
section IV is concerned with so-called self-ascription of properties.
Finally, in section V, we consider the question of whether our account
might be extended to a language with terms playing the roles of proper
names
.
I . Belief as a Triadic Relation
Philosophers have usually taken the notion of belief, as a dyadic
relation between a person and a proposition, as primitive. Once we
grant the truth of principles such as principle (B) of chapter II, the
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idea that belief is simply dyadic becomes unattractive. Granting (B),
we seem forced to admit that there can be pairs of sentences, S and S',
and a context c such that (i) S and S' express the same proposition
relative to c; (ii) the agent of c knows what proposition is expressed
by S relative to c and by S' relative to c, but; (iii) the agent doesn't
know that S and S' express the same proposition. (Take William, “You
are in New York", and "She is in New York" as an example.) If this is
so, then, of course, an agent may have strikingly different attitudes
towards the truth values of two sentences which express the same pro-
position. In such cases, it becomes difficult to explain a person's
behavior simply by appeal to the objects of his propositional attitudes. 3
For example, we may try to explain why William shrieks when a truck
swerves towards the phone booth by saying that he believes that she
[the woman in the phone booth] will be injured. But this tends to
undercut our explanation of why he doesn't yell a warning into a
receiver—viz
.
,
that he doesn 1 1 think that she will be injured.
In cases such as this, one finds oneself appealing as much to the
sentences a person thinks true or false in order to explain his behavior,
as to the propositions expressed by those sentences. This at least
suggests that there is something associated with those sentences (other
than propositions) which helps to explain that behavior and is a component
in belief. A natural candidate is the meani ng of the sentence.
As in chapters I and II, we take the meaning of a sentence to be
the function from contexts and times to propositions which is the
semantic value of a sentence. Note that such meanings have Kaplanesgue
characters as special cases: The value of the meaning of a sentence S,
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relative to c and c
T
is the proposition expressed by S in c. We shall
say, when the meaning of S, applied to c and c,, has p as a value, that
the meaning of S yields. p in c. We will also speak of the value of a
meaning M in a context c—this is always to be understood as M(<c,c
T
>).
We propose to take the notion of acceptance
, a relation between a
person and a meaning, as primitive, instead of that of belief. (We
borrow this term from Perry.) To believe a proposition p, „e suggest,
is to accept a meaning such that, relative to your context, that meaning
yields p; indeed, we suppose that this constitutes a definition of the
locution (’..believes the proposition p . When a person accepts a meaninq
m, and the value of m in her context is p, we say that she believes p
under m.
While we take the notion of acceptance as primitive, we can say
some things to elucidate this notion. Acceptinq a meaninq is not, of
course, simply being disposed to assent to a sentence which has that
meaning, just as believing a proposition is not simply being disposed
to assent to a sentence which expresses that proposition. However, much
of the behavior which we take to be a rough test of whether a sentence
is one which a person can use to express one of his beliefs will also
constitute a rough test of whether the person accepts the meaning of the
sentence. Thus, for example, if, given that X knows the meaninq of
sentence S, is being honest, doesn't make any verbal mistakes, etc., X
agrees that his use of S expresses a truth, then we have fairly good
(although not conclusive) evidence that X accepts the meaning of S.
Accepting a meaning is not being related to a sentence type or
token. Just as we may have beliefs that are not expressed by any sentence
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we are able to construct, so we may accept meanings that are not mean-
ings of any sentence which we can construct.
Although we take the notion of acceptance as primitive (and hold
that belief may be defined in terms of acceptance), we do not take the
objects of acceptance-meanings-to be the objects of belief. As Kaplan,
in effect, points out ([D], 60), to say that two people accept a mean-
ing is not to say that they share a belief: When you and I both accept
[I am wearing a funny hat], you believe that you are wearing a funny
hat, I believe that I am. Conversely, it does not follow from the fact
that we share a belief that we accept the same meaninq: We may both
believe that I am acting like a fool, but you don't believe that under
[I am acting like a fool], while I do.
The reader will, I hope, grant that the notion of acceptance is
tolerably clear. What is not yet clear is how the fact, that to believe
a proposition is to believe it under a meaninq, enters into the truth
conditions for attributions of belief. Let us turn to this question.
II
. Semantics for Belief
I suggest that to ascribe a property to an object is to believe a
proposition under a certain meaning. There are, I shall suggest, certain
propositions, contexts, pairs of characters, and properties such that,
relative to the context, both characters yield the same proposition,
but to ascribe the property to an object, one must believe the proposition
under one of the characters. I suggest, further, that an attribution
of belief may imply (in a straightforward and clearly definable way)
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that the believer ascribes certain properties. When an attribution
implies that the believer makes such an ascription, it is true only
if he does make that ascription.
Let us begin by returning to the case of William and Edwina. We
have maintained that, relative to the context of which William is the
agent,
(1) She is in New York and you are not in New York.
(2) You are in New York and you are not in New York.
(3) You are in New York and not in New York.
all express the same proposition. Consider, now, what is involved in
understanding each of these sentences, viz
., in knowing their meaning.
To know the meaning of (2) and (3) is, among other things, to know that
they are true in a context only if something has the property of being
in New York and not in New York. 4 But this, of course, is not true of
( 1 ).
If we accept the view that to believe a proposition is to believe
it under a meaning, there is, then, a difference between believing, on
the one hand, a proposition under the meaning of (1), and, on the other
hand, believing it under the meaning of (2) and (3). To believe it
under the meaning of (2) or (3) is to believe it in such a way as to
ascribe the property of being in New York and not in New York to some-
thing; this is not the case, if one believes the proposition under the
meaning of (1 )
.
We suggest, then, that to ascribe a property to an object is to
accept a meaning. It is this fact, we suggest, that explains why
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embedding (2) or (3) in 'I believe that', relative to William's context,
yields a falsehood, even though embedding (1) within 'I believe that'
yields a truth: The former embeddings imply that William ascribes the
property of being in New York and not in New York, the latter embedding
does not. Since what is implied in the former cases is false, the
attribution is false, even though William believes the proposition to
which belief is attributed.
The theory we are suggesting also explains why the inference from
a sentence of the form of
(4) (3 x ) (3y ) (x=y & A believes that x is F and y is G)
to one of the form of
(5) Ox) (A believes that x is F and x is G)
fails. It is, we hold, the meaning of the embedded sentence in a belief
attribution which determines what properties the attribution implies are
attributed. Now, the meaning of the embedded sentence in (4) is quite
different than the meaning of the embedded sentence in (5). To under-
stand the open sentence in (5), we think, is (among other things) to
know that it is satisfied only if something is both F and G. But this
is not the case with the embedded sentence in (4). Thus, (5) implies
that a property (being F and G) is ascribed which (4) does not imply is
ascribed. Thus, in general, (4) may be true when (5) is not, for some-
one may ascribe F, ascribe G, but fail to ascribe being F and G. Thus,
(5) is not validly inferable from (4).
We will now show how our theory may be given a formal development.
The key to such a development is a characterization of when believing
a proposition under a particular meaning is to ascribe a property to an
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object. As we mentioned In the Introduction to this chapter, we choose,
for the sake of simplicity, to represent meanings by sentences. Thus,
we begin by characterizing what it is for a sentence (to be such that)
relative to a context (it may be used) to ascribe a property to an object.
Define the 1-class of a sentence * of RLD as unless 4, is a
conjunction; as { <*> } union the union of the i-classes of y and X, if
t
r>&x
. Let l/* = {v, v
1
,
v
2 ,
...} be a denumerable set of terms (to
be treated as variables) foreign to the vocabulary of RLD. 5 A frame
of a sentence
<p is any expression v which results from replacing demon-
stratives, indexicals
,
and free variables in <p with members of \j
,
subject
to the provision that occurrences of distinct terms are replaced with
distinct members of 1/ . We speak of a sentence f as beinq a <t> ( ^ n
\®
1
» • • •
»
frame whenever y is a frame of 4> obtained by replacinq occurrences of
a
-j
by 0..
Intuitively, the frames of a sentence correspond to the properties
which (the meaninq of) the sentence ascribes. Note that a sentence
such as "f| the x g| x" has no frame other than itself, since it contains
no demonstratives, indexicals, or free variables. This is because, in
our opinion, to ascribe a property to an object is to have a de re belief
with respect to the object. To believe the proposition expressed by
"f| the x G] x" is not, on our view, to have a de re belief.
Say that P is a property just in case, for some n, P is in (Un )
W
.
Let f be restricted to assignments to V, the set of variables of RLD;
let h be restricted to assignments to l/*. Now, let <p be a formula such
that the distinct members of V* occurring therein are exactly v^
,
....v^
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V * v i jl * 1f J * J'. We say that *, taken relative to c, t, and f,
expresses the property P exactly if, for any h and w,
(i) cfhtUJw iff <h(v. ) h (v. )> e P(W ),
where cfht[*]w is defined, in the obvious way, by extendinq the defin-
ition of cftMw. We say that relative to c and t, expresses P iff,
for any h, w, and f, schema (i) obtains.
A sentence
* ascribes a property Pn to <u, u
n
>, relative to
c, t, and f, exactly if there is a y and v.
, .... v in (/* such that/ a
i
» . .
. ,
a *
1 n
1S a Hv. v. ) frame which expresses P
n
relative to c, t, and
i
n
/
and
^
a
l^ctfc
~ U
1
’
l
a
rJctfc
= u
n‘
We de ‘fri
'
ne
> analogously, <j>
. n
w w
ascribes P to <u-j
, u
n
>, relative to c and t.
Let us consider an example. Take the sentence
(6) that
i
& ~ f\ou-|
The i-class of (6) is
F
1
that
]
& - F
1
your F
1
that
]
,
~ F
1
you
1
The set of frames of (6) will be the set of sentences of the following
forms
:
F^that-j & ~ F^you^
F^v. & ~ F^you-j
F^that-j & ~ F^v.
fV & - fV
i 3
F^that^, F^v^
,
~ F^you-j, ~ F^v.
where v^ f v . . Note that
(*) fV & ~ fV
is not a frame of (6). Suppose that in a model M, F
1
expresses the
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property of being in New York, relative to c and Cj
,
and that c[you] =
c[that-| ] = Edwina. Then, relative to c and c-p (6) ascribes
being in New York
not being in New York
being in New York and such that Edwina is not in New York
not being in New York and such that Edwina is in New York
to Edwina. But (6) does not ascribe being in New York and not in New
York to Edwina, for nothing of the form (*) is a frame of (6).
Making use of the above definitions, we now propose truth conditions
for attributions of belief. (The truth definition given here is
tentative; it will be revised in section III.) We propose that an
attribution ^B<p is true only if (i) the denotatum of a believes what
is expressed by <j>, and; (ii) for every n+1 tuple <P, Up ..., u >, if $
ascribes P to <u-j
,
..., u
n
>, then the denotatum of a attributes P to
<Up ..., u^>— vi_z
. ,
he accepts a sentence (a meaning) which, relative
to his context, makes this ascription.
We are letting sentences, in our formal semantics, play the role
of meanings. Thus, we introduce into the models of RLD a function N in
(^P(L))
,
where L is the set of closed sentences of RLD. Intuitively,
N assigns to each context the set of meanings which the agent of the
context accepts.
We define the proposition expressed by a sentence 4> , relative to
c, t, and f (written: ctf [cf ] ) as (w | ctf [<t>]w} . We say that the ascription
set of a sentence <f>, relative to c, is the union, for each n, of all
n+l-tuples <P
n
,
Up..., u
n
>, such that <j> ascribes P
n
to <Up..., u
n
>,
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relative to c and c
T ;
the ascription set of
Then
we denote this set AU,c)
. Analogously, we define
''!
’
re ^Ative to c, t, and f, denoting it A( 4= , c , t , f )
.
(T1 ) ctf[aB(J>]w iff
Oc'HjfHcj - t & |a|
ctfw = & c; = „ s f E
& Ctf[<J>] = c'c^ffy]
& (s)(s e A((|),c,t,f) -> s E A(v,c')).
Using these truth conditions, we can show that the argument
discussed in II. IV and III.V
—
viz
. ,
the argument from
(4) (3x)(Jy)(x=y & A believes that x is F & y is G)
1
to
(5) (3x)(A believes that x is F and x is G)
is invalid, even in the presence of a rule allowing quantification into
belief contexts in which demonstratives and indexicals occur.
Let us first discuss quantification in. Our truth conditions
sanction the rule
( R*) aB<j> & (3 x) (x = 3 )
(
H
v )[(aB 4>)[ 3/v]]
whenever 6 is a demonstrative or indexical free for v
in aB 4> .
To see that ( R*) is valid, suppose eft [gBcf & (3x)(x = e)]w. We have
cft[(3 v)[(aB<t>)[B/v]]w iff
( 3 U ) (3 c' )(3 f)(c-j. = t & c^ = |a| cfu tw & c^ = w & v c N c ,
& cf^t[<()[3/v]] = c'^cjO]
( s ) ( s e A( 4>
[
e/v] ] , c, t, fy) s £ A(<|>, c
1
) ) )
.
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Since *?3x)(x = bP is true, there is something-say, i^-such that
^ctfc
w
= V Because cft[aB<f>]w, we know that eft [4,] = c'fc-j-M, and
so, since 3 is a demonstrative or indexical, cfui t[<j>[8/ v ]] = c 1 f U 1 c ’ [^]
{'V is, you will recall, closed.) Suppose that s-, e A(cj>[6/v]
, c, t,
then there is a frame X of 4>[6/ v ] that ascribes, relative to c,
t, and fjjl, P to <u^, u^>, where S] = <P, u.
, ..., u. >. But
then, there will be a frame X' of 4 , differing frorA at mostly some
occurrences of B_ where X has occurrences of v. So, since I r I = 1 .
- 1
'ctfw 1 ’
X attributes P to <u^
, ..., u >, relative to c, t, and f. So
/
1 n
s-| e A(<j>, c, t, f).
Thus, rule (R*) is a valid rule of inference. But it should be
clear, given (Tl), that we may not validly infer
(7) OxHcBfF’x 8 - f’x))
from
(8) (3 x)(3y) (x = y & aB(F ] x & ~ F1 y)).
For suppose that |a^
fc = u, and let c' be the (only) context such
T wI
that c
-J-
= c
y
and c
^
= |a|
cc fc .
Suppose that H
q ,
= {F that-, & ~ fV^K
T w
Then (8), taken relative to c, is true. But (7) is not. For let u be
any object in the domain; with fu
,
<P, |xj f u >, P the propertyX CCtT C
expressed by
T 1 ^
T x w
r l 5 rlF v, & ~ F v
.
will be in A(F^x & ~ F^x, c, cT , f
u
J. If (7) is true, then for some u,
<P»
l
x
l cc f
u
c
> must be in A ( F^ that
1
& ~ f\ou, , c 1 ). But no such pairll
T x w
is therein.
This shows that we are able to respond to the argument attributed
to van Fraassen at the conclusion of chapter III. van Fraassen's
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argument assumed that once we granted the validity of a rule such as
(R*) and held that a necessary condition of the truth of was that
the denotatum of a believe what is expressed by *, we would be committed
to the inference from (8) to (7). We have shown that this is not the
case.
One aspect of our truth conditions needs further discussion. Given
our representation of propositions and our definition of cft[<j>], we have
the result that a sentence in which a demonstrative or indexical a occurs
generally expresses, relative to a context in which a does not denote,
the impossible proposition. Thus, if N
q
includes, say, the sentence
"F t ha t
-j " , and ' that-j ’ does not denote relative to c, "IBF 1 that-j" will
be true, taken relative to c. It is because of this feature of our
truth conditions that the existential statement is required for quanti-
fying in.
We think that this shows a problem, not with our approach to the
truth conditions of attributions of belief, but with the representation
of propositions as sets of worlds. Given such a representation (and a
natural definition of 'the proposition expressed by 4>'), we are unable
to differentiate between a sentence which expresses an impossible pro-
position— e.g. , "(3x)(F x & ~ F^x)" and one which, we feel, fails to
express a proposition at all— as does "F^hat^', when ' that-j ' fails to
denote.
With a more satisfactory representation of propositions, it would
be possible, we think, to differentiate between these cases (as well as
differentiating between distinct impossible propositions). Given such
a representation, we could then insist that raB<p be true only when it
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did attribute a belief-viz., only when * expressed a proposition.
Since, on our view, a sentence with a non-denotinq demonstrative does
not express a proposition, the need for the existential premiss when
6quantifying in would then disappear.
Ill- An Extension of our Approach
In this section, we suggest an extension of the truth conditions
proposed in section II; our extension allows us to give intuitively
correct truth conditions for a wider range of cases than those handled
by the above truth conditions.
Consider, again, the case of William and Edwina. Suppose, first,
that we bring it to Edwina’s attention that William is looking at her.
We think Edwina would say
(1) He believes that I am in New York.
Suppose, however, that Edwina becomes aggravated with her father's
refusal to say to her "You are in New York." She might well say, in
despair,
(2) It's not the case that he believes that I am in
New York.
We think it plausible to suppose that either of these utterances might
be truly made, relative to the context of which Edwina is the agent.
(We do not, of course, hold that they could be conjoined and express
a truth.) We will attempt to make this view plausible.
Let us ask why_ Edwina might utter (2), even when she knows that her
father is looking at her through the window. It is plausible to think
that Edwina might explain herself as follows: My father doesn't realize
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that the person speaking to him, the person he is addressing with
'you', is in New York. If Edwina were to so explain herself, she
would, we think, be implicitly claiming that William doesn't accept
the character of "You are in New York." Now, it is analytic that 7
(3) You are in New York if and only if you are a person
who I am addressinq and you are in New York.
Thus, were Edwina to explain herself in the way we have suggested,
she would, implicitly, be presupposing that William does not ascribe
to her the property
F: being a person William is addressing and being in
New York.
We suggest that it is this sort of a presupposition which explains
the truth of (2), even though William believes the proposition expressed
by the embedded sentence in (2). When an attribution of belief is made,
it may be presupposed that the person to whom belief is attributed
holds his belief under a meaning such that to have a belief under that
meaning is to ascribe certain properties not in the ascription set of
the sentence used to attribute belief. When there is such a pre-
supposition, we suggest, the attribution is true only if the believer
does make the presupposed ascriptions. Thus, (2) may be true because
William fails to make the presupposed ascription.
However, (1) may be accompanied with no such presupposition, or
with a presupposition which corresponds to an ascription William actually
makes. Thus, (1) could also be true in the relevant context.
Deciding when such presuppositions are made is a fairly ticklish
business. (It would seem to be approximately as ticklish as deciding,
145
for van Fraassen, what the contextual assumptions of an attribution
are.) We will eschew dealing with this pragmatic question, and turn
our attention to adapting our semantical treatment to our proposal.
We begin by extending the syntax of RLD. We say that an expression
Y is an fl-transform of a formula 4 of RLD just in case, for some
demonstratives, indexicals or variables a,, c
2 «n
and formulas
xr •••» x n ’ Y is the result of subscripting occurrences of a. with
[X-j-1 ’ ^0 subscripted cu being a bound variable. Thus, for example,
FVn F 1 ! F 1 ! [(3 x) ( F you. rJx]
are all A-transforms of
A-transforms are intended to represent sentences used to attribute
beliefs when it is presupposed that the believer ascribes properties
not in the ascription set of the sentence used to attribute belief.
We now stipulate that where a is a term and y is an A-transform of
an RLD formula, Gby1 is a formula of RLD. Consider, now, possible
uses of (1) and (2) by Edwina. In using (1), Edwina may make no
presuppositions concerning William's ascriptions. If so, then her
utterance would be represented by
(T) That^BF 1 1
(where 'that^' denotes William and ^expresses the property of being
in New York.) But Edwina, in using (2), may be presupposing that
2
William fails to ascribe the property F to her. Let G_ represent the
predicate "is speaking to". We may then represent (2) as
< 2 ') ~ That 4
BFVthat
4
I]
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(2 ) may be read It s not the case that he believes that I (to whom
he is speaking) am in New York"; the parenthesized material here re-
presents the presupposed ascription.
Having expanded the syntax of our language, we now adjust the
semantics. We first extend our definition of i-class to include A-
transforms, as follows: If 4, is not a conjunction, then the i-class
of <|> is the set of formulas of the form rx
]
& x 2 &
. . .
x & n > 0,
where each X.. is a subscripted formula occurring in <j>, and y is the
formula of which 4, is an A-transform; if
* is a conjunction, rx&P,
then the i-class of
<t>
is the union of {41'} and the i-classes of x and v,
where <j>' is the formula of which 4> is the A-transform.
With this redefinition, we extend our definitions of a frame, a
|
ap'" ,a
n\
. .
Mr,,..
,8 )
trame
’
Droperty ascription, and ascription set, in the
\ 1 ’ n '
obvious way, to A-transforms. We may then continue to use (Tl) to give
truth conditions for attributions of belief in our language. The reader
may verify that, given this extension of our truth conditions and our
proposal for representing (1) and (2), we are now able to account for
how (1) and (2) may both be true, relative to one and the same context.
IV. An Analysis of de se Ascriptions of Belief
Let us now consider whether our approach can be employed to give
an account of (so-called) ascriptions of attitudes de se . By a "de se
belief ascription", we understand a sentence of the form of
( 1 ) a believes that a himself (herself, myself, etc.) is F.
(We assume that such sentences are but idiomatic variants of sentences
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of the form of
(2) a believes himself (herself, myself, etc.) to be F.
It has been claimed by a number of authors 7 that there are cases in
which a de se belief ascription of the form of (1) is false, but that
the corresponding de re belief ascription
(3) (3 x) (x=a and x believes that x is F)
is true. As we saw in 1 1 . V , such a claim is problematic, given the
traditional account of the semantics of belief ascriptions, since it
seems that a sentence of the form of (1) is used to ascribe a belief
to the referent of a in the very proposition which is expressed by a
sentence of the form of rx is F~\ when the referent of a is assigned
to x.
On the basis of the discussion in the preceding sections, one might
attempt to explain the truth conditions of de^ se^ belief ascriptions
as follows: For a sentence of the form of (1) to be true, it must be
the case, not simply that the denotatum of a believes what he would
express, were he to say *1 am F 7^ (where F£ expresses, in the denotatum
of a 1 s mouth, whatever £ expresses, relative to the context in which
(1) is taken). Rather, the denotatum must also accept a sentence with
the meaning of I am F. On this approach, pairs of sentences such as
(1) and (3) do not ascribe belief in distinct propositions; rather, (1)
indicates something about the way a proposition is believed ( viz .
,
about the meaning under which it is believed) which (3) does not.
Let us consider how our formal treatment of belief ascriptions
might be extended along the lines suggested in the above paragraph.
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Our first problem is a syntactic one-how shall we represent sentences
of the form of (1)? It will obviously not do to represent them using
sentences of the form of
(4) aB(Fa)
since such a sentence, on the view we are attempting to formalize, can
be true even if (1) is not. What we shall do is to introduce a term-
term functor * which will behave as a 1 reflexive-izer 1
,
being
read ra himself (or: herself, myself) 7
. We shall also reformulate our
formation rules, since we wish to restrict where terms involving
can appear. That such restrictions are necessary can be seen by re-
flecting on the following: If we do not restrict how *-terms can appear
in formulas, we will be forced to deal with formulas of the form of
(5) aB(Fe*)
.
Even given that something of the form of
(6) aB(Fa*)
is intended to correspond to (1), it is far from clear what to make of
something of the form of (5). Suppose 6 to be a demonstrative or
indexical. If we treat (5) as a cte re belief ascription, having truth
conditions along the lines of those suggested in IV. II, either we will
have to allow that the argument
a=6
aB(Fg*)
BB(FB*)
is valid (and, therefore, allow that a de se belief ascription can be
derived from a de re belief ascription, contra the view we are attempting
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to formalize) or we must impose complex (and ad hoc) restrictions on
substitution of identicals. But (5) is not a dese belief ascription
as we have characterized such; nor would it Qualify as such on most
v i ews
.
There seems, then, no appropriate interpretation for formulas of
the form of (5). Thus, we shall reformulate our formation rules to
restrict how and where *-terms can appear in formulas. Furthermore,
in order to avoid complications in the definition of cft[cf>], we shall
now suppose the definite description operator to be deleted from the
language RLD.
Our reformu 1 a ti on is as follows: (1) Terms . We now distinauish
between A-terms (which are exactly those expressions classified as
terms under the former definition of a term) and B-terms, where 6 is
a B-term iff, for some A-term a, 3 = ra*n . (Note that expressions
like "I**" are thus not terms.) (2) Formulas . We alter the clauses
for atomic formulas and for forming belief ascriptions. We now say that
where n
n
is a n-Dlace predicate and a-j
,
..., a
n
are A-terms,
n
n
a
-| (*2 ... is a formula; where a is an A-term, <j> a formula,
Qb(cJ)*)"
1
is a formula, where
<f>* is obtained from <j> by replacing zero or
more occurrences of a with ra*~7 . The rest of the definition of a
well -formed formula is as before. (We discuss below the question of what
syntactic restrictions on substitution of identicals in 'extensional
place 1 ( viz ., outside the scope of modal, temporal, and epistemological
operators) will yield semantically valid rules of inference.)
Our definition of a model remains as before; the truth definition
is changed in the following ways. (1) The definition of denotation is
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extended to B-terms so that if 3 = frl, then I 3 I = | a |
1
'ctfw | ctfw’
( ) We extend our definition of frame so that frames may be formed by
substituting on starred demonstratives and indexicals; (3) Let <p be an
expression such that, for some term a, ( 4,)
1
is well-formed. For any
B-term 3* we define the 3*-ascription class of <|>, relative to c, t, f,
and w (A ( , c, t, f, w)) as the set S of one-place properties such
that P e S iff, for some v e [/*
,
there is a
<j>(f ) frame that ascribes P
^
^cftw’
Native to c, t, and f; (4) Let $ be any closed sentence
of the language. We define the self-ascription class of <j>
, relative to
c (A*(<j>, c)) as the set S of one place properties such that S e P
exactly if, for some v e l/*, there is a y which is either a 4, (
1
) , a ${
1 *)
II* v v
or a 4%* v ) frame and y attributes P to relative to c and c
T ;
(5) The truth conditions for ascriptions of belief are now modified as
foil ows
:
(T2) cft[aB(<f>)]w iff
(3C)(3»)(c^-t 1 cj = l«l ctfw *c- -w
& y e N
c
,
& eft
[
4 ] = c'fcjW &
(S)(S e A(«j,, c, t, f) -* S e A(<j>, c')) &
(P)(P e Aa*4, c, t, f, w) -v P e A*4, c' ))).
At this point, an example may be helpful. Note that, in general,
(7) aB(F-ja)
(a an indexical or demonstrative) may be true, relative to ctf, at w,
while
( 8 ) a B( f| a*)
is not, even though cft[F^a] = cft[F^a*]. To see this, let
I «
I
c tfw
= C
A
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(with
C-J-
= t, c; = w); suppose that N
c
,
= {F^dthatf ft xJg’s) } and that
(7x)(i.|X
c '
c
jfc^ ~ C A*
"^ en (7) is true. However, since A
a
*(Fja*, c,
t, f, w) contains a property (V
p
l) not in A*(F]dthat( (
'J x)gJx) , c'),
(8) is false. Of course, the intent of our truth conditions is to
insure just such a result.
However, our truth conditions are problematic for at least two
reasons. A minor problem is this: It is not clear to what extent sub-
stitutions on the initial term in a statement of the form raB(<}>p pre-
serves truth. It is, of course, clear that some restrictions on such
restrictions must exist:
a=B
aB(F|a*)
gB(F ja*)
cannot qualify as a valid argument, for its 'conclusion' is not even
well-formed. One might suppose that the following restriction on
substitution of identicals would preserve truth:
(R) From ct=B
and 4>(ot)
infer 4>{a/B}, where <j){a/B) is the result of replacing
one or more occurrences of a in 4>(a) in extensional
place ( viz . , not within the scope of modal, temporal,
or epistemological operators) with b, provided that,
if y is a subformula of <j) of the form laB(Xp, then,
if the initial occurrence of a is replaced, all
occurrences of a* in X are replaced by b*.
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For simple cases, following this rule preserves truth: For example, it
leads us from sentences of the forms
a=8
aB ( F-J a*
)
to
b
b(f
i
6 *>
—an inference our semantics shows to be valid. However, consider,
where a and 8 are distinct demonstratives or indexicals
a=8
aB(
B
B(FBa*B*))
b
b(
b
b(fb b*b*))
This inference is not valid since ^,B(F-j 8*8*P will have frames which
f^B ( F-j a*8*) does not, and, therefore, the former will in general ascribe
properties which the latter does not. For similar reasons, a rule like
R, save that it requires substitution of 8 for a in X when 8 is sub-
stituted for the initial a in a subformula faB(Xp will not preserve truth.
A more serious problem with these truth conditions is this: Given
(T2)
,
whenever
(9) (3 x) (x=a & xB(f|x)
)
is true (relative to a context c), then relative to the context c' of
which the denotatum of a (relative to c) is the agent,
(10) IB(f]i)
is true. (To see this, it suffices to note that (i) the ascription
class of "F]l M
,
relative to c 1
,
must be a subset of the ascription
class of whatever sentence it is in N
c
,
which makes (9) true, and;
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(n) "F’l" has a null I*-ascription class.) Thus, given (T2), we must
allow that, for example, whenever we can truly say "There is an x such
that x is the tallest man and x believes that x is wise", the tallest
man can himself truly say "I believe that I am wise".
That this constitutes a problem for our truth conditions can be
made manifest as follows: It would seem that sentences of the forms
believe that I am F 1 and rl believe myself to be F*1 are but idiomatic
variants of one another. But sentences of the latter form are the
paradigmatic forms for ascribinq to oneself a belief de se. Thus, if
u can utter a sentence of either form truly, then he can truly ascribe
to himself a belief de se. But if u can do this, so can anyone else.
Thus, it would seem, whenever u can truly say something of the form of
believe that I am F 1
,
anyone else who can refer to u using a can
truly say *"a believes that a himself is F*. Thus, given the implication
which our truth conditions insure, it would appear that de se belief
ascriptions are, in general, implied by corresponding de re belief
ascriptions, contra the view we are attemptina to formalize.
It is, at this juncture, worth noting that other philosophers who
have written on belief de se^ and related topics accept the araument of
the above paragraph. Thus, for example, Lycan and Boer interpret
Castenada (as well as Perry, Lewis and Chisholm) as holding that
(11a) I believe that I am underpaid
"reports an attitude de se/', while sentences of the form of
(lib) I believe that N is underpaid. (
1
N
1 is to be
replaced by any singular term which denotes
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[some individual] but which contains no
occurrence of any form of 'I').
"[ascribe] an attitude de re or de dicto " ([WM], 427). Indeed, they
(apparently) see the view that no sentence of the form of (lib) implies
one of the form of (11a) as equivalent to (or, at least, a corollary of)
the view that sentences such as
(12a) John believes that he himself is in danger
are not implied by any sentences of the form of
(12b) John believes that T is in danqer. (T is to
be replaced by any singular term which denotes
John but which contains no reflexive element
such as 'he himself'
.
)
One reaction one might have is the following: One might say that
English sentences of the form of
(12) I believe that I am F
are semantically ambiguous between a de_ se^ and a (purely) cte rereading,
the former being symbolized by sentences of the form of
(10) IB(FI)
the latter symbolized by ones of the form of
(13) IB(FI*)
If one maintains this, one can rescue our formalization. It is
worth noting, however, that if one does not accept this view, maintaining
instead that sentences such as (12) are always used as de se ascriptions,
then one must give up the view that a de re belief ascription does not
imply its corresponding de se ascription.
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To see this, suppose that a sentence of the form
(3) (3 x) (x=a and x believes that x is F)
is true, relative to some context c. Let the 4) be some definite
description (not containing explicit indexicals or demonstratives)
which is such that the denotatum of a relative to c (call her u) can use
the 4> to denote herself. Then u can truly say
(14) The $ believes that I am F'
(where F_^ expresses, relative to u's context, whatever F expresses
relative to c). For (14) is simply a de re ascription
,
true just in
case the denotatum of the $— namely u— believes what u expresses, when
she says H am F'~*. But if u can truly utter (14), then she can truly
utter
(15) I believe that I am F'
(for (15) is implied by (14) and
r
i = the p, and the latter is true,
relative to u's context). Thus, if one insists that sentences such as
(15) always ascribe attitudes cte s£, one must reject the view that de re
ascriptions do not imply de se ascriptions.
Whether the extension of our semantics is acceptable then, seems
to depend upon whether sentences of the form of (15) inevitably report
de se belief ascriptions. If they do not, but are rather ambiguous,
as suggested above, then our extension is acceptable. If, however, they
are not ambiguous, then not only is it the case that the extension is
unacceptable (since it allows r^aB(Fa*)'1 and = a & I B (
F
iT® both to
be true relative to a context) but an extension of our semantics is
unnecessary, since, it would seem, cte ^e ascriptions say no more nor less
than their corresponding de re ascriptions.
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V. Proper Names
We close with some remarks on the extension of our treatment of
attributions of belief to languages containing terms which represent
proper names.
If we accept the view that proper names are directly referential,
we should be willing to extend principle (B) of Chapter II to allow
that substitution of co-referential demonstratives, indexicals, or
proper names (in normal contexts) preserves propositional identity.
Such an extension of (B), of course, poses problems similar to those
discussed in Chapter II. For example, Costello's uses of 'Tony Curtis'
and 'Bernie Schwartz' may be co-referential (unbeknowst to Costello).
In such a case, we may be inclined to allow that
(1) Costello believes that Tony Curtis is Tony Curtis,
is true, but will resist the claim that
(2) Costello believes that Bernie Schwartz is Tony Curtis,
given that Costello insists that Bernie Schwartz is the man who grew up
down the block from him, and isn't in the least related, much less
identical with, Curtis.
If our general approach can be adapted to such cases, then we must
be able to hold that co-referential proper names may have distinct
meanings. For the motivation of our approach is that an attribution
of belief, r*B<p fails to be true, when the denotatum of a believes
the proposition expressed by <j>, only if the attribution implies that
the believer makes some ascription he does not in fact make. What
ascriptions a person makes, we have suggested, depends upon what meanings
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he accepts. If, then, co-referential proper names have the same meaning,
then substituting them preserves not only propositional identity but
meaning. Thus, it would seem, we could not explain the divergence in
truth value between (1) and (2) by claiming that (1) could be true in
virtue of Costello's accepting the meaning of "Tony Curtis is Tony Curtis",
while (2) is false, because Costello fails to accept the meaning of
"Bernie Schwartz is Tony Curtis". Neither, it seems, could we claim
that (2) implies some ascription that (1) does not imply.
Now, it is plausible to suppose that names which are co-referential
in a speaker's idiolect often do have different meanings. For it is
plausible to suppose that if two terms have the same meaning, then a
speaker who knows the meaning of both expressions will know that they
have the same meaning. It is, furthermore, plausible to think speakers
who do not recognize co-referential proper names as co-referential
nevertheless know the meanings of those names. Thus, it would seem
plausible to think that co-referential proper names can have distinct
meanings
.
Thus, we differ with Kaplan, who holds that co-referential proper
names have the same meaning. It is difficult to see why Kaplan holds
this view. Kaplan's one discussion of the matter is contained in
g
section XXII of [D] . There, Kaplan takes a word to be a pair <e,m>,
whose members are, respectively, an expression and a meaning. Two
words w and w' are homonyms, on this view just in case w = <e,m> and
w' = <e,m'>. Kaplan argues
...assuming the causal chain theory of reference...
proper names are not indexicals. The contextual
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feature which consists of the causal history
of a particular proper name expression seems
more naturally to be regarded as determining
what word was used than as fixing the content
of a single context sensitive word. Although
it is true that two utterances of 'Aristotle'
in different contexts may have different con-
tents, I am inclined to attribute this differ-
ence to the fact that distinct homonymous words
were uttered rather than to a context sensitivity
in the character of a single word 'Aristotle'.
Unlike indexicals like 'I', proper names really
are ambiguous
.
'
... Each such word is directly
referenti al
. . . and it also has a fixed character
[its character is a constant function on
contexts]
... [Proper names] are not context
sensitive. [[D], 97-98).
These considerations constitute a red herring. While it is quite
plausible to suppose that uses of 'Aristotle' which are not co-referential
constitute distinct words ( viz . , one is <'Aristotle'
,
m>, the other
<
' Ari stotl e
' ,
m'>, m ^ m'), it does not follow from this my use of
'Aristotle' is not context sensitive, nor does it follow that Plato's
use of the Greek name of Aristotle and my use of 'Aristotle' have the
same meaning. Thus, so far as I can see, Kaplan has no cogent defense
of the claim that all co-referential proper names have the same meaning.
But to make plausible the claim that co-referential proper names
can have different meanings is not to explain what such meanings are,
or when two names have the same meaning. It is far from clear how such
an explanation is to be given. Fortunately, giving such an explanation
is not part of the task we have set ourselves. We have, however, made
plausible the claim that our approach to the semantics of belief
attribution can be extended to a treatment of attributions of belief
involving proper names. With this modest accomplishment, we shall hold
ourselves content.
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Notes
]
See [D], [FD], [CEI], and [BA].
2
Kaplan, for example, suggests that an attribution ra believes
that is true, relative to c, if and only if the denotatum of a,
relative to c accepts, relative to his context c', a character whose
value in c* is the value of y
s_
in c: See [D], p. 86. Such truth
conditions will not resolve the problems raised in II. IV and II.V.
3
The following argument derives from, and is more fully developed
in, the work of John Perry. See, especially, his [FD] and [CEI].
4
More precisely, to know the meaning of (2) is, amonq other thinqs,
to know that when (2) is used in such a way that both occurrences of
'you' therein are co-referential, it is true in a context only if some-
thing has the property of being in New York and not in New York. On
our view, when (2) is used in this way, its correct formal representation
replaces both occurrences of 'you' with the same term.
5
Note that we are not extending the syntactic base of RLD here:
The members of l/* are not new variables for the language.
^After completing this work, it was brought to my attention that
Bigelow in [BS] takes "believes" to operate primarily on meanings. Our
treatment differs notably from Bigelow's; indeed, it is not clear that
on Bigelow's treatment sentences of the forms of
(i) 3 X 3[y (x=y & aB(Fx & —» Fy)
)
and
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(ii ) 3x(aB(Fx & *nFx))
can differ in truth value. (It is not altogether clear how Bigelow's
account is to be applied to sentences such as (i) and (ii) since Bigelow
never precisely specifies the formal language he is working with, nor
how sentences with the complexity of (i) are to be represented therein.)
That (i) and (ii) will always have the same truth value seems, nonethe-
less, to be a consequence of how Bigelow assigns meanings to open sentences.
Open sentences receive a meaning, relative to an assignment v to variables;
the meanings of variables x and y, under an assignment v are identical
whenever v(x) = v(y). Hence, the meanings of "Fx & -iFy" which make (i)
true will, it seems, be precisely those which are meaninqs of "Fx & ~»Fx"
and which make (ii) true.
7
We follow Kaplan in holding that it is sentence types which are
the bearers of analyticity. See his discussion in the "Epistemological
Remarks" of [D].
g
Alternative views of self-ascription are discussed in Chisholm's
[TFP] and Lewis' [BDS]
.
q
In fairness to Kaplan, we should note that the passage discussed
here comes from a section that Kaplan characterizes as 'hastily written'.
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